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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A common responsibility of the director of an organization which 
has adventure education as a main focus, is the coordination of all safety 
practices within the organization. This function is logical for the 
director's position is at the interface between the operational side of the 
organization and the policy-making side of the organization; see Figure 1 
below. 
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Figure 1: Director's role in an adventure education organization. 
(Hale, 1984 p.7). 
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It is fairly typical of outdoor education centers worldwide that the 
director is appointed to this administrative position after advancement 
through the ranks of the operational side of the industry. The assumption 
is that the person's experience and instructional qualifications lead to 
good judgement, and this in turn will translate to skillful personnel and 
safety management abilities. One weakness with such an assumption is 
that the person generally has had no formal training in safety 
management, or in administration for that matter. This places the 
director in charge of the safety of an entire organization without 
necessarily having the base of understanding to know how to go about 
meeting the responsibility. The author suspects many outdoor education 
directors are in this situation. This study came about through a real need 
experienced by the author as the director of an outdoor education center. 
The educational models used in the adventure setting depend on the 
use of risk (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Ewert & Hollenhorst, 1989a; Priest 
& Baillie, 1987), and thus our very business necessitates that some degree 
of risk be involved. 
"It is not possible to obtain the benefits of outdoor education 
(adventuring) without putting staff and students at risk" 
(Horwood, 1987, p.17). 
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"Few of us ... in adventure programs harbor any doubt that the 
outcomes greatly outweigh the risks involved" (Meyer, 1979 p.1 0). 
" ... risk is essential ... hazardous environments in which the 
program operates are necessary to its educational goal" (James, 
1980 p.20). 
Safety is a particularly perplexing issue in adventure education. On 
the one hand we need to use appropriate risk, and on the other we have " .. 
. the ultimate goal of providing high quality, safe experiential activities 
for the public . . ." (Ewert, 1988c, p.3). The fundamental difference 
between those involved in adventure recreation activities on their own 
and the responsibilities that outdoor educators have to those in their care 
while part of an adventure education experience is; 
" . . . The use of the adventure condition to bring about purposeful 
educational outcomes . . . (which) . . . results in adventure education 
involving lower levels of uncertainty and risk" (Hollenhorst, 1987, 
p.7). 
In other words people sign up, or are signed up, for adventure programs to 
receive the challenge and rewards the adventure experience has to offer, 
but do not expect to get injured or die. 
" . . . Ironic is the fact that while participants in adventure 
programs want a sense of excitement and danger, they have no 
intention of being injured" (Ewert, 1984b, p.27). 
This duality of safety and risk is the paradox that all adventure educators 
are working in. 
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For the administrator it poses a further dilemma by having 
responsibility for establishing the fine balance between the two. If one 
errs too far on the side of risk, the organization can lose business and 
possibly incur other financial costs through litigation with the occurrence 
of unacceptable injuries. 
"Because of potential danger and possible accidents many public 
agencies and schools are questioning the validity of these activities 
as regular parts of their program" (Ongena, 1981 p.13). 
" . . . Public opinion quickly turns against programs that experience 
even an occasional loss of life" (Mobley, 1981 p.37). 
"The reality of this paradox suggests unpleasant metaphorical 
parallels: the death or maiming of an individual student can mean the 
death or maiming of the school. The death or maiming of several 
students can mean the death or maiming of the adventure education 
movement" (Mobley, 1981 p.45). 
If, in contrast, one errs too far on the side of safety, then the very 
medium of the educational tool - adventure - could be lost. This would 
result in no value for the participants and a loss of business as clients 
looked elsewhere to have their needs met. 
"In making a program as safe as possible, such an organization must 
be careful not to capitulate to the social forces it is trying to resist 
and reform. Otherwise it too will become jaded by the malaise, and 
in time, it too will have lost heart and forgotten how to teach the 
lessons it was created to teach" (James, 1980 p.23). 
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" ... as a result the trend in many recreational and school programs 
is to make their activities so safe for the participants that much of 
the risk, excitement and value is eliminated" (Ongena, 1981 p.13). 
" To totally eliminate the critical risk contact points may build an 
enviable safety record but undermine the 'raison d'etre' of a 
program" (Ewert, 1984b, p.32). 
This dilemma is much talked about 
" . . . How to eliminate unreasonable risks to participants without 
reducing levels of excitement, challenge, and stress; essential 
components of the adventure experience" (Bruner, 1986 p.4). 
However while many might see this as an obstacle, others see it as an 
opportunity. 
"The dilemma of safety versus risk is the critical state-of-the-art 
issue in the experiential education movement . . . This reality 
provides one of the strongest progressive forces in adventure 
education" (Mobley, 1981 p.38). 
" The paradox . . . is also a goal for organizations to build up their 
support systems for staff working in the field . . . The paradox of 
safety and risk has been a progressive force" (James, 1980 p.21). 
The prime goal then is achieving the fine balance necessary to 
provide an appropriate level of challenge without compromising the 
broader definition of safety that encompasses safety of student, staff and 
organizational continuity. Figure 2 illustrates this balance. 
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Figure 2: The risk vs safety meter for adventure programs. 
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Figure 2 shows that the goal of adventure education programs is non-
destructive challenge. To achieve this requires risk, and to balance the 
risk the organization needs to employ suitable safety controls. The higher 
the risk levels undertaken by the organization, the greater the safety 
controls required. As discussed previously, if the meter is imbalanced, 
the needle will swing one way or another, leading to overcontrolled 
boredom as an outcome on the one hand, or undercontrolled recklessness 
on the other. As shown in figure 2, the fulcrum of the balance is the 
implementation of the actual program. No matter what the planned levels 
of risk are, or what the safety controls are that are employed by the 
organization, the balance between the two can be completely shifted by 
inappropriate judgement or supervision by the instructor in the field. If 
any imbalance exists, the participants, staff or organization will pay the 
penalty in the short or long term. 
There is also the question of the type of risk we are talking about. 
Adventure educators talk about perceived risk and real risk; many 
advocating the use of activities which students perceive as having high 
risk, but that actually have low real risk, in order to achieve educational 
objectives (Rawson, 1991 ). An example of this is a high ropes course 
element. The participant, unused to such experiences, perceives a high 
degree of risk. The instructional staff on the other hand are 
knowledgeable about safety practices and perceive a low level of risk. 
Who is right and how these perceptions relate to real risk is explained in 
relation to figure 3. This is an expanded version of figure 2, further 
developed to incorporate the elements of risk. 
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On the right side of the balance is the absolute rjsk. The absolute 
risk can be thought of as the "uppermost limits of risk inherent in any 
situation" (Priest & Baillie, 1987 p. 18). In other words the worst 
possible losses that could be incurred in an activity if all safety controls 
were removed. For a high ropes course element the absolute risk is large, 
as there is the potential to fall and suffer great damage should something 
go wrong. However, there are safety controls implemented, and the rW 
risk that exists at any time is the actual balance that exists between the 
interaction of absolute risk, safety controls and instructor judgement. 
This value can never be known for sure; there is always some uncertainty 
remaining. 
Perceived risk can be thought of as an individuals mental image of 
how the risk safety meter is balanced at any point in time. For the high 
ropes course example students are not familiar with the safety controls 
in place, thus have a perception of the real risk as being very high. 
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Figure 3: The risk versus safety meter. showing types of risk 
Instructors on the other hand, with increased knowledge and experience, 
have a perception that the real risk is very low. Generally, the students 
perception is incorrect, and the instructors perception is more astute; 
after all that is why they are being employed. The danger is when the 
instructor's perception of the risk is very different from the real risk 
that exists. 
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As can be seen from this discussion, the ability to have an accurate 
perception of the real risk levels depends on having all the necessary 
information available; and that the information is correct. The students 
perception of the real risk is generally high because they lack information 
of the safety controls and they lack trust in the controls. Instructors' 
perceptions of the real risk should be more astute as they have the skills, 
experience, and knowledge to make an accurate assessment. However, 
over time instructors can be desensitized to certain commonly used risk 
situations and no longer seek the information they should, leading to an 
inadequate amount of knowledge to accurately perceive the real risk. Any 
time there is a misperception it can be dangerous. 
The question also arises as to how much real risk is required. The 
answer, as shown in figure 3, is a suitable amount to achieve educational 
goals in a nondestructive way. For novices, whose perception of the risk 
1 1 
is higher, real risk can be reduced: ropes courses, abseiling/rappeling, flat 
water kayaking, etc. are good examples of activities that have lower real 
risk. For adults progressing along a course of skill development, the level 
of real risk must be higher, and this must be managed in different ways. 
This concept of various risk levels being appropriate for different types 
of participants is echoed by Ewert in his model of risk recreation 
participation shown in figure 4 (Ewert & Hollenhorst, 1989a p.136). 
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Figure 4: Adventure recreation: a revised conceptual model 
(Ewert, 1989, p. 136) 
There needs to be a practical way for outdoor center directors to 
evaluate how successfully their efforts are at providing an appropriate 
level of real risk in all their activities; how well balanced the meter is. 
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It is relatively easy to measure if the scale is tipping too far onto the 
safety side, leading to boredom in the participants; outdoor professionals 
have several readily available tools: for example they can monitor program 
enrolment levels, or get feedback from students and staff. The questions 
for focus are: 
a) How can one determine if the scale is tipping too far to the risk side? 
b) How can one know if all the necessary safety processes are in place? 
c) How can one know if the safety practices are up to contemporary 
standards? 
d) How can one know which of these safety practices need more attention 
and which systems are strong? 
e) How can one be sure that the instructors implementing the program are 
exhibiting sound judgement? 
The unacceptable method of finding out the answers to these 
questions is the early morning phone call that notifies of an accident or 
fatality, and wakes up the organization to a problem that exists within it. 
What is needed is a preemptive diagnostic tool. 
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It should be remembered that while such a tool will act to provide 
the organization with better information, and therefore a better 
assessment of real risk levels operating within that organization's 
programs, such a tool will never remove all uncertainty surrounding the 
potential for losses. The information is always changing and can never be 
known completely by everyone at all times. For this reason there will 
still be losses, as there are in the process of everyday life. However, it is 
the responsibility of professional adventure educators to reduce this level 
of uncertainty as much as possible, by using all ways that are available. A 
diagnostic preemptive tool would be a powerful aid in this task. 
Auditing as a diagnostic preemptive tool. 
Financial systems are checked for correctness and completeness by 
having an audit done. An audit is, " . . . an examination of all records, 
accounts or procedures carried out by a person trained in such 
examinations" (Clark & Gottfried, 1957 p. 23 - 24). Surely then outdoor 
centers should carry out a safety audit. 
The key to this solution however is in finding an 'examination' to 
carry out and a person trained in that examination to make it valid. Using 
the Outdoor Pursuits Center of New Zealand (OPCNZ) as a model, the author 
will develop a case study of this problem. 
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The Outdoor Pursuits Center of New Zealand has built into its safety 
policies a biennial external audit. An outside expert( s) is invited to carry 
out this audit. In 1991 the director invited an expert in outdoor education, 
Mr C. Knol of the Hillary Commission for Sports and Leisure to audit the 
center safety systems and their implementation to the field. Knol's 
response was astute: "What do you want audited and in relation to what?" 
The director's own question had been thrown back at him. 
Progress was made however when Knol obtained a copy of an 
industrial safety audit. The director, his safety officer and Knol together 
changed this to make it applicable to the outdoor situation. The result 
when applied to the outdoor center showed deficiencies in some safety 
systems while reinforcing the use of others (Knol, Davidson, & Holding, 
1991 ). 
Statement of the Problem: 
The questions that arose are; If a thorough research was done of 
industrial auditing systems, safety management theory, adventure 
education review systems and legal principles relating to adventure 
education, could a generic safety audit be generated? Could this be 
written so that it could apply to any outdoor center? Could it be written 
in such a way that it would allow the staff at that center to identify 
needs in safety management and guide them towards developing a better 
safety plan? 
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The concept of using the knowledge contained within these other 
industries makes sense because the safety management industry, the legal 
profession, and insurance companies have been dealing with the same 
issues, applied to much larger businesses, for decades. 
Research Question: 
Is it possible to generate a generic safety audit based on 
techniques used in other industry? Can this audit be applied to any 
outdoor center allowing its staff to identify needs in safety management 
and guide progress towards a better safety plan? 
Importance gt_the Question: 
Adventure educators stand precariously balanced, trying to find the 
right balance between safety and risk. The cost of an incorrect decision 
could be the life of a participant, or the loss of the organization, in the 
extreme. There are other costs even with smaller injuries. Mobley lists 
many costs of accidents under headings of personnel, equipment and 
material, corrective actions, legal and insurance fees, prestige, 
confidence and morale (Mobley, 1981 p.66 - 67). The implementation of a 
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thorough safety auditing system could go a long way to identifying the 
risks, and putting into place preventative actions before they happen. 
This question is of growing importance considering the growth of 
the recreational and adventure education industries (Ewert & Hollenhorst, 
1990; Mobley, 1981 ) , and lack of safety management skills which the 
author believes exists within the administrations of those industries. 
As Ewert stated in 1984, 
"Perhaps the time is right for all professional organizations 
concerned with adventure activities to support the concept of risk 
management in society and our educational system" (Ewert, 1984b 
p.32). 
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Definitions gLTerms: 
A. Nom in a I De f i n it i o n s : 
The following are definitions of terms pertinent to this study. Their 
definitions are based upon the work of recognized experts in the fields of 
adventure education and safety management. 
Accident: An undesired event which results in injury, damage or loss. 
(Kauffman, 1989) 
Near Miss: An undesired event that, under slightly different 
circumstances could have resulted in personal harm, property 
damage, or loss. (3M, 1991) 
Risk: The potential to lose something of value. (Priest & Baillie, 1987) 
Absolute risk I competence: Uppermost limits of risk inherent in a 
situation and the greatest competence the individual could possibly 
muster in response.(Priest & Baillie, 1987) 
Perceived risk I competence: Estimates by the participants involved 
in the adventure experience of their limits.(Priest & Baillie, 1987) 
Real risk I competence: The amounts of risk and competence which 
actually occur at a given moment in time. They arise from the 
interaction of individual and setting as a manifestation of absolute 
values.(Priest & Baillie, 1987) 
Danger: Threat of injury or property damage. A popular expression 
covering the subjective perception of hazard or risk. (3M, 1991) 
or, two components of danger are: 
Peril: Is the source of the loss. 
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Hazard: Is a condition that increases the likelihood of loss. Can be 
either physical I environmental or human. (Mobley, 1981) 
Safety: Those collective procedures utilized to keep risks and losses 
within an acceptable range. (Priest & Dixon, 1990) 
or, Freedom from danger, risk or injury. (1985, American Heritage 
Dictionary) 
Adventure: Is an experience where the outcome is uncertain. 
Uncertainty is present because information important to resolving 
the uncertainty may be missing, vague or unknown. (Priest & Dixon, 
1990) 
Challenge: Is present when personal competence is engaged as a means 
to resolve the uncertainty. (Priest & Dixon, 1990) 
Safety Audit: It is an in-depth analysis of the facilities, the 
management and employee attitudes towards safety, the managerial 
effectiveness in maintaining safety and the quality of the safety 
planning as well as the operations conformity with safety 
19 
regulations. (Grimaldi & Simonds, 1984) 
Loss Control: Describes a program designed to minimize accident-based 
financial losses. (3M, 1991) 
Risk Management: The professional assessment of all loss potentials in 
an organizations structure and operations. leading to the 
establishment and the administration of a comprehensive loss 
control program. (3M, 1991) 
Safety Management: The planning, organizing, directing, and 
controlling of those activities necessary to achieve an organization 
loss prevention and loss control objectives. (3M, 1991) 
B. Operational Definitions. 
The following terms are defined as follows for the purpose of this 
paper: 
Auditor: An expert in the professional field who is invited to audit an 
organization. 
Professional Assessment Audit: The auditors are given little or no 
guidance on what areas to look at and the content of the audit is left 
to their discretion. 
Written Protocol Audit: The auditors are given a written list of 
guidelines, under category headings, by which to follow to complete 
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the audit. These guidelines or protocols are generally in the form of 
open-ended questions, requiring a subjective judgement from the 
auditors. 
Checklist Audit: The auditors are provided with a set list of criteria 
that they must check as having been met or not met, as is 
encountered by the auditors. 
Graded Checklist Audit: The auditors are provided with a checklist of 
questions and must choose from a predetermined set of responses. 
Each response is allotted a set number of points depending on the 
completeness of the response to the question asked. Each question 
has the potential to contribute the same number of points to the 
audit total. The auditor adds the cumulative total and can calculate 
an average response to summarize the audit. 
Graded Checklist With Weighting: The auditor is provided with a 
graded checklist audit where the question responses have been 
assigned different values depending on the importance of that topic 
to the writer of the audit. The audit is summarized by a rating 
calculated for that category of question so that various categories 
of safety management can be compared. 
Functional Safety: A traditional approach to safety where programs 
are run until problems(accidents) occur. The accidents are 
investigated for the function that failed, and corrected. 
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Systems Safety: A preemptive approach to safety where a series of 
analytical tools are used to identify all risks associated with a 
proposed system, throughout all phases of its life cycle, before the 
system is put into operation. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction: 
The literature on the management of risk is extensive. The possible 
danger with any review is heading off on worthwhile tangents, yet never 
getting to the heart of the research question. For example it would be 
very easy here to explore the field of safety management, delving into the 
current thinking of why certain issues are important, or into accident 
causation theories in adventure education. However the focus with this 
research are primarily the what and how questions. 
This review will be limited to present what the various authors 
within the safety management industry, and adventure education industry, 
feel is important to a comprehensive safety management plan, how these 
subjects might best be audited, and then draw comparisons to conclude: 
a) whether a generic safety audit can be constructed on this combined 
knowledge that will be applicable to the adventure education field, and 
b) an appropriate form for such an audit.1 
1 For a review of literature explaining w1ut certain categories were included in the audit, refer 
to Chapter II of the audit manual in Appendix A of this study; Theoretical Basis for the Audit. 
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Industrial Safety Man age men t: 
There have been major changes within the safety industry since it's 
beginnings early this century. These changes are documented in detail in 
many books and articles (Heath, 1986; Petersen, 1988; Roland & Moriarty, 
1983). To gain an understanding of contemporary thought, and how 
traditional models fit into the evolution, a brief synopsis of this changing 
field follows. 
Throughout the history of mankind the concept of safety has been an 
ever-present concern in life. As depicted by Maslow's heirarchy of human 
needs in Figure 5, safety or self-preservation is one of humankind's 
primary needs. However the need for physical safety becomes a secondary 
consideration when the more basic physiological needs exist: the 
requirements for food and shelter. The situation many found themselves 
faced with during the industrial revolution in the 1800s was having to 
work in hazardous environments in order to get the basic food and shelter 
necessary to sustain life. At the end of the 19th century a large 
percentage of the work force were still working in environments that 
were hazardous in order to scrape out an existence. 
Self realization 
Love and 
belonging needs 
Safety 
needs 
Physiological 
needs 
Self actualization 
DEFICIT 
MOTIVATION 
Figure 5: The hierarchy of needs to self-actualization. (Maslow, 1970) 
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Industry also is concerned with survival; economic survival. At this 
period there was no motivation for industry to be concerned with worker 
safety and health other than moral considerations. Those who were 
injured were considered careless, and occupational disease was not a 
recognized field of study. There was no economic impact on industry if 
workers were injured or unhealthy as there was a large labor force and no 
penalties for contributing to illness or death. This was about to change. 
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In the early 1900's the number of occupational deaths and injuries 
was made public in the U.S. by virtue of the Russel Sage Foundation report. 
This shocked the nation. Compensation laws were passed and National 
safety organizations formed. 
Suddenly there became an economic incentive for industry to be 
concerned with worker health and safety. The industrial safety age was 
born. Companies appointed safety officers and safety departments became 
an integral part of most industry with the role of reducing financial loss 
due to injury and occupational health problems. 
"The earliest approach to safety was to examine the system during 
its operational life and correct what were deemed to be 
unacceptable hazards . . . This concept started with the detailed 
investigation of accidents . . . to determine cause. Having 
determined cause, corrective action could be initiated and the 
system would supposedly have an improved state of safety for the 
remainder of its service life" (Roland & Moriarty, 1983 p.183). 
For the purposes of this paper, the traditional 'fly - fix - fly' approach to 
safety will be termed functional safety; as it operates by observing the 
function of a program in failure mode. This approach is represented in 
figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Functional safety: the Fly-Fix-Fly approach. From Roland, 1983, p.1o 
The 1940's saw management's role in the safety effort identified. 
This is born out by a quote from Roland P. Blake, then principar safety 
engineer for the Bureau of Labor Standards in 1941, 
"If really good practice in the elimination of preventable tnJunes is 
to be achieved and held in any establishment, top management must 
apply a good share of its attention to the task, just as it does to any 
other undertaking of vital importance . . . " (Heath, 1986 p.18). 
27 
Rather than simply delegating safety to a department within the industry 
it was now recognized that safety was the responsibility of all levels 
within an organization, and the drive for safety needed to be seen to be 
coming from the very top. 
Driven by the insurance industry in the 1960's, the principle of .LQn 
control was developed. Loss control departments were concerned with the 
financial risk management of the company. These risks were not only 
health and safety risks, but other economic risk situations the company 
might face. Thus safety management became a component part of the 
larger concept of risk management, which was controlled by the loss 
control department through a loss control plan. 
The loss control departments began to look for ways that they could 
analyze an industry for sources of potential loss and once identified, take 
steps to reduce or eliminate the hazard, or reduce the extent of any loss 
should an incident occur. As Heinrich's research had suggested, this led 
increasingly to dealing with people issues as preventative strategies. 
Issues of training, workload, abilities, ergonomics, etc. were addressed 
rather than simply inspecting for unsafe conditions. These preventative 
measures were more expensive to implement in the short term, but over a 
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period of time were found to be a wise investment. 
Another philosophy developed within the broad concept of loss 
control; quality control. Here the emphasis is placed on quality assurance 
and hence on " . . . the reduction, elimination and, most importantly 
prevention of quality deficiencies ... " (S.A.N.Z., 1987, Part 2 p.5)2. This 
was in contrast to the traditional view held by loss control people where 
the emphasis was on reducing the impact of a loss should it occur. Quality 
control as a philosophy has changed and evolved to a much wider, all-
embracing concept known as guality systems. Originally quality control 
was an inspection function, where production items were inspected for 
quality against standards. This developed to quality assurance, where 
quality was designed into products, and then to strategic quality 
management, or a quality systems approach, where quality is seen as a 
management function. This revolution is impacting business throughout 
the world and is best evidenced by the international ISO 9000 standards3 
required by many countries to assure quality. 
This quality revolution had effects throughout all aspects of 
industry including the structure of companies. Quality management 
2 Standards Association of New Zealand. 
3 International Standards Organization. 
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models were replacing traditional hierarchical management models. The 
aim of quality management being the most efficient and economic use of 
resources. This new management approach uses participative methods 
involving all people in a company, to make the best use of the potential 
human resource that the company possesses. 
Paralleling these developments were major advances in technology, 
producing innovations such as nuclear weapons, nuclear power stations, 
space missions, and large capacity airliners, to name a few. Suddenly the 
safety management industry was faced with products where the 
traditional functional safety approach was inappropriate. With these 
products it was inappropriate to have any failure as the results would be 
catastrophic. A new approach was developed especially for these types of 
conditions known as systems safety. This involves a series of analytical 
tools being used to identify all risks associated with a proposed system, 
throughout all phases of its life cycle (See Figure 7). 
Termination 
Deployment 
Concept 
Life 
Cycle of 
a 
System 
Production 
Figure 7: The Life Cycle of a System. 
Definition 
Development 
Detection, elimination and control of hazards is accomplished 
through the use of proved techniques and well-established safety 
practices. If the hazards cannot be reduced to an acceptable level at 
planning stage, the project is not continued. 
The strength to the systems safety approach is its thorough 
considerations of all risks before production, including interaction 
between all components of the system. 
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" . . . System safety is concerned with controlling safety while 
taking other factors into consideration. For example it is frequently 
necessary to quantify variations in the safety level of a system as a 
function of defects in design, material and workmanship, human 
errors of omission and commission, and interfaces of the system 
with the environment and other equipment over the life of the 
system" (Roland & Moriarty, 1983 p.14). 
While system safety was designed for large industries of complex 
nature, manufacturing products where failure would mean a large 
catastrophe, the tools developed such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
(P.H.A.), Fault Tree Analysis (F.T.A.), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(F.M.E.A.), etc. are finding increasing application to smaller industries. 
Certainly the concepts of thorough analysis of all possible hazards, and 
the ability to control them, before implementation is the natural 
extension of loss control techniques. The power systems safety brings is 
forcing a close look at the interaction between all components in the 
system, including the important human error considerations. 
A contemporary approach to an organized safety effort can therefore 
be considered as in Figure 8 . 
QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT 
LOSS CONTROL 
/ 
SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT 
Quality Safety 
Systems 
Systems Safety 
Financial 
risks not 
related to 
safety of 
individual 
workers 
Figure 8: Contemporary Safety Approaches 1992. 
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Systems 
Approach 
Other Managemen 
Concerns 
The most recent major change in safety legislation, causing 
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increased effort by industry, is the Right-to-Know legislation. This was 
precipitated by OSHA in late 1983 with the promulgation of the Hazard 
Communication Standard (29CFR 191 0.1200). This standard requires that 
manufacturers and importers label their containers for supplying and 
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provide a material safety data sheet for all hazardous chemicals. Further 
it makes employers responsible for maintaining communication programs, 
to ensure their employees are aware of all the hazards in the workplace. 
This is in response to the vast and everchanging number of chemicals and 
substances workers may be exposed to in their daily work. They can no 
longer be personally expected to keep track of, and be cognizant of, all the 
dangers they can be exposed to (Asfahl, 1990). 
As can be seen by this brief synopsis of the history of safety 
management, the emphasis has been constantly shifting from the employee 
being responsible for their safety in the workplace, to a management duty. 
This is parallelled by development in safety technology to preemptive 
forms, and management techniques to quality, participative approaches. 
Industrial Safety Audits: 
A large number of audits exist for use within various industrial 
settings. In the following section a representative sample of these will 
be reviewed, classified according to their structure, the differences 
discussed in terms of advantages and disadvantages. 
In discussing the approach of the company Allied Signals to health 
and safety auditing, Moretz differentiates between three styles of audit 
(Moretz, 1989). The styles identified are: Professional assessment, 
written protocol and checklist auditing. Taking Moretz's terminology as 
broad classifications for audits, these will be built on as other audits 
studied become more sophisticated. 
For the purpose of this paper the following definitions will apply: 
Auditor: An expert in the professional field who is invited to carry out 
the audit of an organization. 
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Professional Assessment Audit: Auditors are given little or no guidance 
on what areas to look at and the content of the audit is left to their 
discretion. 
Written Protocol Audit: The auditors are given a written list of 
guidelines, under category headings, by which to follow to complete the 
audit. These guidelines or protocols are generally in the form of open-
ended questions, requiring a subjective judgement from the auditors. 
Checklist Audit: Here the auditors are provided with a set list of criteria 
that they must check as having been met or not met, as is encountered by 
the auditors. 
Note that while the first two audit types are qualitative, the 
checklist type of audit introduces a quantitative format for the first time. 
With a checklist a comparison can be made between the number of 
conditions 'met' with the number 'not met'. 
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Moretz describes the disadvantage of the professional assessment 
audit as being that the professional may get diverted away from important 
matters, focussing on something that in his or her view has a higher 
priority. In the end the auditor doesn't cover the entire scope of the 
program. He goes on to say that in the other methods the audit team is 
obliged to follow the protocol and cover every step, even if it looks OK on 
the surface. Allied Signals uses the written protocol audit system, but 
keeps its protocols broad-based on purpose because of the companies 
diversified manufacturing operations. 
A) Compliance with regulations: 
Almost all employers in the U.S.A. are under the jurisdiction of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970. This requires every 
employer to provide a work environment that is free from recognized 
hazards that cause or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm. 
OSHA publishes standards which consist of rules for avoiding hazards 
which have been shown to be harmful to personal safety and health. 
Checking or auditing for compliance can be done in several ways: The 
National Safety Council (N.S.C.) offer a self-evaluation form, OSHA has 
local compliance officers who will physically check premises, and there 
are also published compliance checklists e.g. The OSHA Compliance Manual 
(Petersen, 1980), and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) Health and Safety Guides (NIOSH, 1975). 
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Additionally, many industries must comply with environmental 
standards established by the E.P .A. Again these are industry specific and 
many publications are available explaining how to carry out an 
environmental audit (Cockburn, Boivin, & Gosselin, 1991; Tusa, 1990). 
The point to gain from this discussion is that industry will have 
certain compliance requirements that should be part of the agenda of any 
audit. These exact requirements will vary from state to state and 
certainly country to country. 
B) Professional assessment audits: 
There is little reference to this form of auditing in industrial 
safety literature. The limitations are so extreme, as has already been 
pointed out, that this is not considered an appropriate tool. 
C) Written protocol audit: 
A "comprehensive safety audit" is described by Boley (1977). This 
audit is composed of 71 broad-based questions which Boley states should 
be applied to each operational area of an industry by a safety specialist. 
The audit is not divided into sections but inspection of the audit reveals 
the following categories of questions: 
Question No. 
1 - 4 
5- 12 
13 - 21 
22- 24 
25- 30 
31 - 33 
34- 36 
37- 38 
39-40 
41 - 44 
45- 56 
57- 59 
60- 63 
64- 69 
70- 71 
Category: 
Follow up of last audit 
Accident reporting 
Medical screening and facilities 
Lock-out and entry permits 
Inspection of physical plant 
Personal protective equipment 
Safety meetings 
Supervisory training 
Safety involvement by management 
Safety record and meetings 
Fire prevention 
Policies and procedures 
Safety training 
Compliance 
Overall inspection and evaluation 
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In this audit, no standards are set by which to answer the questions. The 
questions or protocols are present to point out to the auditor the areas 
that should be investigated. 
Sample question: 
#44: Does a new employee's safety training and indoctrination program exist? If yes, 
is it effective? (Boley, 1977) 
D) Checklist Audits: 
The Environmental Protection Agency (E.P .A.) publish the, Health and 
safety audit guidelines. These audit guidelines, and contained audit, 
" . . . provide step-by-step guidance for assessing preliminary evaluations, 
health and safety plans (HASP's) and off-site emergency response 
programs required under the OSHA and EPA worker protection standards ... 
for employees engaged in hazardous waste operations" (EPA, 1989, p.1 ). 
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This format gives the auditor a brief paragraph explaining the reason 
for the question(s) in that section. The auditor is then led through a 
series of closed questions. Each question has an option of being answered 
Yes or No. If a 'No' is given then space is provided to describe the 
apparent deficiency. Additional space follows each section to formulate 
any other questions that might arise, and/or comments, on a given subject 
area. This allows for differences between industries, not catered for in 
the overall generic nature of the audit: 
The audit is divided into four sections: 
1) Preliminary evaluation 
2) Written health and safety plan review 
3) Health and safety field review 
4) Emergency response review 
Sections 1, 2 and 4 take place off-site. Section 3 takes place on-site and 
is a verification of procedures and practices. 
Disregarding topics specific to hazardous waste control, the 
categories covered by the audit are: 
Supervision 
Employee training 
Personal protective equipment 
Policies and procedures 
Emergency response 
Medical surveillance 
Each section finishes with a summary of responses: i.e. how many 
'Yes' and how many 'No' responses were obtained for each section. This 
summary, " ... permits easy tabulation ... which indicates potential 
problems and alerts on-site employees to areas requiring additional 
work" (EPA, 1989, p.2). 
Sample qyestjons: 
4.3 Training- 29 CFR 1910.120(e) 
Training is required for all employees who engage in hazardous waste field 
activities. These requirements include initial off-site health and safety training, 
supervised on-the-job training, and annual health and safety refresher training. 
On-site managers or supervisors with direct responsibility for supervision of 
employees engaged in hazardous waste operations require additional training. To 
determine field compliance with training requirements, the users should interview 
employees, request documentation from employees and/or their home office, and 
determine employee efficiency through observation and requests of employees to 
demonstrate proficiency. 
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4.3.1 Do all employees working on-site have documentation available to indicate initial 
health and safety training? 
(YES) (NO, EXPLAIN) 
Field Verification 1. 2. ________ 3. 
4.3.2 Do all employees working on-site have documentation available which meets the 
on-the-job training requirements for 29 CFR 1910-120(e)? 
(YES) (NO, EXPLAIN) 
Field Verification 1.________ 2.________ 3. ______ _ 
etc ... (EPA, 1989, p.29). 
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Industrial hygiene program self-appraisal quality control checklist 
(Clayton & Clayton, 1978). This is described as a standard quality 
program audit adapted to the needs of the analytical laboratory. It 
consists of 34 questions. This checklist audit differs in that each 
question has a choice of three graded responses. Each level of response is 
explained and awarded a number of points dependent on its completeness 
or acceptability as a solution to the posed need. 
Sample question: 
2 8. Training of new employees is accomplished by: 
a. A programmed system of training where elements of training, including 
quality standards, are incorporated in a training checklist; the employee's 
work is immediately rechecked by supervisors for errors or defects, and 
the information is fed back instantaneously for corrective action ........... 5 
b. On-the-job training by the supervisor, who gives an overview of quality 
standards; details of quality standards are learned as normal results are 
fed back to the employee ........................................... 3 
c. On-the-job learning, with training on the rudiments of the job by senior 
co-workers ....................................................... 1 
(Clayton & Clayton, 1978, p.1255) 
For each of the 34 questions the same point system is used. This 
allows the auditor to summarize the entire audit with one figure: the 
average response score. " ... a standard of 3.8 average score is 
acceptable. An average score of 2.5 to 3. 7 indicated a need for 
improvement. It was felt that an average score of less than 2.5 indicated 
a risky situation, requiring immediate correction" (Clayton & Clayton, 
1978, p.1249). In addition to the average score, the auditor fills in a 
summary outlining strong points, weak points and improvement goals. 
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The form of audit described above does not fit any of the previous 
definitions. For the purpose of this paper it will be named and defined as: 
Graded Checklist Audit: The auditor is provided with a checklist of 
questions and must choose from a predetermined set of responses. Each 
response is allotted a set number of points depending on the completeness 
of the response to the question asked. Each question has the potential to 
contribute the same number of points. The auditor adds the cumulative 
total for all questions and can calculate an average response to 
summarize the audit. 
The author sees the 'graded checklist audit' as an attempt to reduce 
the subjectivity of the auditor, by providing a standard scale of responses 
that can be interpreted equally well by anyone conducting the audit. In 
this way any industry can better monitor improvement, or lack of, knowing 
changes in score are unlikely to be due to interpretation by different 
auditors. 
The 'cost' of this increased objectivity appears to be the broad 
nature of the questions in order to keep the responses applicable to a wide 
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range of industry. If the questions were more detailed the response 
categories would become industry specific. The value of summarizing an 
audit in a single figure is questionable. This figure says little about 
where the strengths and needs for improvement lie. 
A further variation on this type of checklist audit is provided by 
Diekemper and Spartz's, A quantitative and qualitative 
measurement of industrial safety activities (Petersen, 1980). 
Diekemper and Spartz concur with the use of more objective criteria by 
saying, "We must use the same 'yardstick' and use it the same way each 
time an evaluation or measurement is made" (Petersen, 1980 p.63). These 
two recognize the difficulty in converting the meaning of audit results 
and the personal knowledge gained by the auditor into concrete terms to 
inform management. They recognize the importance of measuring the 
safety activity as well as the results. They produced an audit where the 
response categories do not have the same point value for each question. In 
their audit the questions are weighted, where the values incorporated into 
the measurement device " . . . realistically reflect the degree of 
importance placed by management ... " on them (Petersen, 1980 p.63). 
43 
They use the broad categories of : 
1) Organization and administration. 
2) Industrial hazard control 
3) Fire control and industrial hygiene 
4) Supervisory participation, motivation and training 
5) Accident investigation, statistics and reporting procedures. 
Sample guestjon: 
D. SUPERVISORY PARTICIPATION, MOTIVATION AND TRAINING 
Poor Fair Good Excellent Comments 
1. Line supervisor safety 0 1 0 22 25 
training. 
2. Indoctrination of new 0 1 5 1 0 
employees. 
3. Job hazard analysis. 0 2 8 1 0 
4. Training for specialized 0 2 7 1 0 
operations. 
5. Internal self-inspection. 0 5 14 5 
6. Safety promotion and 0 1 4 5 
publicity. 
7. Employee I supervisor 0 5 20 25 
contact and communication. 
Total value of circled numbers + + + X .20 
Where definitions are given separately e.g. 
D. SUPERVISORY PARTICIPATION, MOTIVATION AND TRAINING 
Activity 
1. Line supervisor 
safety training. 
etc .•... 
Poor Fair Good 
All supervisors All shop super- All supervisors 
have not re- visors have participate in 
ceived basic received some division 
safety training safety training training session 
a minimum of 
twice a year. 
Rating 
Excellent 
In addition, specialized 
sessions conducted on 
safety specific problems. 
(Petersen, 1980 p.66 - 67) 
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Each of the five categories is totalled, as shown above for sample 
section D, and a rating is calculated for that section. In this way the 
audit can be summarized by five figures which are comparable. Using this 
management can quickly identify which categories they are doing well in 
and those they are doing less well in. For more detail the auditor would 
write a report based on the comments made during the course of the audit. 
The form of audit described above is outside the previous 
definitions. For the purpose of this paper it will be named and defined as: 
Graded checklist with weighting: The auditor is provided with a graded 
checklist audit where the question responses have been assigned different 
point values depending on the importance that topic has to the writer of 
the audit. The audit is summarized by a rating calculated for that 
category of question, so that various categories of safety management can 
be compared. 
Another example of a 'graded checklist with weighting' is the Mine 
profile rating system (Petersen, 1980). This audit is divided into 
three main parts each assigned a number of points: 
1) Incident frequency rate 
2) Compliance with regulations 
3) Safety and health program 
200 points 
300 points 
500 points 
Thus the safety manager who designed this audit wants to be able to 
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compare these three components of the program individually, but also 
come up with a single figure audited value for the mine where the three 
components to the audit are weighted by the ratio 2 : 3 : 5. 
Individual questions within each of the three main parts are also 
weighted to contribute towards the final score for the section. The 
Safety and health program has subsections with categories: 
A. Safety and health management. 55 points 
B. Management training 40 " 
c. Accident Investigation 60 " 
D. Inspection 35 " 
E Job safety analysis 40 " 
F. Job observation 35 " 
G Work place design 30 " 
H. Personnel protection 15 " 
I. Maintenance 40 " 
J. Employee placement 40 " 
K. Employee training 30 " 
L. Rules 30 " 
M Safety communications 30 " 
N. Promotion 20 " 
This is followed by a list of instructions and explanations for the 
person conducting the audit. 
3M is a large international company and its Corporate Safety 
Operations Department (C.S.O.D.) has developed an audit that it believes 
can be used at any of its branches worldwide: Self-evaluation of 
safety facilities (3M, 1991). They have used a 'graded checklist with 
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weighting audit' but in a different way than other audits reviewed. 
The C.S.O.D. first itemized 16 elements that it considered were the 
minimum requirements for an effective safety program. It then broke this 
down further to represent each element by a series of questions and these 
questions were weighted for importance. The questions were made as 
detailed as possible to cover all important points and phrased to provide a 
simple Yes or No answer. Realizing the variations that might occur from 
country to country the designers have allowed an auditor to rate a 
question as not applicable. This is catered for in reporting by presenting 
the results for each section as a percentage of total possible points. Thus 
this audit allows progress in 16 key areas to be compared from audit to 
audit and the possibility of a single figure, total percentage, to represent 
the entire audit if required. 
The questions do not have objective lists of graded responses from 
which to choose answers, and it is suspected that this is a compromise to 
keep the questions detailed and applicable to as wide a user group as 
possible by using the subjective judgement of the auditor at each location. 
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Sample gyestjon: 
Note: If a question does not apply to your situation, eliminate it and subtract the 
available points for the question from the total for the element. The new total is the 
"Adjusted Points Available" to be used in score calculation. 
ELEMENT 7. SAFETY ORIENTATION I TRAINING PROGRAM. 
(Possible points: 435) 
Questions 
7. 1 Is there a comprehensive listing of the safety 
training required to enable an employee to 
perform his/her job properly? 
7. 2 Do all new employees or employees transferring 
to different jobs receive initial safety training? 
7. 7 How soon after a job assignment is the safety 
and health I loss prevention orientation given 
to new management? 
- During the first week? ( 1 5) 
During the first month? ( 1 0) 
During the first 3 months? ( 5) 
7.12 Are supervisors and key employees trained in: 
- The use of appropriate personal 
protective equipment? 
- Entering into confined spaces? 
- Lock out and tag out procedures? 
- Proper use of open flame and spark 
hazard permit? 
- Use of material safety data sheets? 
- Handling hazardous materials? 
Available points 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
Yes/No 
25 
35 
15 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Total available points ............................ 435 
Total adjusted points available ••.••..•.•••• _ 
Score: Total Achieved Points 
Total Adjusted Points Available X 100 = ____ % 
Points: 
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As can be seen this format has a range of options in which to pose 
questions and a range of ways of reporting the results. The C.S.O.D. state 
that ''There are three major methods of checking the actual existence and 
effectiveness of the program activities: 
1) Record checks 
2) On-site interviews with all levels of employees 
3) Physical conditions sampling" (3M, 1991 p.2). 
The sixteen elements considered as minimum requirements for an 
effective safety program are: 
1. Safety performance included in all performance appraisals 
2. Active safety committee 
3. Comprehensive safety program documented and communicated 
4. Designated safety coordinator 
5. Accident reporting and record keeping, investigation & follow 
up 
6. Timely and effective near miss I potential hazard 
investigation 
7. Safety orientation I training 
8. Monthly safety surveys 
9. Monthly crew I department I staff meetings 
1 0. Personal protective equipment 
11 . Contractor safety program 
12. Emergency response plans 
13. Job safety analysis 
14. Process safety management and reviews 
15. Operational safety procedures 
16. Engineering standards and reviews 
The Accident Compensation Corporation of New Zealand (ACC) has 
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developed a generic audit that can be applied to any organization: Basic 
Programme Audit (ACC, 1985). This is similar to the 3M audit except 
for one important difference; questions within categories can be scored in 
two separate ways. Some questions allow for a simple scoring system 
where either all the points are awarded if the criteria are met, or no 
points are awarded if the criteria is not met. e.g. 
Has one person been designated as safety and health/loss control 
coordinator? (X0-30) (ACC, 1985 p.1 ). 
Other questions however allow for a degree of completion or compliance. 
In this case the auditor is given the ability to use their professional 
judgement to award points up to those allocated for the question, 
depending on the level of completion or compliance seen to be existing 
within the organization audited. e.g. 
Does the organization have copies of all relevant legislation, codes 
of practice, and related standards? (PJ-25) (ACC, 1985 p.2) 
This system allows for questions which can be applied across a 
range of cultures and interpreted appropriately by trained auditors 
operating in that culture. 
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Industrial safety research: 
Many important pieces of research have been carried out that 
produce a better picture of what is important to cover in a safety 
management program. The review will be limited to the major research 
applicable to the study. 
In 1931 Heinrich reported on his now famous study of over 5000 
accidents in the first edition of his book, Industrial accident prevention: a 
scientific approach. This study established a ratio of 300 : 29 : 1 of no-
injury accidents : minor injuries : major injuries. This showed for the 
first time that investigation of near-misses could show trends which, 
when analyzed, would lead to the prevention of major accidents. Heinrich 
also reports on the results of further research where 75,000 individual 
accidents were analyzed for cause. The results showed that: 
2o/o ARE UNPREVENTABLE 
50o/o ARE PRACTICABLY PREVENTABLE 
98o/o ARE OF A PREVENTABLE TYPE 
Of the 98o/o of preventable accidents, 1 0% were found to be due to unsafe 
mechanical or physical conditions, and the remaining 88o/o were due to 
unsafe acts of persons. This pointed out to Heinrich the importance of the 
human factor in accident prevention, and that inspection for the unsafe 
practices and conditions underlying even the no-injury accidents, would 
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lead to the reduction and possible elimination of all accidents and injuries 
(Heinrich, 1959). 
In 1967 Planek, Driessen and Vilardo carried out research to 
determine general and specific factors considered most important to the 
functioning of a comprehensive industrial safety program. They compiled 
a list of 78 activities in 8 program areas by consulting literature covering 
safety program implementation, corporation safety programs and earlier 
questionnaires. Their 78 items focussed on factors that were general 
enough to be independent of particular industrial products, processes or 
philosophies. They then asked 148 experts in industrial safety to rate 
each activity for importance. 100 were returned in usable form. The 
results gave a rank order of the 78 safety activities. From this the 
researchers produced rank orders in the 8 safety program areas and the 
three top-rated activities in each area. 
THE THREE TOP-RATEP ACTIVITIES IN EACH OF THE MAJOR PROGBAM AREAS: 
Supervisory Participation. 
- Enforcing safe job procedures 
- Setting an example by safe behavior 
- Training new or transferred employees in safe job procedures 
Middle Management Participation. 
- Setting an example by behavior in accord with safety regulations 
- Restating management's position on safety 
- Using safety as a measure of management capability 
Top Management Participation. 
- Setting an example by behavior in accord with safety regulations 
- Assigning someone to coordinate safety on a full or part time basis 
- Publishing a policy expressing management's attitude on safety 
Engineering, Inspection, Maintenance. 
- Specifying guards on machinery before it is purchased 
- Setting up a formal lockout procedure 
- Establishing a system of preventive maintenance for tools, machinery, plant, etc. 
- Inspecting tools and equipment periodically 
Screening and Training of Employees. 
- Making safety a part of every new employee's orientation 
- Including safety in supervisory training courses 
- Including safety requirements in job procedures based on job safety analysis 
Coordination by Safety Personnel. 
- Advising management in the formulation of safety policy 
- Analyzing the safety program to determine its effectiveness 
- Assisting and advising other departments on various safety-related matters 
Forming a Record Keeping System. 
- Requiring the department supervisor to conduct investigation of disabling injuries 
- Using a standardized injury investigation form 
- Including recommendations in injury statistics reports 
Motivational and Educational Techniques. 
- Providing for the employees a list of general safety rules 
- Establishing a procedure for disciplining violators of safety rules 
- Holding work place safety meetings 
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(Pianek,Driessen, & Vilardo, 1967) 
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Shafai-Sahrai's 1973 study of the determinants of occupational 
injury experience produced some relevant results. Shafai-Sahrai studied 
eleven matched pairs of companies in the Michigan area, where each 
matched pair consisted of a company having a high injury rate and a 
company with a low injury rate. All of the companies studied were in the 
category of small business, where a large business is defined as having 
greater than 500 employees. Small businesses were studied because 
research had revealed that the safety records of large businesses were up 
to four times better on average than for small businesses (Shafai-Sahrai, 
1973, p.21-22). The reasons for this have been attributed to many 
factors. " . . . one of the most comprehensive listings of the factors is 
provided by the U.S. government publication Safety Subjects 
a. Small firms cannot (or do not) employ full-time safety personnel. 
b. The executive of a small business carries a complex load and has no technical staff 
to assist him (sic). 
c. He (sic) rarely joins any safety organization or attends any safety meetings or 
conferences. 
d. Costs of accidents are not known because small firms do not have detailed cost 
accounting systems. 
e. As there are few employees, the accident rates must be extraordinarily bad to yield 
a flow of injuries sufficient to arouse a management immersed in its manifold 
problems of sales, finance, and production. 
f. Small companies usually cannot afford expenditures for which immediate and prompt 
return is not highly expected. 
g. Small businesses are so great in number that it is impractical to communicate the 
'gospel of safety' to them by using the promotional methods that have been so 
widely and effectively used with employers in large companies. 
Most of the above-mentioned factors were confirmed by the findings of 
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this study . . . " (Shafai-Sahrai, 1973, p.22). 
Shafai-Sahrai examined the following factors as being of high 
significance in the causation of different accident experience. The 
following summarizes whether they were confirmed as significant at the 
0.05 level of significance or not: 
Factor 
Management Related Factors 
Managerial attitude towards safety 
Company age 
First line supervisor's span of control 
Accident record keeping procedures 
Safety committees 
Safety rules 
Confirmed Not Confirmed 
Recreational programs and facilities V 
Interest of employee families in overall company programs V 
Plant Related Factors 
Physical working conditions V 
Quality and quantity of safety and control devices on 
machinery V 
Age of machinery and equipment 
Employee Related Factors 
Marital status of employee V 
Age of employee V 
Educational level of employee 
Length of service of employees 
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In 1977 Cohen studied forty two matched pairs of companies in 
Wisconsin. Within the pairs the two companies differed by at least 2:1 in 
work injury experience. He found that the following factors were more 
evident in the low accident companies than in their high accident 
partners, and to be particularly prominent in the record holding 
establishments: 
1) Greater management concern and involvement in safety matters. 
2) More open, informal communications between workers and 
management, and frequent everyday contact between workers 
and supervisors. 
3) Tidier work areas, better ventilation, lighting and noise levels. 
4) Work force has more older, married workers with longer job 
service, less absenteeism and turnover. 
5) More regard for the use and effectiveness of measures other than 
suspensions and dismissals in disciplining violators of safety 
rules. 
6) Greater availability of recreational facilities. 
7) Greater efforts made to involve workers families in campaigns 
promoting safety consciousness. 
8) Well defined selection, placement and job advancement 
proceedings with opportunities for training in developing new 
skills. 
(Cohen, 1977) 
Edwards and Hahn reported the results of their research which 
showed that " . . . workers observed unsafe acts and conditions in the 
workplace and this correlated 0.61 with accidents .... The data suggest 
that accidents are happening where they have a chance to happen - where 
people report the existence of unsafe acts and conditions" (Edwards & 
Hahn, 1980, p.63). This points out the importance of having hazard 
reporting forms and letting the staff take part in the safety plan: they 
know where the hazards are. 
Other Safety Management Writings: 
A) Categories for inclusion: 
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Other writings on safety management in the industrial arena can 
also help to point out activities that should be included in a safety audit. 
Many of these articles and books stress the value in carrying out an 
evaluation of the safety program, pointing out that the organization will 
benefit in various ways such as: confirms success and identifies areas 
where further work is needed, prevents major injury to employees and 
surrounding public, the safety of a system can be rationalized, hazards 
can be identified, and the knowledge that a system is in place to help 
insure continued compliance with the law and corporate policies 
(Freeman, 1989; Krivan, 1986; Manuelle, 1980; Moretz, 1989; Van de Putte, 
1980). 
The following are lists summarizing the categories that various 
writers have stated as being important components of a safety program: 
Management Involvement 
Safety administration 
Safety committees 
Supervisory participation 
Selection and training of employees 
Preventive maintenance 
Human factors I industrial engineering 
Control of health hazards 
Safety rules 
Maintaining interest 
Emergency plans 
OSHA compliance 
Management Leadership 
Assignment of responsibility 
Maintenance of safe working conditions 
Establishment of safety training 
Accident record system 
Medical and first aid systems 
(Manuelle, 1980) 
Acceptance of personal responsibility by employees 
(Burks, 1986) 
Management must desire to prevent every preventable accident 
Management must select a competent person to take charge 
Management must put safety on the map 
Safety engineer must plan and carry out a program for the 
minimization of hazards 
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Accident prevention must be incorporated into the work program as 
a part of routine operations 
(Heath, 1986) 
Objectives and goals 
Documentation of process knowledge 
Review of capital project and design procedures 
Management of process risk 
Management of change 
Process and equipment integration 
Incident investigation 
Training 
Commitment and policy 
Safety committee and coordinator 
Safety manual 
Inspection 
Maintenance 
Site development 
Site management 
Public information and education 
Employee training 
Research and evaluation. 
Communicate the company safety policy 
Seek employee involvement 
(Freeman, 1989) 
(Gold, 1991) 
Establish measurable goals and objectives 
Don't hire accident prone people 
Investigate all accidents 
Develop safe operating procedures 
(Bryan, 1990) 
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Petersen (1980), in talking about analyzing safety systems, provides 
a checklist with the categories of: 
Management Organization 
Accountability for safety 
Systems to identify problems and hazards 
Selection and placement of employees 
Training and supervision 
Motivation 
Accident record and analysis 
Medical program 
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From the lists above, and those contained in the audits that have 
been reviewed, certain commonalities appear. It is possible to isolate the 
essential categories that should be contained in any safety audit. This 
conclusion is shared by Manuelle who states, " Having completed a large 
number of evaluations . . . in a large variety of industries, it became 
apparent that there are elements common to all successful hazard control 
programs, and that exceptionally favorable accident experience could not 
be achieved unless those elements were well managed" (Manuelle, 1980 
p.55). It is then only a matter of deciding what category headings to group 
the essential elements under. 
The actual detail contained under each category heading will be more 
industry specific. As Petersen ( 1989) states, ". . . the safety program 
must be right for the specific organization. What is right and essential at 
one property is not right and essential at another" (Petersen, 1980 p.27). 
B) How to analyze the safety program. 
Based on writings and research Petersen (1980) summarized the 
areas of control that need to be analyzed into three basic categories; the 
behavioral influences, the safety system, and the physical environment. 
His model of safety effectiveness is shown in Figure 9. 
THE BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCE 
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Figure 9: Factors Affecting Safety Effectiveness. (Petersen, 1980. p.29) 
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"This model is based on a belief that safety 
effectiveness of an organization is determined primarily by current 
employee behavior. The current individual employee behavior is 
based first of all on those items in the behavioral influence 
category. Our past experience developed our current behavior. That 
behavior is very much influenced by the current factors noted Oob 
factors and peer factors). The accumulation of these factors 
determines our current motivation, which, coupled with our ability, 
determines behavior. 
This current behavior is then filtered by the safety system 
that we have constructed, including all (and more) of the items 
noted on the chart. This behavior is filtered and influenced further 
by the physical environment in which the employee works. The 
result is the current behavior, which determines safety 
effectiveness. Additionally, the physical environment and the safety 
system are very much influenced by a number of items which 
determine the current corporate emphasis as listed on the chart" 
(Petersen, 1980 p .. 30). 
Petersen wrote about checklist type audits being appropriate to 
analyze the safety system. 
For the physical environment analysis he suggests checklists as an 
aid to inspection, where checklist items are obtained from job safety 
analyses (JSA's) and hazard hunts. In a later book he identifies a newer, 
but similar method known as safety sampling (Petersen, 1988). In this 
method a code is established of unsafe acts, with possible causes, then an 
inspector goes into the work place recording safe and unsafe observations 
of workers. This gives quantitative and qualitative feedback on the 
physical environment. 
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For the behavioral influence, Petersen admits that there is almost 
nothing in safety literature from which to draw. He concludes that 
probably the best device to analyze and motivate is the interview process. 
The performance analysis interview is suggested whereby employees are 
interviewed for performance deficiencies, physical deficiencies, 
knowledge deficiencies and execution deficiencies. 
This opinion and model suggested by Petersen is supported by the 
thoughts of Manuelle (1980, p.58) who, after completing many evaluations 
of hazard control programs concluded that ". . . the best approach is to use 
several measurement systems to evaluate the quality of ~azard control 
management" and Grimaldi & Simonds when talking about measurement 
say, ''The desired results occur through the use of a number of tactics and 
methods" (Grimaldi & Simonds, 1984 p.79). 
C) Different degrees of risk. 
In discussing improving conditions, Petersen (1980) wrote about 
several methods for determining priorities for improvement once hazards 
have been discovered by the analysis. This same priority system could 
help in establishing weightings for audit responses. One method suggested 
for assigning priority is by way of a matrix offsetting degree of hazard 
against time taken and cost involved. A second is by way of a 
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mathematical formula where a "risk score" is calculated by multiplying 
factors: 
Risk score = Consequences X Exposure X Probability 
It is also possible to take into account the difficulty of the correction and 
the cost. This is termed a justification factor: 
Justification factor = Consequences X Exposure X Probability 
Cost factor X Degree of correction 
Van de Putte makes the point that, "Within a safety study, 
calculation of the consequences of unwanted events plays an important 
role. In the first place it is possible to make a selection among identified 
unwanted events by means of calculated consequences. In addition it is 
true to say that, as the consequences increase in significance, the 
perception of an unwanted event comes to be determined more by the 
consequences than by the probability of occurrence and in the case of very 
great consequences, almost exclusively by the size of the possible 
consequence" (Van de Putte, 1980 p.233). 
This discussion indicates that there are factors an auditor can take 
into account if wishing to weight response categories, and the most 
importance of these is consequence. 
Summary of Industrial Safety Management: 
This review of industrial safety literature reveals the following 
main points: 
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a) Safety management has evolved from the traditional functional 
safety or 'fly-fix-fly' model, that concentrated on the investigation of 
accidents and incidents in a reactive way. Modem models of loss control 
take a pre-emptive approach believing it is more efficient to consider the 
impact of potential hazards before any system reaches production stage. 
This new 'systems safety' identifies hazards and then works to ensure the 
hazards are designed out, reduced in some way or the system is abandoned 
as being unsafe. Tools have been developed to aid in this pre-emptive 
approach. 
b) The pre-emptive approaches to safety are tied to a quality 
management model to provide a contemporary safety approach throughout 
the organization in the 1990's. 
c) The use of auditing systems to review safety programs is 
considered valuable in industry. 
d) Studying a range of audits in existence identifies a range of 
different formats: 
Professional Assessment 
Written Protocol 
Checklist 
Graded Checklist 
Graded Checklist with Weighting 
Qualitative only 
Can be both 
qualitative and 
quantitative 
The ease of monitoring the measured effectiveness of the safety 
program increases down the list of audit formats, as we are given the 
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ability to compare quantitative results. In addition the reliability of the 
results from the audit improves as we go down the list of formats as 
subjective audits give way to more objective ones. Finally the accuracy 
of the results increases as weighting is introduced which gives a 
representative result to the final score dependent on the importance of 
the question asked. 
e) Generic audits are being carried out successfully in large 
corporations on an international basis. 
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f) The cost of making an audit generic is a reduction in the 
specificity of response categories and in the audit format being able to 
take into account redundancy of some questions, while still remaining 
valid. 
g) The reduction in specificity of questions, necessary to make an 
audit generic, can be countered by incorporating professional judgement of 
trained auditors into assigning points for any question. The number of 
points assigned depending on the degree of compliance sighted in that 
category. 
h) There are common elements that should be included in any safety 
audit. These common elements would be covered under the broad category 
headings of: 
Organization and administration 
Safety systems 
Staff selection, training and evaluation 
Equipment 
Hazard evaluation 
Physical plant 
Health control and medical facilities 
Emergency response 
The exact detail ·contained within each heading depends on the individual 
industry. 
i) It is recognized throughout industry that small businesses have 
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poorer safety records than large ones. This can be attributed to a range of 
identified factors relating mostly to lack of resources to be allocated to 
the safety effort and that a high accident rate is not as obvious in a small 
worker pool. 
j) Modern safety theory is concentrating increasingly on a people 
approach in the goal of increasing safety. 
k) A safety program's effectiveness can be thought of, using 
Petersen's model, as having three main elements: the behavioral influence, 
the safety system and the physical environment. To audit a safety 
program therefore requires the auditing of each of these elements, and 
each element is best evaluated using different methodology: 
Behavioral influence - survey/interview 
Safety system - checklist 
Physical environment - inspection with criteria ( safety sampling ) 
I) Risks identified in an audit can be rated for priority according to 
consequence, probability, exposure, cost and degree of correction required. 
Adventure Education: 
Safety is a continual agenda item for all adventure educators. The 
following is a summary of their writings in the field of auditing and 
approaches to safety management. 
Adventure Education Reviews. Audits and Checklists: 
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Many adventure educationalists have recognized the need for some 
sort of audit of their safety programs, while others have various forms of 
audit forced upon them by government regulation. The following section 
looks at a representative sample of audits currently being used; comparing 
them with the classifications for audit types generated earlier in this 
paper. 
A) Compliance audits: 
A number of adventure education providers are inspected by 
Government agencies to ensure that the organization is meeting its legal 
requirements regarding health and safety of participants and employees. 
An example would be that used by the National Centers Board of the 
British Sports Council (Gilpin, 1991 ). The items covered in such an audit 
would depend on the country, state, or local district and the regulations 
that governed that area. Examples of categories would be: 
HEALTH: Food hygiene, water quality, residential dormitory 
requirements 
FIRE SAFETY: extinguishers, smoke doors, detectors, fire drills, 
egress points 
BUILDING INSPECTIONS 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS: storage and handling 
VEHICLES: Current legal requirements 
These point out areas that should be included in an audit if not 
already controlled by an external agency as part of normal procedure. 
B) Professional assessments: 
This is a common technique employed by smaller outdoor centers. 
Examples are audits carried out on the Outdoor Pursuits Center of New 
Zealand (Collister, 1987; Holding, 1989). In this system an organization 
invites a renowned expert to come in and review the safety of the 
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organization. What normally results are some astute comments related to 
one or more specific aspects of the organization's operation, but no global 
look at safety management in a structured fashion. There is little to be 
learnt from this as a system due to it's lack of structure. 
C)Written Protocol Audits: 
Outward Bound National Office carries out regular (two yearly) 
reviews of each of its schools. The National Office has published "A guide 
to conducting safety reviews for assessing and upgrading safety in 
outdoor adventure programs", with the stated purpose to " ... assess the 
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safety management practices and make recommendations for 
improvemenf' (Wade & Fischesser, 1988 p.2). This document outlines a 
suggested process of putting together a review team, conducting the 
review and report writing, with responsibilities for various members of 
the gathered team. It also itemizes categories for review, with questions 
that act as indicators for assessment. The categories covered are: 
Participant preparation and screening 
Staff hiring training and assessment 
Management systems 
Program activities 
Emergency procedures 
Logistics 
Physical Plant 
Transportation 
Manuals, policies and procedures 
The document suggests an audit should be carried out at two levels: an in-
field component and an administrative or "in-town" review. 
The audit does not contain any checklists, does not provide any sort 
of scoring system, does not weight any aspects of safety higher than 
others. 
The audit does not imply or expect a thorough check of any one or all 
aspects and so is not as exhaustive as a complete 'written protocol audit' 
by the definition of this paper. 
The final report structure stresses improvements, not mentioning 
what is being done well. 
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The Association for Experiential Education is currently 
investigating the process of accreditation of outdoor programs possibly 
incorporating the process of peer review. The New England branch of AEE 
has been running "A pilot model for a New England peer review program" 
which they believe " . . . promotes program safety, quality, and moral and 
ethical programming concerns" (Gray, 1990 p.1 ). This review document is 
very similar to the structure used by Outward Bound. It describes how to 
set up the review process and team, suggested areas for inquiry and report 
writing, including a sample report. The criteria suggested are, to all 
intents, identical to the Outward Bound list and described as " . . . not 
meant to be exhaustive" (Gray, 1990 p.13). 
All comments made in reference to the Outward Bound Review 
process could be echoed here. 
The National Outdoor Leadership School has a safety and 
training department which has developed an auditing procedure for its 
branches. These procedures are " ... intended as a method to insure 
systems are functioning optimally, to upgrade systems as needed and to 
continually enhance the safety consciousness of the school" (NOLS, 1991 
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p.1). 
The audit outlines how to put together the audit team, 
responsibilities, report writing and procedures. It stipulates an in-field 
audit where comments should be made by auditors ". . . specifically on the 
following areas: 
Supervision . . . 
Evaluation . . . 
Paperwork ... 
High risk activities . 
Technical systems . . . 
Equipment ... 
Minimum impact techniques ... 
Quality of instruction . . . 
NOLS field safety policies ... 
Attitudes ... 
Field rations . . . 
Admission process . . . 
Other safety concerns . . . 
Expedition behavior ... " (NOLS, 1991 p.4-5). 
This is accompanied by an in-town audit and is " ... composed mostly of 
various checklists providing for areas requiring specific comment; 
however the general impressions of the auditor of the in-town operations 
are also very important and should be included in the final report" (NOLS, 
1991 p.5). The checklists for the in-town audit supplied were: 
Course paperwork audit 
Instructor file audit 
Physical plant audit 
Student information and files audit 
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Evacuation coordinator resources 
With this audit can be seen the introduction of checklists to the 
written protocol system. The checklists are applied to the in-town audit 
where each system is checked as being either Satisfactory, Needs 
Improvement or Not Applicable. 
D) Checklists: 
In a Winston Churchill Fellowship Study, Allan compiled a Checklist 
for administrators of outdoor programs (Allan, 1983). Within this Allan 
lists a number of questions that administrators need to ask concerning 
their outdoor programs under the headings: 
Program 
Evaluation 
Participants 
Equipment 
Framework 
Staff 
In the AEE publication, Safety Practices in Adventure Programming, 
a Safety Review Checklist is included which is an adaptation from the 
Outward Bound Safety Review Manual already discussed (Priest & Dixon, 
1990). 
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Other Adventure Education Writings: 
Many other authors have written, expressing their views on what is 
crucial to safety practices in the adventure education field. These will be 
summarized under broad subject headings so that the reader can gain an 
understanding of what is considered important and, if interested further, 
is directed to the original articles in the references section. 
Trip Planning: "A majority of the accidents that occur with 
groups in the outdoors are a result of poor planning by the leaders" (Green, 
1987 p.401 ). Green then goes on to expand on what he sees as the major 
considerations for trip planning under subcategories of: philosophy, site 
selection, realistic schedules and routes, group policies, safety 
guidelines, risk management plans, transportation, permits and licensing, 
food, methods of resupply and emergency procedures. 
Near miss and accident investigating: Many writers point out 
that "Usually accidents are preceded by a series of events which, when 
viewed in retrospect, form a chain of events that lead quite clearly to the 
actual accident . . . Near misses are important since they could just as 
easily result in a serious accident another time" (Kauffman, 1989 p.69). 
Other writers echo this sentiment (Hale, 1984; Helms, 1983; Meier, 1984; 
Meyer, 1979; Mobley, 1981; Raffan, 1988; Rawson, 1991 ). 
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Staff selection, training and evaluation: Many see this as the 
fundamental safety consideration, as these people are in the decision-
making role and in have the ultimate ability, through judgement and 
choice, to influence the safety of the client; despite other precautions 
(Ewert, 1984b; Hunt, 1984; Meyer, 1979; Priest & Dixon, 1990; Udall, 
1987). "The single most important criterion in program safety is the 
quality of training of staff . . . in both program skills and program design" 
(Prouty, 1986 p.5). We '' ... can still expect accidents because of the 
judgement error, the limiting human factor presents the biggest challenge 
to be overcome ... " (Meier, 1984 p.4). 
Emergency planning and preparedness: These help people 
realize what dimensions of risk exist in all chosen activities and have the 
skills to safely cope with them if they should occur (Meier, 1984; Raffan, 
1988). 
Supervision: Appropriate supervision should be planned and used 
to match the level of activity as well as the age, maturity and experience 
of the students (Hale, 1984; Meier, 1984; Rawson, 1991). 
Equipment, maintenance and inspection: It is important to 
purchase quality equipment and then have in operation planned regular 
inspection and maintenance schedules (Meier, 1984; Priest & Dixon, 1990). 
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Student Selection and Screening: It is considered important to 
have knowledge of the students before activities: their physical abilities, 
medical history, special problems, etc (James, 1980; Priest & Dixon, 
1990). Udall suggests that " ... accidents happen to particular students 
at particular times in predictable situations" (Udall, 1987 p.383-384). He 
believes it is important for all instructors to do an accident probability 
assessment of each student by analyzing each student in terms of 
stamina, grace, strength, agility, mental abilities and medical record. 
Administration and organization: "Effective organization is a 
major contributor to safety in outdoor activities and administrators have 
a particular and often the initial responsibility, (Rawson, 1991 p.1 0). 
Administrative responsibility is seen to include: setting appropriate and 
achievable objectives, designating responsibilities, selecting appropriate 
sites and venues, establishing appropriate procedures and regular 
appraisal and review. 
Program policies and guidelines: An organization needs to 
develop a set of policies and guidelines that are based on legal and 
morally defensible practices. In addition there needs to be an adequate 
communication medium of these to all staff. This is seen as 'most 
critical' to some writers as the importance the organization places on 
safety is displayed in these policies and how they are enforced (Hale, 
1984; James, 1980; Mobley, 1981; Priest & Dixon, 1990). 
Litigation protection and insurance: This is seen as an 
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important responsibility in the risk management plan of any organization 
to guard against the possibility of a major financial loss through accident 
or litigation (Hale, 1984; Priest & Dixon, 1990). 
Safety reviews: These are seen as necessary in order to 
determine the status of safety systems within an organization (Hale, 
1984; Priest & Dixon, 1990; Schimelpfenig, 1991 ). 
Role clarity: Establishing clearly the roles and responsibilities of 
all members of the organization in respect to safety (Hale, 1984; Mobley, 
1981; Schimelpfenig, 1991; Wade, 1986). 
Evaluations: Of staff, programs, safety records, goals, and other 
organizational parameters (Hale, 1984; Rawson, 1991 ). 
Risk Management: 
In 1984, Mobley wrote, "There is much to be gained by examining 
what people outside the field of adventure education have learned about 
accidents" (Mobley, 1984a p.11 ). He and several others were looking 
closely at the work being done by safety engineers such as Heinrich and by 
the insurance industry. Mobley studied Heinrich's pyramid of numbers, and 
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'Domino theory of causation' concluding that, " . . . at the stage of unsafe 
acts or conditions we can intervene so that a potential accident does not 
lead to a serious injury" (Mobley, 1984a p.13). What Mobley realized was 
that in order to stop accidents in adventure education it was necessary to 
identify all of the unsafe acts or conditions before they could have an 
effect, and manage them. This is the concept that the insurance industry 
had been developing in the early 1960's and terming risk management. The 
insurance companies aim was to reduce . the financial loss potential. The " 
. . . theoretical design of risk management policies was to expect the 
unexpected . . . if an unplanned event did occur, the negative effect upon 
current operations would be held to a minimum" (Bruner, 1986 p.139). 
Bruner continues to say that " ... risk management requires the analysis 
and consideration of all aspects of uncertainty, not just financial loss. 
The concept also refers to the possibility of exposure of persons to injury, 
danger or loss of life, and the possibility of harm to equipment and 
physical resources which may increase the possible risk exposure of 
participants in the activity" (Bruner, 1986 p.139-140). Mobley developed 
his "buffer-zone" analysis technique from this. "Buffer zones are simply 
positive ways to answer the question 'What if?' " (Mobley, 1981 p.81 ). 
Meier ( 1984) used these concepts of risk management and developed 
a three phase system of risk management for adventure education. This 
consisted of: 
Step 1. Pre-event Phase: Before the activity identify all the risks 
possible based on prior experience. 
Step 2. Event Phase: Use strategies to minimize the chance that 
injury will occur. 
Step 3. Post-event Phase: Consider what strategies you could use 
to reduce the necessary consequences of accidents should they occur, 
and plan for this. 
(Meier, 1984 p.6-8) 
In discussing models of safety management, Kauffman pointed out 
that all of them study " ... the three same elements but emphasizes 
different aspects of the Host - Environment - Agent triad (people, 
environment, machine)" (Kauffman, 1989 p.70). He saw the basic causal 
factors of accidents to be: 
A) HUMAN FAILURES: (approx 80o/o of accidents) 
- psychological factors 
- physiological factors 
- cultural factors 
B) ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: (Approx 15o/o of accidents) 
- Natural factors 
- Human factors 
C) DEFECTIVE AGENTS: ( Approx 5°/o of accidents) 
- Design agents 
- Mechanical factors. 
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The New Zealand Education Outside the Classroom (EOTC) committee 
took these various ideas and collapsed them into a simple tool for the use 
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of outdoor educators. They termed this a risk management matrix (EOTC, 
1988). See Figure 10. 
PEOPLE EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
RISK 
IDENTIFICATION 
RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 
Figure 10: Risk Management Matrix Developed by the N.Z. E.O.T.C. 
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This is used before any activity is run. First of all past experience 
is used to identify all the risks in an activity under the headings of 
PEOPLE, EQUIPMENT and ENVIRONMENT. Then a decision is made on an 
appropriate management technique, again based on insurance company 
principles of Avoid I Transfer I Reduce I Accept. If the decision is made 
to either accept or reduce the identified risks, the ways planned to do this 
are written down under the risk management heading. Finally a plan for 
crises is made, so that if something unexpected does happen all the 
appropriate systems and resources are in place. This is revised after the 
activity so that any risks identified during, but not before, can be taken 
into account in future. An easy tool to use, and a good summary of the 
other writers' ideas. 
Many of adventure educators advocate the necessity of carrying out 
this risk management analysis of all activities and programs as part of an 
active safety program. 
Severity of Risks in Adventure Programs: 
Some authors in the adventure education field differentiate between 
different degrees of risk. Ewert uses a frequency/severity matrix to 
divide risks into four categories and uses this as a basis for determining 
the best management technique for handling the risk. The techniques he 
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suggests are based on the insurance industry's loss control techniques of 
avoid I transfer I reduce I accept (Ewert, 1984b). In a later article Ewert 
looks at how different decision-making modes can be incorporated into 
those risks you have decided to retain based on three categories; 
depending on their relative frequency and consequence of the risk if it 
occurs (Ewert, 1988c). Fink uses a "Crisis Barometer" to rate risks 
according to impact a crisis would have and probability of it occurring. 
This analysis allows Fink to classify risks into four broad categories of 
severity (Fink, 1986). 
The important point is that there are different degrees of risk to 
adventure education which may require an appropriate weighting system 
to be used in any audit that is quantified. 
Adventure educators see people as the key to safety. 
"The fulcrum on which balances the paradox of risk and safety lies 
with the practitioners and their possession of sound judgement" (Priest & 
Dixon, 1990 p.9). 
The clear message throughout adventure education writing is the 
importance of the instructional staff in the safety effort. No matter what 
policies, manuals and other elements of the safety program are in 
existence, they become meaningless instantaneously in the field if an 
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instructor exhibits bad judgement. 
"We can, and must develop policies and operating procedures that 
will ( 1) assure the recognition of and preparedness for unsafe 
conditions and .(2) minimize unsafe acts. Further, even when we 
have satisfied these two prerequisites, we may still expect 
accidents including fatal ones. Why? Chiefly because of judgmental 
errors" (Meyer, 1979 p.12). 
We " . . . can still expect accidents because of judgement error, the 
limiting human factor that presents the biggest challenge to be 
overcome" (Meier, 1984 p.4). 
In fact many writers are afraid that in the present litigious climate, 
rules and policies are encroaching too much on the decision-making ability 
of the instructor in the field who must deal with various situations which 
are ever changing. 
"The issue is the conflict between rules and instructor judgement 
as the means to achieve safe adventure courses ... I am afraid that 
the rule-based model for making decisions is gaining the upper hand 
in adventure based programs in the U.S. today. Fear of lawsuits and 
bad publicity are compelling many program administrators to 
minimize the amount of freedom provided to their field instructors 
in order to maximize certainty of results in specific situations" 
(Hunt, 1984 p.20). 
While the writers see people, namely instructional staff, as the key 
component to safety in an adventure education organization, they also 
concede that the judgement these people must possess to be safe as being 
". . . one of the most difficult competencies to train and assess" (Priest & 
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Dixon, 1990 p.9). 
Adventure educators need to know why! 
There is a common thread through the literature that adventure 
educators need to have an understanding of basic safety practices in order 
to implement them positively (Kauffman, 1989; Meier, 1984). This makes 
good sense in terms of intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation for a safety 
program. It is not enough to have an audit that simply points out that your 
organization should be more proactive in various areas of its safety plan, 
without educating those people as to why. 
Summary: 
From a review of the literature in the adventure education field 
some general conclusions can be drawn: 
a) There is much consensus in the writing about what categories 
should be covered in a safety management plan, as seen by adventure 
educators. These could be summarized under the broad headings: 
Organization and administration 
Safety systems 
Staff selection, training and evaluation 
Participants selection and monitoring 
Equipment 
Risk management 
Physical plant and resources 
Emergency procedures· 
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b) There are several case studies in existence outlining how an audit 
team should be put together and the roles of those members. 
c) There is very little sophistication in terms of the audit format 
itself. The audits reviewed in this document (which cover the leaders in 
the field of adventure education) leave the major decisions on the content 
of the audit in the hands of the audit team, with some guidelines. Formats 
used can be divided into the following categories: 
Professional Assessment 
Written Protocol 
Written Protocol with 
some Checklists } 
Qualitative 
Qualitative with a 
quantitative component 
d) There is general consensus that there should be in-town and in-
field components. 
e) The risks involved in adventure education can be seen as having 
different levels; in terms of degrees of consequence. Hence there is a 
good argument for weighting certain categories of risk in terms of 
importance in any audit. 
f) Adventure educators feel the key to safety lies in the people in 
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the field; the instructional staff. They are left with the power, through 
their judgement and behavior, to carry out the actions which will decide 
whether an accident will occur or not. 
g) Adventure educators point out their need to know why various 
safety measures are important. This would indicate a need for a manual 
that can accompany the audit, giving overviews of the various rationale 
for safety management practices and references to appropriate further 
reading. 
Insurance and legal Issues: 
Insurance: 
Adventure education organizations need insurance to cover them 
against the occurrences they are working hard to avoid, should they ever 
happen: property damage, illness, injury and litigation. This is what 
insurance companies are in existence for and, for the adventure education 
organization, is a valid form of risk transference in their operation's risk 
management matrix. The problem is, as a survey by Wolff and Washburn 
(1984) revealed, that many adventure education programs had trouble 
getting insurance coverage and others found it but only at high cost. Wolff 
and Washburn asked the insurance companies for their comments on 
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covering adventure education programs. The responses can be summed up 
by two quotes, "We would certainly consider quoting on this type of risk, 
however, the quoted rate would be based on our evaluation of a particular 
risk . . . " and, " Our willingness to provide insurance for any given activity 
is greatly dependent upon the availability of information which we can use 
to determine the probability and severity of claims characteristic of that 
activity" (Wolff & Washburn, 1984 p.54-55). 
The real problem then, is that as a relatively new industry, 
adventure education needs to establish a reliable track record with 
insurance companies. One writer expresses this as the " . . . Need to 
educate the insurance company about their program: What their programs 
do, what types of activities are involved, what populations they serve, 
how many staff, how many volunteers, how long their programs run, how 
many claims I near misses I losses have occurred, what did the claims I 
near misses I losses involve. They should be made aware of the perceived 
risk versus the actual risk of each activity" (Marlow, 1986 p.32). Mobley 
(1981) discussed the need for a standardized database of information for 
quantifying the risk. "Without such information insurance company agents 
can only make intuitive guess as to the objective risks associated with 
adventure activities" (Mobley, 1981 p.90). 
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The bottom line then is; if the insurance companies don't have 
access to the ". . .information, evaluations will be based on subjective 
data that hasn't been favorable to the field" (Wolff & Washburn, 1984 
p.55). With this in mind and that, " to get the most favorable coverage at 
the lowest cost, an organization needs to demonstrate that it understands 
and practices risk management techniques" (Mobley, 1984b p.29). 
Different writers have come up with checklists of practices to help 
become a better insurance risk: 
a) - Establishing a procedure for accident emergencies and providing a 
record of injuries. 
- Develop a written plan of supervision and be sure to hire only 
competent personnel. 
- Establish and enforce safety rules, regulations and procedures. 
- Provide in-service education for employees to keep them up-to-
date with the latest information. 
- Conduct regular inspections of facilities, areas and equipment and 
be sure to have an efficient program of maintenance. 
- Check the progressive nature of the education program and 
training. 
- Provide accident insurance for your participants for the inevitable 
accident that can and will occur. 
- Provide liability insurance for the agency and your staff. 
(Wolff & Washburn, 1984 p.55-56) 
b) 1) Safety record of organization. 
2) Safety record of similar programs. 
3) Written policies, procedures and guidelines. 
4) Standards for staff hiring, progression and supervision. 
5) Adequate staff training. 
6) Systems for handling emergencies. 
7) Systems for detecting staff burnout. 
8) Systems for detecting and correcting non-human hazards. 
9) Real nature of risks involved. 
1 0) 1st aid training. 
11) Location of medical facilities on/off site. 
12) Progressive training of students. 
13) Risk transfer techniques. 
14) Inspection schedules. 
15) Use of safety coordinators, safety committees. 
16) Top managements regular involvement in safety program. 
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17) Involvement in national and regional associations that address 
safety. 
18) Regular reviews 
19) Willingness to use experts. 
20) Contingency plans for loss of key personnel. 
21) Qualified personnel in safety in top management positions. 
22) Understanding and identification process for high-risk 
participants. 
(Mobley, 1981 p.98-99). 
Legal Issues: 
There have been many well written articles explaining the legal 
responsibilities that adventure programs have and their implications 
(Ewert, 1981; Ewert & Boone, 1987d; Frakt, 1987; Mobley, 1981; Priest & 
Dixon, 1990; Rankin, 1987b; Rawson, 1991; Rubendall, 1982; Van der 
Smissen, 1980; Van der Smissen, 1987). 
Some authors have summarized the requirements that they see are 
necessary for outdoor programs to incorporate into their safety 
management plans to protect against possible litigation: 
(Clement, 1988 p.32-34; Ewert, 1981 p.21; Koehler, 1987 Risk 
management suggestion at chapter summaries; Mobley, 1981 p.171-172; 
Van der Smissen, 1980 p.34-35) 
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These lists reiterate, and build on the detail of, the categories and 
items already mentioned in this review and as such will not be repeated 
here. 
Summary of Insurance and Legal Issues: 
Investigating the literature relating to the legal and insurance 
aspects of adventure education has: 
a) Revalidated the importance of the risk management approach, and 
hence the value of the auditing process itself, in terms of building a 
strong case with insurance companies. 
b) Shown that the same categories of concern for inclusion in an 
audit of a safety management system have shown up again. The Ymm. for 
the audit is further documented. 
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Conclusion: 
From a combined look at the information provided by the various 
disciplines of industrial safety management, adventure education, and the 
legal and insurance professions the following conclusions can be reached: 
a) Auditing of safety programs is a valuable undertaking. This is 
especially true for small businesses that do not have the resources and 
staff to allocate to safety that larger businesses might. 
b) Certain commonalities exist that are integral components of all 
safety programs. This fact makes it possible to construct a generic audit 
that will be applicable to all adventure education organizations. 
c) The cost of making an audit generic is the reduction in 
specificity of questions. A generic audit therefore will be checking to see 
that key elements are in place. These elements can be assessed 
accurately in any culture by utilizing the professional judgement of 
trained auditors within that culture to check for level of compliance. 
Further to this there is the ability to remove parts of the audit if they are 
'not applicable' in that particular legal or cultural setting. 
d) Adventure education literature and safety management literature 
both point to the importance of people and their actions in the final 
effectiveness of any safety program. 
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e) Any audit produced needs to look at the various aspects of the 
safety effectiveness of an organization as displayed by Petersen's Model 
(Figure 9). Further, that the audit will need to use different 
methodologies to audit the different components, namely: 
Behavioral Influence - survey/interview 
Safety System - checklist 
Physical Environment - inspection with criteria (safety sampling). 
f) The audit should be based on contemporary methods of safety 
management: Quality management techniques and systems safety methods. 
This means that the adventure education industries should be audited to 
see if they are using pre-emptive tools and modern management methods, 
and if not guide them towards some. 
g) Adventure educators require an accompanying document that 
gives an explanation of why various questions are contained in the audit, 
so they can better understand and improve their safety system. 
CHAPTER Ill 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the knowledge contained 
within the industrial safety, adventure education, insurance and legal 
industries to see if a generic safety audit can be generated for the 
adventure education industry. The literature review reveals that this is 
possible. The following is a description of the audit design and the 
methods used to develop it. 
Instrument Design: 
The goal for the generic audit is to provide the management of any 
adventure education organization with a summary of their safety 
preparedness, controls, and practices. This summary can be thought of as 
a 'snapshot' of the safety program when compared against contemporary 
practices within other industry; i.e. the audit will provide the management 
of any organization with a basis for gauging strengths and identifying 
areas needing improvement. Suggestions for improvements will be 
indicated to bring the safety plan up to contemporary standard. 
The audit is designed around the contemporary model of safety 
practices shown in Figure 8. Within this broad context, the goal is to use 
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Petersen's behavioral approach (Figure 9) as the base. The behavioral 
approach is used because the literature in both industrial safety 
management and adventure education stress the importance of people's 
behavior in the safety of any operation. In order to meet this goal the 
audit is constructed to measure three areas: behavioral influence, safety 
system and physical environment. In addition each area must consider the 
interaction of the others. Each of these areas requires a different 
methodology. 
Behavioral Influence. 
This section is concerned with the influence that the behavior of the 
staff of an organization have on the safety effectiveness of that 
organization. The approach to auditing the behavioral influence is based 
on the model shown in figure 11. In figure 11 the behavior of any 
individual is represented by their performance. This performance is a 
direct result of their motivation to perform. In turn, their motivation can 
be seen to be the result of many factors. These are the factors that are 
surveyed in this part of the audit. The audit contains indexes which 
measure the staff members' motivation to perform based on their: 
• Current attitudes toward their jobs 
• Current attitudes toward the organizational climate 
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• Current attitudes toward the safety program in the organization 
• Background stress levels (past events affecting personality). 
r -----
JOB ITSELF 
Fun? 
JOB 
MOTIVATIONAL 
FACTORS 
Norms 
Pressures 
1=1 L ___ _ 
I 
Current attitudes 
toward the job 
-, 
I 
L 
Stress from past events 
that affect personality 
PERSONAUTY 
MOTIVATION 
Attitudes toward the 
organizational climate 
I r-----
1 BOSS'S S1YLE 
I 
...J 
I 
EXTRINSIC I I 
PERFORMANCE 
r---------.1 1-"--•~1 REWARD 1-.1 SATISFACTION II 
t 
I ABILilY I 
-/-~ 
SB..ECTION 
Can he/she? 
--- -~-
TRAINING 
Know how? 
Considered in the Part 2 of 
the audit: safety system 
analysis 
I 
IN'miNSIC 
.., --l--
Current attitudes 
toward the job 
(reward system) 
Figure 11: The behavioral system in terms of motivational factors. 
Based on Motivational Factors (Petersen. 1980, p.83) 
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This part of the audit is designed to be self-administered and anonymous. 
The advantage of this is that staff may be willing to give truthful 
responses to questions they view as sensitive because of the anonymity of 
the questionnaire. 
Safety System: 
This part of the audit measures the completeness of the safety 
system operated by an organization compared to contemporary industry 
standards. The model used for the contemporary safety system is shown 
in a simple form in figure 12, and a more detailed form in figure 13. This 
model contains what W. G. Johnson describes in the Management Oversight 
Risk Tree (MORT) as the " ... elements of a safety system congruous with 
goal-oriented, high performance system" (Petersen, 1980, p.56) As shown 
in figures 12 and 13, major categories to check within any safety system 
include: 
• Management decision processes 
• Hazard analysis processes 
• Work flow processes 
• Information and monitoring systems. 
The safety system audit is arranged according to these major headings. 
Individual items checked for compliance under these headings, which 
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constitute an effective safety system, were obtained from the literature 
in the industrial management and adventure education fields. 
Management 
High Decisions ------
r ~, i I Participation and \ Feedback ~/ Performance 
Work Flow l 1, .... , I 
' ""' Low ' I / I / / 
~ 
-----
Figure 12: Safety System Congruous with Goal-Oriented. High Performance 
System (simplified version). 
Six Elements of a Safety System by W.G. Johnson (Petersen, 1980, p.56) 
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Figure 13: Dynamic Safety System - Congruent with Goal-Oriented. High 
Performance System. 
Safetv System Flowchart by W.G.Johnson (Petersen, 1980, p.57) 
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The safety system audit is of the type earlier identified as 
a checklist audit with weighting . The weighting of items was 
arrived at for any question by a subjective application of the following 
scale to the importance of the question: 
Fundamental element of safety system: 
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Score = 30 points (major component) to 10 points (minor component) 
Component part of fundamental element: 
Score = 20 points (essential component) to 
5 points (minor/less essential component) 
In addition to the categories mentioned, a physical inspection 
procedure is included to check equipment and facilities. This serves to 
audit how effective the safety system is in ensuring the safe condition of 
the physical plant: buildings and equipment. 
Physical Environment. 
This section of the audit addresses the physical conditions that the 
staff and clients of any adventure education program operate under. It 
adopts a technique known as safety sampling which is used within 
industrial safety management to inspect for unsafe acts and conditions. 
Safety sampling operates by compiling a list of unsafe acts and 
conditions, and safe acts and conditions, then checking at the work site as 
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to how many of each are observed. This system has the added advantage 
that it checks: 
• the physical environment (safe and unsafe conditions) 
• the interaction of people (behavioral system) with the physical 
environment (safe and unsafe acts) 
• the interaction of people with each other (safe and unsafe acts) 
• the interaction of the safety system with both the behavioral 
system and physical environment (managements attempts to control 
safe and unsafe acts and conditions) 
Figure 14 shows these interactions that safety sampling audits. 
BEHAVIORAL 
INB_UENCE 
Staff 
t 
Students 
SAFETY 
SYSTEM 
Figure 14: Interactions audited by safety sampling. 
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Thus by observing students and staff carrying out their activities in the 
field, not only will the physical environment be checked, but so will the 
interactions between each element of the safety program of the 
organization being audited. 
An initial problem was encountered in finding an appropriate tool to 
use which would allow an auditor to compile a list of the acts and 
conditions to look for in observing any specific outdoor activity in 
progress. If the organization being audited already uses a systems 
approach to safety management, it will already possess a hazard analysis 
breakdown for each activity that it operates. This can easily be adapted 
to compile the list required for the safety sampling process. Based on a 
knowledge of many adventure education organizations, it is assumed that 
finding an organization that has a hazard analysis breakdown will be the 
exception rather than the rule, and that most organizations will be 
operating at the functional safety level at best. The opportunity exists 
then to demonstrate the power of the systems safety approach to any 
organization during the audit process, by role modelling this approach at 
the safety sampling stage of the audit in order to obtain a comprehensive 
checklist of inspection criteria for any activity. 
Common systems safety tools that can be used in such an analysis 
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are either inductive (e.g. Fault Hazard Analysis; FHA) or deductive (e.g. 
Fault Tree Analysis; FTA). These methods are able to be applied to the 
adventure education industry and are very thorough, but for correct 
application require training in use and are time-intensive. A new tool was 
developed which offers less power than the systems approaches listed 
above, but which is more user-friendly to those in the adventure education 
field. 
Roland (1983) states that a risk assessment model should have, at 
the very minimum, the five elements shown in Figure 15. 
Basic 
events 
ln~~=~!~g _, Consequences~~~ 
Figure 15: Risk Assessment Model. ( Roland, 1983, p. 283) 
Where the: 
Basic events - are the causal factors that will result in an initiating 
event when they occur in sufficient number and unfortunate order. These 
would be human, machine, or environmental factors. 
Initiating events - are all the possible minor or major accidents. 
Consequences - are the possible results of the initiating event, up to the 
point of describing losses. 
Losses - are the results of consequences. They describe mortality, 
injury, morbidity and property damage to the environment. 
Costs - are the values placed on losses. 
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A risk analy~is model based on Roland's five elements is shown in 
Figure 16. This is suitable for safety sampling and most other analytical 
purposes in an adventure education setting. For the purposes of the safety 
sampling tool required, the first two elements of the risk assessment 
model will allow the identification of any unsafe acts and conditions. 
These will result in a set of possible consequences, losses and costs. 
These consequences, losses, and costs can be reduced by appropriate risk 
management techniques. The techniques will provide a list of the safe 
acts and conditions required for the safety sampling process. 
The best that the adventure education writers have produced in the 
way of a tool to use is the Risk Management Matrix; see Figure 10. 
However this tool has some obvious shortcomings when used. Beside the 
heading 'Risk Management', do the users list causal factors or 
consequences? Beside the headings 'Risk Management' and 'Crisis 
Management', there is confusion when a management technique does not 
fit the category heading that it is under; e.g. an identified risk might be 
equipment related but the management technique to reduce the risk might 
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be people related. Under what column should this be placed? No 
systematic approach is suggested in terms of deciding management 
techniques, and the consequences of these management techniques are not 
used to adapt the organizations safety system under the current model. 
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The systems safety principles espoused by Roland, and incorporated 
into the model shown in figure 16, were applied to the Risk Management 
Matrix to produce the Risk Analysis and Management System (R.A.M.S.) used 
in the safety audit; see Figures 17,18, and 19. This is based on a 
deductive approach to the problem of risk analysis and a systematic 
approach to deciding the appropriate management techniques to employ. 
The deductive approach was chosen because this is the common method of 
thinking in the adventure education industry: 
What is the worst that could happen? 
How could that happen? 
How could I prevent that from happening? 
The decision process recommended in deciding the risk reduction 
strategies to be used is depicted in Figure 20. 
For any activity then, a systems analysis can be conducted for that 
activity using the R.A.M.S. tool shown in figures 17 and 18, and 
incorporating the decision-making strategy shown in figure 20. This 
information can then be summarized using the form shown in figure 19 
which provides the list of safe and unsafe acts and conditions that will be 
checked for during the safety sampling process. 
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NAME: DATE: 
ACTIVITY/SITUATION: 
UNDESIRED 
EVENT(S) 
Accident. Injury. 
other forms of 
damage. 
People Equipment Environment 
CAUSAL 
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Figure 17: Risk Analysis and Management System, page 1. 
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RELEVANT 
INDUSTRY 
STANDARDS 
APPLICABLE 
POLICIES AND 
GUIDELINES 
RECOMMENDED 
SKILLS 
REQUIRED 
BY STAFF 
Choose one 
FINAL 
DECISION ON Accept Reject 
IMPLEMENTING 
ACTIVITY Comments: 
Figure 18: Risk Analysis and Management System, page 2. 
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Safe Acts and Conditions Seen Unsafe Acts and Conditions Seen . . . 
Instructor Dependent Factors: 
Management Dependent Factors: 
, Figure 19: List of safe and unsafe acts and conditions to inspect for. 
Design 
activity 
Redesign 
to reduc 
~ ...... 
risk 
yes 
Provide risk analysis 
package to 
management 
DESIGN FOR MINIMUM RISK 
- -------- -~ Document any relevant policies 
or guidelines to 
ensure 
management 
strategy 
yes 
Provide 
safety 
devices 
SAFETY DEVICES 
- - - +- - - - - - - -
yes 
Provide 
warning 
devices 
WARNING DEVICES 
- +----
SPECIALPBOCEDURES 
Provide 
special +- _ 
procedures 
Document 
policy or 
guideline 
excluding 
activity 
Figure 20: Decision-making process to decide risk reduction management 
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Reject 
activity 
strategies. Based on Hazard Reduction Precedence (Roland, 1983, p.40) 
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Subject Select lo n. 
Since this is an evaluation design the subjects for the audit will be 
self-selecting. Organizations that wish to have their operation viewed by 
an external auditor for the purpose of an objective evaluation of their 
safety effectiveness will approach an auditor who has been trained to use 
this instrument. This audit can be applied to any organization which uses 
elements of adventure education in its work. 
Conditions of Testing. 
Although this audit can be applied to any adventure organization it is 
important that the organization is self-selecting. In this way it is more 
likely that most members of the organization will be committed to the 
audit process. This is an important condition of the audit because much of 
the information is gained from the staff themselves and so the validity of 
the results are dependent on the quality of the supplied data. 
All auditors that comprise the audit team for any organization must 
be trained and experienced in the use of the instrument and in the 
interpretation of the results it produces. Necessary training involves 
attending a workshop, that has been approved by the author, on the theory 
and application of the audit instrument . This needs to be followed-up by 
observing an audit being carried out by an auditor accredited by the author. 
1 1 1 
In this way the intricacies and methodology of the audit process can be 
experienced first hand. If the accredited auditor feels the trainee has 
demonstrated satisfactory skills they will be considered a trained and 
accredited auditor. 
The organization being audited needs to specify which activities it 
wishes to have audited. These must be able to be observed during the 
audit period. Auditors must be chosen who have the background knowledge 
to effectively audit these chosen activities. 
Members of the management of the organization must be available to 
answer questions on the safety system that operates within the 
organization. In addition the organization must be able to assign a 
member of staff to act as guide during the audit process. 
The auditors must be able to talk to all staff who will be surveyed 
to explain the nature of the audit process, the benefits it can offer the 
organization and to answer questions the staff might have. In this way it 
is more likely that the staff will be cooperative towards the process and 
contribute valid information. 
An audit team of suitable size, with suitable time and suitable 
resources must be allocated for the purpose of the audit. The exact size, 
time needed and resources required will be dependent on the size and 
scope of the organization concerned. However these details will be 
stipulated by the audit leader before the audit and agreed to by the 
organization before the audit process is started. 
An estimate of time involved would be: 
Behavioral survey and interpretation - 1 day 
Safety systems audit and interpretation - 2 days 
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Physical environment - dependent on length of program element(s) to be 
audited. 
Validity and Reliability: 
This study is evaluative and so quantitative reliability measures 
were not relevant. Face and content validity concerns were addressed 
qualitatively. The audit has been determined to be valid in its content and 
approach through the following methods: 
1) A review of pertinent literature 
2) A team of experts were asked to comment on the audit for a check of 
content validity. The panel consisted of: 
Professor William Fleischman, PhD - Associate Professor of 
Sociology at the University of Minnesota, Duluth. Expert on research 
methods. 
Professor Jon Tofte - Assistant Professor in Industrial Safety at 
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the University of Minnesota, Duluth, and coordinator of a graduate program 
in industrial safety at that university. Expert in industrial safety and 
safety management theory, and former outdoor education program 
director. 
Simon Priest, PhD - Lecturer in outdoor education, editor of A.E.E.'s 
safety practices in adventure programming: Expert in safety concems in 
adventure education programming. 
3) The audit was pilot-tested on two very different adventure education 
organizations: 
A) The University of Minnesota Duluth Outdoor Program, and 
B) the adventure education activities run by the Audubon Center of 
the North Woods, located near Sandstone, MN. 
The reactions of the staff at the two organizations indicated very good 
face validity. The staff found the results of the audit to be enlightening 
and concurrent with thoughts they had about safety in their respective 
organizations. This feedback further reinforced the validity of the audit 
instrument. 
4) The author trained a second auditor in the use of the instrument. 
During the second of the pilot-tests, both auditors separately scored the 
various categories of the audit as the process was carried out. At the 
completion the results were compared and found to be extremely close 
( <5o/o discrepancy). This provides tentative verification that the 
instrument is reliable. 
5) Changes were made to the instrument based on the results and 
feedback from both the panel of experts and the pilot-tests. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study is to produce a predictive instrument to 
provide a measure of the balance of safety versus risk in any adventure 
organization; a generic safety audit. 
Traditionally safety was considered a process of inspecting for 
unsafe conditions and correcting them, while now it is considered a 
function of how people behave in conditions which are both safe and 
unsafe. While conditions can be engineered which may be considered 
safer, far more important is the behavior of people in those conditions. 
Unsafe acts can occur in theoretically "safe" conditions, and safe acts can 
be carried out in what would be considered unsafe conditions. The audit 
that follows on these pages is built upon a behavioral approach to safety 
proposed by Petersen ( 1988) and represented in figure 9. 
The behavioral approach contents that safety effectiveness is 
reliant on employee behavior which in turn is dependent on a number of 
factors. Past and current attitudes lead to current motivation to perform. 
This motivation is then influenced by the safety system in which the 
individuals operate, by the organizational climate and by the physical 
environment. The audit is devised to assess each of these component 
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parts and their interactions to gauge the safety effectiveness of the 
organization being audited. 
The following pages show the audit as three parts: 
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PART 1: Staff attitudes survey - to measure the current motivation levels 
of staff to perform safely. 
PART 2: Safety system audit - to measure the systems and management 
structures in existence against contemporary industry standards. 
PART 3: Physical environment and interaction audit - to measure the 
levels of safe and unsafe acts/conditions currently in existence in the 
workplace. 
Following each part is a procedure explaining how to analyze any 
results obtained. 
®lf £[F[F £ IJIJOIJQJ[Q)~® 
®QJ[ruW~Wo 
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In the following few pages you will be asked questions relating to how you 
perceive various aspects of your organization and your role within it. 
Please answer each question as you see things; not as you expect others 
see them, or as you anticipate others may want them answered. Your 
responses are anonymous. 
You will be asked to make certain choices along a continuum. Please place 
a cross in one of the numbers along the line that best illustrates your 
feelings between the two extremes. Please cross only one number. 
For example: If you were asked what you felt about the following aspect 
of your job, and you felt fairly bad about it, you might cross as indicated. 
BAD 
Color of uniform.............................. 
1 
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Please indicate how you feel about these aspects of YOUR JOB. 
1. Wages/salary ................................... . 
2. Conditions of employment. ......... 
3. Status/position in workplace.... 1 
4. Working conditions......................... 1 
5. Equipment generally ..................... . 
6. Buildings generally ...................... .. 
7. Vehicles generally ........................ . 
8. Relations with peers ................... . 
9. Professional associations 
you can join and belong to ........ . 
1 0. Rewards for work other than 
salary ................................................ . 
11. Variety of work ........................... .. 
12. Living conditions 
(answer only if residential) ..... 
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Please indicate how you feel about these aspects of YOUR JOB. 
JWl enD 
13. Sense of personal achievement. .. 
14. Recognition of quality of work ... 
15. Value of work to others ................. . 
16. Enjoyment of job .............................. . 
17. Possibility for advancement. ..... . 
18. Chance for growth ........................... . 
19. Training opportunities .................. . 
20. Individual goal setting ................. . 
21. Freedom to act ................................. . 
22. Involvement in decisions ............ . 
23 Amount of responsibility ............ . 
24. Access to information ................. . 
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Please indicate how you feel about the following aspects of the 
CLIMATE that exists in the management of your organization. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
Demonstrates lack 
of confidence and 
secrecy 
No concern for 
people•s problems 
Don•t understand 
people•s problems 
Left on own to gain 
necessary skills 
Not taught how to 
solve problems 
Give blame 
No interest in 
your future 
Unapproachable 
Demonstrates 
7 confidence and 
trust 
Deep concern for 
people•s problems 
Understand 
7 people•s problems 
Provide training and 
7 assistance 
Taught how to solve 
problems 
Interest in your 
future 
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Please Indicate how you feel about the following aspects of the 
CLIMATE that exists in the management of your organization. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
Does not seek 
information from 
you 
Restrict access 
to organizational 
information 
No input into 
decisions which 
affect you 
No recognition 
Inappropriate 
leadership style 
Seek information 
7 from you 
Full access to 
7 organizational 
information 
Opportunity for input 
into decisions which 
affect you 
7 Recognition of work 
goals achieved 
Appropriate 
7 leadership styles 
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The following refer to the SAFETY SYSTEM in your organization. 
Indicate the extent to which you believe each applies. 
38. Poorly stated safety 
goals 
3 9. Your safety role 
ambiguous 
40. Accept mediocrity 
4 1 . All safety decisions and 
goals imposed from above 
42. Ideas come down only 
43. No opportunity to 
observe other staff 
44. No monitoring and 
feedback. Left on own. 
45. Feel inadequately trained 
to be safe in my job 
46. 
Great amount of safety equipment 
required to be worn. Activities 
so controlled they are difficult to 
use effectively. Tone of program 
is heavy. Endless meetings about 
safety which don't have any 
personal meaning for the staff. 
Staff feel overexposed to the 
safety program, etc .. 
Staff identify with safety 
goals and are proud of 
their record. Staff feel 
safety programs are 
important. Safety is a 
lively aspect of the job 
and is more than avoiding 
risk or accident. 
7 
Clearly stated safety goals 
Your safety role in 
organization clearly 
defined 
Will only accept 
quality 
Asked for input to all 
safety decisions and goals 
Flow of ideas down, up 
and across organization 
7 Opportunity to observe other staff for ideas on the 
safe management of 
activities 
Safety of work monitored 
and feedback given 
regularly 
Feel adequately trained to 
be safe in all parts of my 
job. 
6 NELb~NT 
Has programs only after 
the fact; gets busy about 
safety only after a major 
accident. Staff feel 
organization doesn't really 
care. Safety equipment is 
provided only to protect 
the organization. 
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Please answer the following questions about the SAFE Tv 
PROGRAM AND THE ENVIRONMENT in which you operate. Use the 
reverse side of the paper if necessary. 
47. What do you think is the best aspect(s) of the safety program in your organization? 
48. What is the worst aspect(s) of the safety program in your organization? 
49. What would you most like changed in the safety program? 
50. How would you want this changed? 
51. What do you see as the greatest risks that you have to deal with in your work 
environment? 
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52. What unsafe acts or conditions have you observed that you feel need corrective action? 
53. All staff members in an organization have certain needs. For each of the following listed 
needs: 
a) Does your organization have a systematic way to assess that need? 
b) How is that need assessed if it is? 
c) Are your needs met effectively within the organization? 
MEEDS: Ia\ ASSESSED? b) I::IQW ASSESSED? c) MET EEEECII~ELY? 
Safety Yes I No Yes I No 
Training Yes I No Yes I No 
Motivation Yes I No Yes I No 
Utilization of Yes I No Yes I No 
strengths 
Personal Yes I No Yes I No 
problems 
Stress Yes I No Yes I No 
Other Yes I No Yes I No 
(Please specify) 
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The following is a list of events which occur in the process of living which can cause 
stress 1. Indicate any you have experienced in the past 12 months. 
LIFE EVENT POINT VALUE 
Death of long time partner.................................................................. 1 00 
Final separation from long time partner (divorce) ................................ 7 3 
Separation from long time partner (marital separation)....................... 6 5 
Jail term............................................................................................ 6 3 
Death of close family member .............................................................. 6 3 
Personal injury or illness.................................................................... 53 
Marriage ............................................................................................. 50 
Fired from work .................................................................................. 4 7 
Reconciliation with long time partner (marital reconciliation) ............... 4 5 
Retirement......................................................................................... 4 5 
Change in family member's health....................................................... 4 4 
Pregnancy .......................................................................................... 40 
Sexual difficulties.............................................................................. 3 9 
Addition to family.............................................................................. 39 
Business readjustment....................................................................... 3 9 
Change in financial status................................................................... 3 8 
Death of a close friend....................................................................... 37 
Change to a different line of work...................................................... 3 6 
Change in number of arguments with partner (marital)....................... 3 5 
Mortgage or loan over....................................................................... 31 
Foreclosure of mortgage or loan......................................................... 3 0 
Change in work responsibilities.......................................................... 2 9 
Son or daughter leaving home............................................................. 2 9 
Trouble with in-laws.......................................................................... 2 9 
Outstanding personal achievement....................................................... 2 8 
Partner begins or stops work (spouse)................................................ 2 6 
Starting or finishing school................................................................. 2 6 
Change in living conditions.................................................................. 2 5 
Revision of personal habits................................................................. 2 4 
Trouble with boss............................................................................... 2 3 
Change in work hours, conditions........................................................ 2 0 
Change in residence............................................................................ 2 0 
Change in schools............................................................................... 2 0 
Change in recreational habits.............................................................. 1 9 
Change in church activities................................................................. 1 9 
Change in social activities.................................................................. 1 8 
Mortgage or loan undertaken............................................................... 1 7 
Change in sleeping habits.................................................................... 16 
Change in number of family gatherings................................................ 1 5 
Change in eating habits....................................................................... 1 5 
Vacation............................................................................................. 1 3 
Christmas season............................................................................... 1 2 
Minor violations of the law................................................................. 1 1 
Other major events featuring in your life (score in relation to others). ? 
Add up the total for all the items lndicated ••.••....... SCORE __ 
1 The Social Readjustment Rating Scale. (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) 
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Analyzing Results for Part 1: Staff Attitudes Survey. 
Summary figures should be prepared that give an indication of indexes for 
- hygiene factors 
- motivation factors 
- supportive relationships 
- group decision making 
- manager's 'performance goals 
- participative approach in general 
- safety goal setting and communicating 
- safety participative involvement 
- safety feedback and reinforcement 
- safety training outcome 
- safety program in general 
Questions 1 - 12 
Questions 13 - 24 
Questions 25 - 31 
Questions 32 - 35 
Questions 36 - 37 
Questions 25 - 37 
Questions 38 - 40 
Questions 41 - 42 
Questions 43 - 44 
Questions 45 
Questions 46 
These are calculated by calculating a mean score in each index (question 
group) for each staff member. An average mark between 1 and 7 (to two 
decimal figures) should be reported for each index. As these marks are 
calculated watch for trends which indicate factors found particularly 
good by staff, and those found consistently lacking. Also look for groups 
of staff who may be very dissatisfied with a particular index (score low 
consistently) and others who may be having their needs met well (score 
high consistently. Even one staff member who is dissatisfied with a 
particular aspect of the organization is worth noting. This could be the 
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worst situation in some ways because a discontented social isolate could 
have unsafe behavior as his/her only outlet for their feelings of 
frustration. 
An organizational mean for each index should then be calculated by 
averaging the means of each staff member in each index. The range for the 
index should also be noted. Other descriptive statistics should be 
calculated if necessary to adequately describe the resultant distribution 
e.g. standard deviation, mode(s), etc. 
A mean score for any index of 3.0 or less would be considered low. 
An average for any index of 5.0 or more would be considered high. Scores 
between 3.0 and 5.0 indicate interpretation should be done with caution, 
taking into account other information attained from interview. The 
organization may be going through a transition period in the factor being 
measured, individual results scoring in either extreme may be canceling 
each other out, or the factor may only be being achieved within the 
organization to an average level. 
Plot the resultant means. (with range) in graphical form to visually 
summarize results 
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The following chart will act as an aid to interpretation of results. 
Factor 
Hygiene Factors 
Motivation Factors 
Low Score 
Extrinsic needs are 
not being met. Staff 
are dissatisfied with 
the conditions under 
which they work and 
their material and 
social rewards. Over 
time this will lead to 
disillusioned staff 
who become 
increasingly resentful 
of the organization. 
Their attitude to all 
aspects of work, 
including safety will 
suffer. 
Intrinsic needs are not 
being met. Staff are 
not turned on by their 
work. They may not 
value their work, feel 
responsible, be 
involved in decisions. 
At best they will 
carry out their job in 
order to get material 
rewards. At worst 
they will be 
uninterested, 
unproductive and 
unsafe. 
High Score 
Extrinsic needs are 
being met. Staff are 
content with material 
and social rewards and 
the work conditions 
generally. 
Intrinsic needs are 
being met. Staff are 
highly motivated to do 
well. They are keenly 
interested in their 
work and motivated to 
improve their product. 
Factor 
Supportive 
relationships 
Group Decision Making 
Manager's 
Performance Goals 
Low Score 
Staff do not feel that 
management is 
interested in them and 
their. safety. A result 
can be that they will 
not be safe. 
Staff do not feel part 
of the decision making 
system. They are 
made to feel 
subordinate, dependent 
and passive. This 
reduces motivation to 
perlorm and can cause 
rebellion against the 
administration and 
imposed safety 
policies. 
Staff feel managers 
have an inappropriate 
style for them and 
show little 
recognition for their 
work. This can lead to 
resistance to the 
safety programs of 
management and loss 
of interest in work in 
general. 
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High Score 
Staff feel that 
management has a 
strong interest in 
them and their safety. 
They will attempt to 
be safe in return. 
Staff feel empowered 
in the decision making 
system. They see 
themselves as equals, 
are independent and 
active in the 
organization. This 
leads to interest and 
motivation. 
Staff feel that 
management style and 
recognition of their 
work is good. This 
leads to motivation to 
continue to perform 
well in the future. 
Factor 
Participative 
Approach in General 
Safety Goal Setting 
and Communicating. 
Safety Participative 
Involvement. 
Low Score 
Staff feel they have 
little role in the 
workings of the 
organization. The best 
that can be expected 
is passive, dependent 
staff. At worst the 
staff rebel against the 
lack of involvement 
either directly against 
the hierarchy or by 
ignoring safety rules 
and guidelines. 
Staff are not aware of 
safety goals, are not 
made accountable for 
performance and are 
not driven to produce 
and expect quality. 
This leads to poor 
attainment of safety 
standards throughout 
the organization. 
Staff do not feel 
involved in the safety 
program and therefore 
are not committed to 
it. 
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High Score 
Staff feel actively 
involved in all the 
workings and 
decisions of the 
organization. They 
feel aligned with it. 
As such they are 
motivated to help 
build a better and 
stronger organization 
as part of the team. 
Staff are aware of 
safety goals, know 
they are accountable 
to them and 
understand that 
quality results are 
expected. This leads 
to staff striving for 
quality performance. 
Staff feel actively 
involved in the safety 
program and as such 
feel committed to it. 
Factor 
Safety Feedback and 
Reinforcement. 
Safety Training 
Outcomes. 
Low Score 
Staff are not given 
enough feedback or 
reinforcement by good 
role modelling of 
expected behavior. As 
such they do not feel 
their work is valuable 
and do not know the 
standards that the 
organization expects. 
Their is no demand for 
quality performance 
and thus safety 
standards drop. 
Staff feel ill prepared 
for the jobs they are 
asked to do. They are 
placed in positions of 
stress because of this 
which compounds the 
safety problem 
further. 
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High Score 
Staff are getting a 
good level of feedback 
and role modelling of 
expected behavior. 
They know the quality 
standards expected by 
the organization and 
strive to meet them. 
Staff feel well 
prepared for the jobs 
they are asked to 
perform. They are 
comfortable in their 
work and confident in 
their abilities to 
handle the work 
situation. 
Summarize the qualitative feedback provided by staff in note form, 
stressing trends in particular, both favorable factors and those in need of 
improvement. 
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Finally, summarize the background stress levels of staff according 
to the categories shown on the summary sheet. 
1 00 units scored within 12 months = 37o/o likelihood of serious illness or accident. 
200 units scored within 12 months = 51o/o likelihood of serious illness or accident. 
300 units scored within 12 months = 79o/o likelihood of serious illness or accident. 
(Petersen, 1988, p. 298) 
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The following instrument is designed to be administered by a trained 
auditor, with reference to the accompanying Auditor's Manual. It will give 
an indication of the standard of an adventure education organization's 
safety practices in comparison to a contemporary quality systems 
approach. 
Scoring Notes: 
Score the items in the audit according to the following regime: 
AN ••• All or Nothing: Yes = points indicated; No = zero points 
PJ •.. Professional Judgement: score up to the points indicated 
* 
based on your professional judgement. 
Signals that the category needs to be verified for 
compliance by some method other than by word of mouth: 
normally written material should be sighted; alternatively 
the behavior or practice could be observed in action. 
Organization audited: 
Date: 
&J [;¥{] ~[N)~@ ~ [;¥{] ~[N]li 
[Q)~©D@D@[N] ~15KQ)©~®®~®~ 
1. GOALS: 
1.1 Does the organization have stated 
educational goals? (AN 0/30)* 
1.2 Do these convey a positive, quality-
oriented message? (PJ 0 - 20) 
1 . 3 Does the organization have stated 
safety goals? (AN 0/30)* 
1 . 4 Do these convey a positive, quality-
oriented message? (PJ 0 - 20) 
1.5 Have a set of organizational safety 
objectives been developed? (AN 0/30)* 
1.6 Is there a suitable communication 
system so that all staff are aware of these 
goals? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
Section Total: 
2. ACCOUNT ABILITY: 
2. 1 At top management level, is there a 
safety committee with the responsibility to 
administer the safety program? 
(AN 0/30) 
2. 2 Are the responsibilities of the 
committee documented? (AN 0/20)* 
2. 3 Do these responsibilities include: 
- setting safety goals? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- safety of staff? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- safety of participants? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- safety of property? 
(AN 0/5)* 
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Score Comments 
0 
- safety of the environment? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- reviewing accident/incident 
reports? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- reviewing safety of proposed 
programs? 
- reviewing safety of 
changes to programs? 
(AN 0/5)* 
(AN 0/5)* 
- reviewing safety program? 
(AN 0/5)* 
2. 4 Is a person in middle management 
tasked with coordination of safety aspects 
in day-to-day operations (safety officer)? 
(AN 0/20) 
2. 5 For each employee is there a 
written job description? 
All [2 0] 
Most [ 1 5] 
Some [ 1 0] 
none [ 0] (AN 0/1 0/15/20)* 
2. 6 Are the safety responsibilities of the 
staff member clearly stated in the job 
description? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
2. 7 Do these responsibilities include: 
- organizational requirements? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- legislated requirements? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- reporting observed unsafe acts 
and conditions? (AN 0/5) * 
Section Total: 
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Score Comments 
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3. GENERAL COMMUNICATION. 
3. 1 How often does the safety 
committee report to the rest of top 
management? 
- not done [ 0 ] 
- annually [ 5 ] 
- 6 monthly [ 1 0] 
- 3 monthly or more [ 1 5] 
(AN 0/5/1 0/15)* 
3. 2 Is the safety officer on the safety 
committee? (AN 0/20)* 
3.3 Is there a representative from the 
operational level (Instructional staff) on the 
safety committee? (AN 0/20) * 
3. 4 Do all members of staff have a 
formal means to communicate their 
thoughts to the safety committee? 
(PJ 0 - 20)* 
3. 5 Is there a formal process where the 
thoughts of the committee are 
communicated to all levels of staff? 
(AN 0/20)* 
3. 6 How often does the middle 
management (Director, Chief Instructor) 
meet with other staff to discuss safety 
concerns? 
- not done 
- 6 monthly 
- monthly 
- 2 weekly or more 
(AN 
[0] 
[5] 
[ 1 0] 
[ 1 5] 
0/5/1 0/15)* 
3. 7 Is there a written record kept of 
major decisions reached at these meetings? 
(AN 0/20)* 
Section Total: 
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4. SAFETY PROTOCOL. 
4. 1 Is there a written safety protocol? 
(AN 0/30)* 
4.2 Does this protocol include: 
- rules or policies that all staff 
members must comply with? 
(AN 0/20)* 
- operating suggestions for the local 
conditions based on past experience 
of staff? (AN 0/1 0)* 
- emergency preparedness plans? 
(AN 0/15)* 
- accident investigations and 
analysis? (AN 0/1 0) * 
- employee safety training policies? 
(AN 0/10)* 
- personal equipment procedures? 
(AN 0/10)* 
- purchasing policy 
(AN 0/5)* 
4. 3 Which of these means are used to 
arrive at the stated policies/rules? 
- analysis of accidents/incidents 
(AN 0/10)* 
- analysis of near misses 
(AN 0/10)* 
- contemporary industry standards 
(AN 0/5)* 
- formal hazard identification 
process (AN 0/1 0) * 
4. 4 Are all policies/rules unambiguous 
and situationally valid? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
. 4. 5 Are the responsibilities that staff 
have towards following policies/rules clearly 
stated? (PJ 0 - 10)* 
4. 6 Are the responsibilities that staff 
have towards following guidelines clearly 
stated? (PJ 0 - 10)* 
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4. 7 Are the consequences of failing to S co r e 
follow stated policies/rules clearly stated? 
(PJ 0 - 10)* 
4. 8 Is a formal procedure in place 
whereby staff can question, alter or 
propose new policies/rules? (AN 0/20) * 
4. 9 Is the information above clearly 
communicated to all staff? (PJ 0 - 20) 
Section Total: 
5. SELECTION OF STAFF. 
5.1 Has an analysis been made of each 
job that exists in the organization to 
itemize the skills required for the job? 
(PJ 0 - 30)* 
5. 2 Is the applicants level of skill, 
experience and qualifications considered 
against the listed requirements? 
(AN 0/15) 
5.3 What screening processes are 
used? - Application forms (AN 0/5) 
- Referees contacted (AN 0/5) 
- Interviews (AN 0/5) 
- Skill tests (AN 0/1 0) 
- Internships (AN 0/15) 
5.4 Which of the following are 
considered during the screening process: 
- accident history (including 
driving)? (AN 0/5) 
- general level of responsibility? 
(AN 0/5) 
- general stability of personality? 
(AN 0/5) 
- ability as an educator? 
(AN 0/5) 
- medical history? (AN 0/5) 
-physical condition? (AN 0/5) 
-substance abuse? (AN 0/5) 
- criminal record? (AN 0/5) 
0 
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5.5 What percentage of the current Score 
instructional staff is less than 25 years old? 
- >75o/o [0] 
- 75o/o - SOo/o [ 5 ] 
- 50% - 25o/o [ 1 0] 
- 24% - 1 Oo/o [ 1 5] 
- <1 Oo/o [ 2 0] 
(AN 0/5/1 0/15/20) * 
5.6 What is the average number of 
years of experience (at equivalent to full-
time rate) the current instructional staff 
have working with students in a responsible 
role, particularly in adventure settings. 
- < 2 years [ 0 ] 
- 2 - 4 years [ 5 ] 
- > 4 years [ 1 o ] 
(AN 0/5/1 0)* 
Section Total: 
6. STAFF CONDITIONS. 
6. 1 Are there documents ( eg staff 
contracts) outlining conditions of 
employment? (AN 0/20) * 
6.2 Do the conditions allow adequate 
provisions for: 
- holiday entitlement? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
-sick leave? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
- bereavement leave? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
- maternity leave? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
- maximum contact period without a 
break? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
- leave without pay for personal 
growth experiences? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
Section Total: 
7. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
7. 1 Is there an emergency plan in 
writing to address all reasonably expected 
emergencies? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
0 
0 
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7. 2 Does it include well thought out Score 
plans to cope with: 
- lost party? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
- accident/injury? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
- fatality? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
- fire? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
- civil emergencies? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
7. 3 Do emergency plans include 
assigning specific duties to specific 
individuals? (AN 0/5) * 
7. 4 Is there an alternative for each key 
position? (AN 0/5) * 
7. 5 Are the phone numbers of key 
personnel available? (AN 0/10)* 
7. 6 Are all essential emergency 
services, telephone numbers and addresses 
listed? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
7. 7 Are all numbers and addresses 
checked and updated not less than 
annually? (AN 0/5) 
7. 8 Is there a written program to 
control information releases to the public in 
the event of an emergency? (AN 0/5) * 
7. 9 Do emergency plans provide for 
adequate response during off-duty times 
(eg weekends)? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
7. 1 0 Are objectives established for the 
training of staff for potential 
emergencies? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
7. 11 Are mutual aid agreements 
established with outside organizations to 
provide help in the event of an emergency? 
(PJ 0 - 15)* 
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7. 1 2 Does the organization have 
contingency plans for the sudden loss of 
key personnel? (PJ 0 - 20) 
Section Total: 
8. RESOURCES. 
8. 1 Have objectives been set for the 
timely turnover of all forms of equipment to 
ensure quality resources? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
8. 2 Do inventories exist that include all 
equipment, etc., that the organization 
owns? (PJ 0 - 25)* 
8.3 Is this inventory updated annually at 
least? (AN 0/1 0) 
8.4 Is adequate insurance carried to 
cover the inventory? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
Section Total: 
9. LIABILITY. 
9. 1 Are all programs based on 
progressive approaches to learning, 
applying skills that are suitable to the ability 
of the student? (PJ 0 - 30) 
9. 2 Does the organization have a clear 
policy that all activities are to be entered 
into voluntarily? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
9.3 Does the organization have a clear 
policy that potential risks of activities are 
explained to participants (and their 
guardians in the case of minors) before 
they take part? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
9. 4 Are all participants (and their 
guardians in the case of minors) asked to 
sign a release of liability before taking part 
in activities? (AN 0/25)* 
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Score Comments 
0 
0 
9. 5 Is this release of liability witnessed? 
(AN 0/10)* 
9. 6 Is adequate liability insurance 
carried to protect the organization? 
(PJ 0 - 30)* 
Section Total: 
10. STAFF ORIENTATION. 
1 0. 1 Is there a formal orientation 
process documented for all new employees? 
(AN 0/30)* 
1 0. 2 Does this include: 
- personal introduction to managers 
and the philosophy of participative 
management? (AN 0/10)* 
- familiarization with organizational 
goals and objectives? (AN 0/10)* 
- adequate familiarization period (no 
responsibility)? (PJ 0 - 1 0)* 
- training in the organization safety 
program? (AN 0/1 0) * 
- training in safety/risk management 
planning? (AN 0/5) * 
1 0. 3 Is a senior member of staff assigned 
to each new staff member as a resource 
person? (AN 0/10)* 
10.4 Is time allocated to this senior 
member of staff for this purpose? 
(AN 0/5) 
10.5 Is the orientation of the new staff 
member checked by middle management for 
completeness? (AN 0/1 0)* 
1 0. 6 Is there a formal orientation 
process documented for staff assuming 
new roles or programs? (AN 0/20) * 
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0 
1 0. 7 Does this include: 
- familiarization with pertinent risk 
management plans (AN 0/5) * 
- a progressive assumption of 
responsibility? (AN 0/5) * 
Section Total: 
11. STAFF TRAINING. 
11.1 Are training goals and objectives set 
individually with members of staff? 
Not done [ 0] 
Some staff [ 1 0 1 
Most staff [ 2 0 1 
All staff [ 3 0 1 
(AN 0/1 0/20/30)* 
11 . 2 Is a member of middle management 
involved in this goal setting? (AN 0/5) 
11 . 3 Are these goals arrived at taking 
into account: 
- list of skills required for the job? 
(PJ 0 - 20)* 
- industry minimum standards? 
(PJ 0- 10) 
- expiry dates of qualifications? 
(PJ 0- 5) 
11 . 4 Is special emphasis given to training 
staff where: 
- sources of high energy are 
involved? (PJ 0 - 1 0)* 
- non-routine programs are run? 
(PJ 0 - 10)* 
-driving is involved? (PJ 0 - 10)* 
11 . 5 Does the organization contribute 
significantly in time and money to achieving 
these individual goals? (PJ o - 15)* 
143 
Score Comments 
0 
11 . 6 How often are the training goals Score 
reviewed? 
- not done [ 0 ] 
- annually [ 5 ] 
- six months [ 1 0 ] 
(AN 0/5/1 0) * 
11 . 7 What percentage of the 
instructional staff hold professional 
certifications that cover the activity areas 
in which they work at an appropriate level? 
- none [ 0] 
- <30o/o [ 5] 
- 30% - 60o/o [ 1 0 ] 
- 60% - 80o/o [ 1 5 ] 
- 80% - 100% [2 0] 
(AN 0/5/1 0/15/20)* 
11 . 8 How often do instructional staff get 
the opportunity to observe other staff 
(especially senior staff) working with 
clients? 
- never [ 0] 
- every 3 - 6 months [ 5 ] 
-every 2- 3 months [ 1 0] 
- every month or less [ 1 5 ] 
(AN 0/5/1 0/15) 
11 . 9 Does management regularly take 
part in staff training that involves group 
training? (PJ 0 - 5) 
Section Total: 
12. PROGRAMS. 
1 2. 1 Is a check made to ensure that 
every program that the organization 
agrees to undertake fits within the safety 
protocols? (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
12.2 Are instructional staff required to 
leave intentions or route plans for activities 
away from base? (AN 0/1 0)* 
0 
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1 2. 3 Is there an adequate communication Score 
system from field to base that is suitable to 
the level of staff, students and aims of 
program? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
Section Total: 
13. SCREENING PARTICIPANTS. 
1 3. 1 Are all participants screened for 
health before the program? (AN 0/20)* 
13.2 Does this screening include: 
- emergency contact address and 
phone (AN 0/5) * 
- age (AN 0/5) * 
- gender (AN 0/5) * 
- Doctor to contact (AN 0/5) * 
- allergies (AN 0/5) * 
- medical history (AN 0/5) * 
- medications presently on 
(AN 0/5)* 
- general physical condition 
(AN 0/5)* 
- dietary requirements 
(AN 0/5)* 
- ability in water (AN 0/5) * 
- medical insurance policy number 
(AN 0/5)* 
- place to mention other problems 
that might affect participation 
(AN 0/5)* 
1 3. 3 Is the health form signed (by a 
guardian if a minor)? (AN 0/1 0) * 
13.4 Is the information on these forms 
readily available to those that need 
it? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
Section Total: 
14. MEPICAL PROGRAM. 
14. 1 Do all members of instructional staff 
have current first aid certifications? 
(AN 0/20)* 
0 
0 
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1 4. 2 Do all members of instructional staff S co r e 
have current water safety certifications? 
(AN 0/15)* 
14.3 Are first aid kits of suitable quality 
required at all activities and in all vehicles? 
(PJ o - 15)* 
14.4 Is someone certified in first aid 
available at all times? (AN 0/1 0) 
14.5 Is transport available at all times? 
(AN 0/10) 
14.6 Is the medical program supervised 
by a certified person ( eg EMT, nurse or 
Doctor)? (PJ 0 - 15) 
Section Total: 
15. PERSONAL EQUIPMENT. 
1 5. 1 Are staff informed of the equipment 
they must supply in order to carry out 
their work? (AN 0/10)* 
1 5 . 2 Is the quality of the equipment 
checked by the management to ensure it 
meets industry standards? (AN 0/15)* 
15.3 Does the organization contribute 
financially (to a significant level) to 
replacement and maintenance of this 
equipment? (PJ 0 - 1 0)* 
1 5. 4 Are students informed of the 
equipment they need to supply in order to 
have a quality program? (AN 0/1 0) * 
15.5 Is the quality of their equipment 
required to be checked before the 
students are committed to the program? 
(AN 0/15)* 
0 
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1 5. 6 Does the organization have Score 
provision to loan or hire to individuals who 
can't supply their own? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
Section Total: 
C) ~A~A~D A~6!\l V$~$ 
IP~OOle$3$3le~: 
16. CURRENT ACTIVITIES. 
1 6. 1 Does the organization have a 
documented, systematic breakdown of 
potential risks associated with each activity 
it carries out? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
1 6. 2 Have risk management methods 
been documented to ensure each risk has 
been reduced to an acceptable level? 
(PJ 0- 30)* 
1 6. 3 Is this information freely available to 
all staff? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
16.4 Are these analyses reviewed (at 
least every two years) by the safety 
committee to ensure the management 
methods remain contemporary? 
No [0 1 
Some [ 1 01 
Most [ 1 51 
All [2 O] 
(AN 0/1 0/15/20)* 
1 6. 5 Is there a formal process whereby 
staff can report hazards they observe in 
the workplace? (AN 0/20)* 
1 6. 6 Is there a documented process to 
ensure these reports are followed 
through? (AN 0/20)* 
0 
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1 6. 7 Is there the ability for an employee Score 
to refuse to work on the grounds of 
unacceptable hazard, until the hazard has 
been investigated and solutions put into 
place? (AN 0/15)* 
1 6. 8 Are all reported hazards and their 
solutions reviewed by the safety 
committee? (AN 0/15)* 
Section Total: 
17. PLANNED CHANGES. 
17.1 Are all planned changes to programs 
systematically analyzed for potential 
risks? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
17.2 Have risk management methods 
been documented to ensure each risk 
undertaken can be reduced to an 
acceptable level? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
17.3 Does the safety committee review 
these analyses before the program is 
implemented? (AN 0/20) * 
Section Total: 
18. NEW PROGRAMS. 
1 8. 1 Are all new programs systematically 
analyzed for potential risks? 
(PJ 0 - 30)* 
1 8. 2 Have risk management methods 
been documented to ensure each risk can 
be reduced to an acceptable level? 
(PJ 0 - 30)* 
1 8. 3 Does the safety committee review 
these analyses before the program is 
implemented? (AN 0/20)* 
Section Total: 
0 
0 
0 
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19. INFORMATION GATHERING. 
1 9. 1 Does the organization have a 
comprehensive library of relevant 
legislation, codes of practice, and related 
standards for all the activities they are 
involved in? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
19.2 Is this library readily available to 
everyone? (PJ 0 - 5)* 
1 9. 2 Does the organization receive 
weather forecasts suitable to the activities 
it carries out? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
1 9. 3 Is there a process for suitable field 
information to be gathered prior to 
activities (eg snow stability, river flows)? 
(PJ 0 - 20)* 
Section Total: 
20. STAFF PERFORMANCE REVIEWS. 
20.1 How regularly are staff 
systematically observed and given quality 
feedback on their safety performance? 
- not done [ 0 1 
- yearly [51 
- six monthly [ 1 0 1 
- every 3 - 6 months [ 1 5 1 
- every 3 months or less 
[2 01 
(AN 0/5/1 0/15/20)* 
20.2 How regularly are performance 
reviews carried out between individual staff 
and their supervisors? 
- not done 
- yearly 
- six monthly 
[ 01 
[ 1 01 
[2 0] 
(AN 0/1 0/20)* 
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0 
2 0. 3 Which of these levels of staff are 
performance reviews carried out for: 
- managers? (AN 0/1 0) * 
- instructional staff? (AN 0/1 0) * 
- other staff? (AN 0/1 0) * 
20.4 Do these reviews include: 
- review of individual safety 
performance? (PJ 0 - 10)* 
- job satisfaction factors? 
(PJ 0 - 10)* 
- job motivational factors? 
(PJ 0 - 10)* 
- other matters wanting to be 
raised? (PJ 0 - 10)* 
- review of previous goals and 
objectives? (PJ o - 1 0)* 
- setting new goals and objectives? 
(AN 0/10)* 
Section Total: 
21. ACCIDENT/INCIDENT 
MONITORING. 
21 • 1 For which of the following does the 
organization have a formalized investigation 
procedure: 
- fatalities? 
-injuries? 
- near misses? 
- illnesses? 
(AN 0/30)* 
(AN 0/20)* 
(AN 0/20)* 
(AN 0/10)* 
21 • 2 Do the investigations include 
recording of: 
-Name, age, sex, address of 
person(s) involved? (AN 0/5)* 
- Names and contacts of witnesses? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- Time, place, weather details? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- Brief description of incident? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- Summary of any treatment given? 
(AN 0/5)* 
- equipment and property damages? 
(AN 0/5)* 
150 
Score Comments 
0 
- Time lost from program due to 
incident? (AN 0/5)* 
21 . 3 Are these analyzed using multiple 
causation principles? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
21.4 Are they analyzed in total each 
year for significant trends? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
21 . 5 Is there a written procedure to 
ensure that remedial actions and follow-up 
of the investigation is carried out? 
(PJ 0 - 25)* 
21 . 6 Is the safety committee required to 
review the investigation and implemented 
changes before the investigation is 
considered closed? (AN 0/1 0) * 
21 . 7 Is the organization a member of a 
group that shares the statistics, report 
forms and lessons learned from such 
accidents and incidents? (AN 0/10)* 
21 . 8 Are all accident/incident reports 
easily accessible to all members of staff? 
(PJ 0 - 15)* 
21 .9 Is the organization's incident rate 
acceptable? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
21 . 1 0 Is the organization's fatality rate 
acceptable? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
Section Total: 
22. PLANNED SAFETY AUDITS. 
22.1 Are audits of the safety program 
built into the objectives of the 
organization? (AN 0/15)* 
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0 
22.2 How often are these carried out? Score 
- not done [ 0 1 
- every 5 years [ 5 1 
- every 3 - 5 years [ 1 0 1 
- every 2 years [ 1 5] 
- every year [2 0] 
(AN 0/5/1 0/15/20) * 
2 2. 3 How often are audits conducted by 
external auditors? 
- not done 
- every 5 years 
- every 3 - 5 years 
- every 2 years 
(AN 
[0] 
[5] 
[ 1 01 
[ 1 5] 
0/5/1 0/15)* 
2 2. 4 Are checklists of items to look for 
provided for the auditors? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
2 2. 5 Are all unsafe acts and conditions 
observed during the audit rated as to risk 
potential? (PJ 0 - 15)* 
22.6 Are audit reports and recommended 
follow-up actions given to the safety 
committee? (AN 0/20)* 
Section Total: 0 
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153 
23. EQUIPMENT INSPECTIONS. 
Complete the following form for each separate type of equipment owned by 
the organization. For example; first aid supplies, ropes courses, hire gear, 
camping gear, kayaks, vehicles, etc. 
Egulpment Type: 
23. 1 Are regular inspections made of all Score 
items of equipment to ensure quality 
performance is available at all times? 
(PJ 0 - 20)* 
23.2 Has a checklist been prepared for 
those inspecting the equipment that will 
enable all substandard items to be 
discovered? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
2 3. 3 Are the inspections regular enough 
to allow substandard items to be 
discovered? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
23.3 Are the inspections regular enough 
to allow substandard items to be 
discovered? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
2 3. 4 Are these inspections documented? 
(PJ 0 - 20)* 
23.5 Is a preventative maintenance 
program in place? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
23. 6 Is a system in place where faulty 
equipment is taken out of service or 
repaired promptly? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
23.7 Is the equipment currently in a safe 
operating condition? (PJ 0 - 30)* 
23.8 Is the equipment up to 
contemporary standards and meet all 
relevant codes? (PJ 0 - 20)* 
23.9 Is each item of equipment 
ergonomically safe in design? 
(PJ 0 - 15)* 
Date: 
Comments 
23.1 0 Are the items of equipment stored 
appropriately? (PJ 0 - 10)* 
23.11 Does the organization's safety plan 
adequately pass on the potential risks 
associated with the equipment? 
(PJ 0 - 10)* 
23. 12 Does the organization's safety plan 
allow a suitable induction period to train 
staff to use the equipment in question? 
(PJ 0 - 10)* 
Section Total: 
154 
Score Comments 
0 
155 
24. INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES. 
Complete the following form for each separate building or facility Inspected. 
Score Is determined for any Item by using professional judgement. 
Facility Inspected: 
24.1 FLOORS: clean, non-slip, free of 
protrusions. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.2 AISLES&PASSAGEWAYS: 
unobstructed, wide enough. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.3 STAIRS: right dimensions, angle, 
railings, non-slip. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.4 EXITS/EGRESS: number, unlocked, 
signed, size. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.5 VENTILATION: adequate for 
conditions. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.6 LIGHTING: adequate for purposes. 
Emergency lights. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.7 CHEMICALS & FUELS: appropriate 
storage, temperature, labelled, separated 
from others, exits. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.8 WASTE DISPOSAL: Adequate 
numbers of receptacles, divided for 
recycling purposes. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24.9 TOOLS & ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT: 
good condition, guards provided, safety 
apparel available. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24. 1 0 WARNING SYSTEMS: Fire warning 
systems installed, operative and 
instructions in case of fire posted. 
(PJ 0- 10) 
Date: 
Score Comments 
2 4. 11 FIRE PROTECTION: adequate number 
and type of portable fire extinguishers, 
hoses and sprinklers. (PJ 0 - 1 0) 
24. 12 FOOD STORAGE: sanitary storage, 
temperature. (PJ 0 - 10) 
Section Total: 
156 
Score Comments 
0 
157 
Analyzing results for Part 2: Safety System Aydjt. 
Total scores for each of the sections indicated in the audit, and 
convert these to percentages. For any section the scores can be 
interpreted as: 
Oo/o- 50% Low - major components are missing from the safety 
system to adequately address this factor. 
50°/o - 80o/o Medium - The organization is making some efforts in this 
category however changes still need to be made to the 
safety system to ensure the factor in question is 
appropriately covered. 
80o/o - 1 OOo/o High - The safety system is doing a good job at meeting 
the requirements of the factor in question. Some fine 
tuning is probably all that is required. 
Summary of Factors Audited: Information in parentheses is an 
interpretation of a low score in the factor. 
Score Percent 
MANAGEMENT DECISION PROCESSES: 
1 Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1 6 0 °4 
(The organization requires clearly defined and communicated goals in 
order to demonstrate to staff its commitment to safety and a quality 
product.) 
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2 Accountability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 170 °/o 
{An accountability system must be established for every level of the 
organization so that everyone is aware of their role and the 
interdependence of roles. In this way people realize that they are 
responsible for the final delivery of that stated responsibility, and can be 
measured against the standard expected.) 
3 General communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 130 °/o 
{Communication lines must exist within the organization so that everyone 
is aware of what is happening at all other levels. In this way people will 
feel part of the general safety effort and feel they are part of a team 
working towards a common goal.) 
4 Safety protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 245 °/o 
{An organization should possess a set of written protocols based on the 
knowledge gained from the past experience of staff within the 
organization and pre-emptive analysis of possible risks. These should be 
communicated to staff in order to set staff up for success in the field. 
When the organization states these protocols it is equally important to 
state the consequences of not following them. At the same time they 
should be worded in such a way as to be situationally variable so as not to 
restrict an instructor to following them when they would be unsuitable. 
There should also be a formal way for staff to have input into the 
alteration or addition of protocols so that they are empowered and have 
ownership of them.) 
5 Selection of staff. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 155 % 
{Staff should be screened in a systematic way in order to get the best 
match of skills for the role they are to fulfill.) 
6 Staff conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 50 °/o 
{Staff should be working under conditions that eliminate unnecessary 
stress. This should allow suitable non-contact time, provide support in 
times of personal problems/issues, and opportunity for personal growth.) 
7 Emergency preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 200 °4 
(Well thought out emergency plans will reduce stress on staff in times of 
emergency and help ensure the quality of response at those times.) 
159 
8 Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 95 % 
(The staff require quality resources in order to carry out quality 
programs. It is managements responsibility to make this happen.) 
9 Liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 155 oa, 
(The organization should take reasonable steps to protect itself from the 
possibility of litigation which ?ould signal the end of any adventure 
education operation.) 
TOTAL: ••..••••••••.•••..••.•...•••• --~/1~3:..:.4.z.O ___ 0_%, 
Score Percent 
WORK FLOW PROCESSES: 
1 0 Staff orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 130 o/o 
(New staff, or staff assuming new roles in the organization, need to be 
given a formal orientation to that role. This should include 
responsibilities, disclosure of risks and should be checked for 
completeness. A mentor should be formally appointed so that each staff 
member has someone whose responsibility is to answer questions and help 
with orientation. It should not be left up to the individual to continually 
have to impose their questions on others.) 
11 Staff training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 165 °/o 
(Staff should be regularly setting goals for further training, with the help 
of management, and receive assistance to attain these goals. The quality 
that is expected of them should be demonstrated by good role models in 
the organization.) 
12 Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 40 o/o 
(Programs should be set up to meet the same safety protocols expected of 
staff. In addition communication lines should be established so that 
parties in the field can be located should the need arise.) 
13 Screening participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1 05 °4 
(Participants should be screened for possible risks before any program is 
undertaken.) 
160 
14 Medical program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 85 o/o 
(The organization is required as part of its duty to the client to be able to 
provide quality treatment in case of incident occurring.) 
15 Personal equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 75 °/o 
(Staff and students should be using quality equipment in any program to 
prevent unnecessary risk from this potential source.) 
TOTAL: ••••...••••..•••.••.•••..•••• 
--=--/....::6;..;::.0.:.0 ___ 0~~ 
HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESSES: 
16 Current activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 165 o/o 
(All activities should be systematically analyzed for potential risks. 
Management strategies should then be developed for each risk and this 
information available to staff. Technology and techniques change and so 
these plans should be updated at regular intervals. If staff see potential 
hazards in the field there should be a mechanism whereby there concerns 
can be officially registered and they know that they will be actioned.) 
17 Planned changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 80 % 
(All planned changes to programs should be analyzed for risks, and plans 
to manage the risk developed before the changes are implemented) 
18 New programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 80 °/o 
(All new programs should be analyzed for risks, and plans to manage the 
risk developed before the new programs are implemented) 
TOTAL: .••••.•••••••••••.•••••.••••• I 325 ___ 0&.&~ 
INFORMATION AND MONITORING PROCESSES: 
19 Information gathering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 65 °/o 
(The organization should have available all contemporary information 
pertaining to its field of operations in order to make decisions.) 
20 Staff performance reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 130 °/o 
(As a follow-up to accountability, staff should regularly take part in 
161 
structured performance reviews in order to receive quality feedback on 
their to measure their achievement of set goals. This should allow a new 
set of goals to be set to motivate even higher quality in the future.) 
21 Accident/incident monitoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6 o 0/o 
(A procedure should be in place that allows information to be gained from 
accidents/incidents/near misses such that they can be prevented from 
being repeated in the future. Multiple causation principles should be 
employed so that all causes are remedied.) 
22 Planned safety audits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1 0 5 °/o 
(Regular external audits should be planned and carried out so that the 
organization can get objective views of their safety effectiveness.) 
TOTAL: ............................ . I 5 6 0 __ ___,£,o/o:.. 
EQUIPMENT INSPECTIONS: 
Equipment type I 2 1 5 % 
(Steps should be taken to ensure that each type of equipment is in a safe 
operating condition and that it is adequately stored, has a maintenance 
program in place, and is checked so the quality of operation is continually 
guaranteed.) 
INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES: 
Building or facility I 1 2 0 °/o 
(Each building or facility should be made free from dangers to the users.) 
Graph the resultant percentages scored for each of the variables to 
provide a visual summary of results. A report can be compiled based on 
these scores and the qualitative comments recorded during the audit 
process. Recommendations can be made on actions that could be taken to 
improve the safety system. 
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For each of the program elements you are planning to observe, carry out a 
R.A.M.S. analysis using the instrument on the following pages. This will 
identify safe and unsafe conditions and acts to look out for. Be aware that 
there may be many different management techniques (safe acts) to deal 
with certain situations. This means the auditor will need to be prepared 
to adapt their completed R.A.M.S. to the situation. 
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NAME: ____________________ __ DATE: 
ACTIVITY/SITUATION: 
UNDESIRED 
EVENT(S) 
Accident. Injury. 
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RELEVANT 
INDUSTRY 
STANDARDS 
APPLICABLE 
POLICIES AND 
GUIDELINES 
RECOMMENDED 
SKILLS 
REQUIRED 
BY STAFF 
Choose one 
FINAL 
DECISION ON Accept Reject 
IMPLEMENTING 
ACTIVITY Comments: 
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Analyzing results for Part 3: Physical environment and interaction 
of factors: 
For each activity observed summarize observations in a quantitative 
manner by simply stating the number of safe acts/conditions observed and 
the number of unsafe acts/conditions observed. Express the safety quality 
attained for the event as a percentage: 
number of safe events 
safety quality = •••••••••••••••••••••••••• X 1 0 0 
total number of events 
Summarize observations, both safe and unsafe, in a qualitative 
manner and attach these to the R.A.M.S. analysis for the activity. 
Making overall recommendations: 
From the results of the individual parts of the audit the team should 
compile an interim report. This will summarize the safe acts/conditions, 
so that the host program can build on what it is doing well, and also the 
unsafe acts/conditions as feedback required to improve quality. 
Each of the unsafe acts/conditions should be explained in full as to 
the impact it could have on the staff, participants and organization. It 
should then be assigned a quantitative risk score according to the formula 
below2. 
Risk Score = Consequences x Exposure x Probability 
Where: 
Consequences 
Degree of severity of consequences 
Catastrophe: numerous fatalities or extensive damages, 
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major costs to organization, major disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 00 
Major: fatality or serious damages and costs to the 
organ1zat1on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 
Serious: extremely serious or disabling injuries or 
large costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 
Notable: injuries requiring professional medical 
attention, lost work time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Minor: minor cuts, bumps and bruises; minor damage . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Exposure 
The hazard event occurs: 
Continuously: many times daily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Frequently: approximately daily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Usually: from once a week to once a month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Occasionally: from once a month to once per year. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Rarely: has been known to occur or known to be possible . . . . . . . 1 
Probability 
That the accident sequence, including consequences, will occur: 
Most likely: expected result and consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Quite possible: would not be unusual, an even 50/50 chance . . . . 6 
Unusual: unlikely to occur, but not to be ruled out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Rarely: extremely unlikely but has been known to happen . . . . . . . . 1 
2 Risk scores and justification scores are based on the work of W.Fine, 1973. 
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Examples: 
1) A high zip-wire (flying fox), used every day by groups, is found to have 
a defective pulley due to no inspection program being in place: 
risk score = (C=50) x (E=1 0) x (P=1 0) = 5000 
2) A low ropes course element does not use any form of spotting for its 
students: 
risk score = (C=1) x (E=1 0) x (P=6) = 60 
Obviously the assigning of scores is a subjective process but is very 
helpful in ranking faults according to seriousness. It should be kept in 
mind as a rough guide that a risk score: 
Greater than 250 indicates a condition requiring immediate correction. 
The activity should be discontinued until the hazard is reduced. 
90 - 250 is urgent. Requires attention as soon as possible. 
20 - 90 should be eliminated without delay, but the situation is not an 
emergency. 
The team then needs to recommend changes that will improve the 
quality of the program. These need to be realistic in terms of what the 
organization can be expected to achieve with its resources. The 
recommendations should be prioritized according to Justification Score, 
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where: 
Risk Score 
Justification score = 
Cost factor X Degree of Correction 
Cost Factor 
Estimate of dollar cost and difficulty of corrective change 
Large: many thousands of dollars; difficult and lengthy . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Moderate: hundreds of dollars; average time and effort . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Easy: very little cost; fast and simple changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Degree of Correction 
The degree the proposed change will eliminate or alleviate the hazard 
1 OOo/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
> 75% I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 2 
50o/o - 75o/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
25% - 50o/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
<25o/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Examples: Consider again the examples given above in terms of the 
following recommendations. 
1) Recommend that the program 
a) Discontinues using the zip line until; 
b) A new pulley is purchased of appropriate standard, and 
a monthly inspection and maintenance program is put in place. 
Justification a) = 5000 I ((CF = 1) x (DC = 1)) = 5000 
As cost is nothing and it provides 1 OOo/o correction. 
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Justification b) = 5000 I ((CF = 5) x (DC = 1)) = 1000 
As cost is over $1 00 and the inspection program should completely 
solve future problems. 
2) Recommend that staff are trained in contemporary spotting techniques 
and that having students spot each other becomes an operating procedure 
for low ropes elements, written into the staff handbook. 
Justification = 60 I ((CF = 1) x (DC = 2)) = 30 
As the cost is minor assuming someone on the staff can instruct 
others, and the effect these changes will have should eliminate the hazard 
more than 75% of the time. 
As seen from our small case history above, the priority we would 
suggest is: 
1) Discontinue zip line use until other corrections made ... 5000 
2) Buy industry standard pulley and institute monthly 
inspection and maintenance program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 0 
3) Train staff in spotting and write procedure into staff 
manual for low ropes course elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to generate a generic safety audit for 
adventure education programs based on techniques used in other industry. 
The audit was to be able to give an indication of current safety 
preparedness of any adventure education organization and identify needs 
in its safety management processes, guiding progress towards 
improvement of those processes. 
A review of literature in the fields of safety management revealed 
that 
1) Safety audits for any industry were considered feasible, desirable and 
valuable. 
2) Making an audit generic, in order that it can be applied industry wide, 
necessitates making audit questions general so that they can be 
interpreted for a wide range of users. The negative implication of this is 
that the audit may not be able to successfully assess the safety readiness 
of the organization, due to the lack of specificity of the questions. This 
potential limitation of the audit can be avoided by using the professional 
judgement of trained auditors to interpret the generalized questions and 
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award points for the organization's state of compliance to the questions, 
based on the auditors' training and past experience. 
3) That the audit needs to be able to be adapted by auditors in various 
cultures to make the instrument applicable in terms of language and items 
that may be made obsolete in that particular culture. 
4) That the audit should be based on principles of : 
• systems safety 
• quality management 
• multiple causation. 
5) That the most efficient and efficacious approach to the audit was to 
use a behavior-based construct. This led to the auditing system adopted 
for this study being designed in three parts: a survey of staff attitudes to 
establish motivational levels, a checklist audit of the safety system in 
the organization, and a safety sample of the physical environment. The 
last part of the audit also samples the interaction of all parts of the 
organization's safety plan, in that a safety sampling process views the 
actual current state of the safety functioning of staff and students in the 
field including the effects of past and current behavioral influence and the 
organizations safety system. 
The audit was field tested on a panel of experts and pilot tested on 
two different adventure education organizations. 
Findings: 
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1) The field test indicated that the auditing instrument had good content 
validity. 
2) The audit had a high level of face validity. This was gauged by its 
acceptance as an appropriate safety audit by the individuals in the 
organizations it was tested on. 
3) A crude measure indicates that this instrument shows signs of having 
a high level of reliability when trained auditors are used. 
4) Organizations, although outwardly stating their openness to the safety 
audit, exhibited very defensive behavior to the process beforehand. Safety 
in any organization is a sensitive issue, and even more so when inferences 
are going to be drawn to management styles and comments are to be 
passed on safety effectiveness. The author considers it normal that the 
process will be viewed by most as threatening. It was found that by 
maintaining open communications with the staff of the organizations, 
carefully explaining the positive nature of the process and its potential 
rewards, and remaining positive and receptive to the barrage of questions 
that people have that defensiveness is kept to a minimum. 
Once the auditing process actually began, the staff involved all 
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became very positive to the process. There were many opportunities for 
the staff to learn a great deal about safety management during the 
process. 
5) Individual staff members were keen to find time alone with the auditor 
to express their opinions on organizational safety. It is important to 
listen to everyone but be nonjudgemental in all aspects of the audit. By 
presenting information collected as a summary of the present state of the 
organization, and making recommendations based on theoretical 
constructs while remaining nonjudgemental in the process, defensiveness 
is further defused and replaced by a questioning attitude. 
6) The information provided by the audit was considered valuable by the 
organizations audited. This confirms the appropriateness of the industrial 
safety models applied to adventure education settings. 
7) Many of the instructional staff were concerned by the emphasis on 
structured approaches to safety (based on systems safety and multiple 
causation concepts). The threat they saw was that their ability to use 
judgement in the field was being threatened. When it was explained that 
it was management's responsibility to provide staff with information 
based on previous experience of other staff, and systematic evaluations of 
activities in order for staff to be able to make better informed 
judgements in the field, many of their fears were alleviated. 
Limitations: 
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Limitations exist in the audit design at present due mainly to the lack of 
application and exposure that it presently has. Within each of the three 
parts of the audit the quantitative values obtained can't be compared 
across the adventure education industry because no norms have been 
established. In part 2 of the audit (Safety System) the values assigned to 
each question, to give a weighting to signify the importance that question 
holds, were decided by the author. While reference was made to industry 
weightings of similar types of questions, it cannot be assumed that the 
same weightings can and should apply within adventure education. A 
Delphi panel of respected experts in the field of adventure education, and 
safety management within the adventure education industry in particular, 
could be used to get a consensus view on the weightings used. 
Conclusion: 
The audit described in this study can be applied to any adventure 
education organization. It is based on industrial models of contemporary 
safety management. When implemented by a trained auditor the audit is a 
valuable predictive and diagnostic tool. It is able to provide measures of 
the current safety effectiveness of an adventure education operation, and 
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guide towards improvement of safety systems in order that they become 
more effective. 
Safety is, and will continue to be, an important issue in any 
organization where risk is involved. In an increasingly litigious world the 
threat is that all risk will be eliminated and with it all challenge, 
adventure, and much joy of life and discovery. With the help of tools such 
as this it is hoped that risk can be maintained at an appropriate level to 
the educative goals of an organization without compromising the safety of 
the participants in those programs. 
Implications: 
The power of this instrument can only be realized if it is used. The 
challenge now is to market the instrument throughout the adventure 
education world in such a way that it is seen as a non-threatening asset 
rather than a destructive weapon. This may best be done through selective 
application of the audit to key programs whereby the reputation of the 
instrument will spread by word of mouth, and by endorsement by key 
organizations in different countries such as the A.E.E. in the U.S. and the 
N.Z.O.I.A. in New Zealand1. 
Association of Experiential Education 
New Zealand Outdoor Instructor's Association 
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The potential exists in the future for further research based on this 
instrument. The author's hypothesis is that the safety of an adventure 
education organization will improve through repeated applications of this 
audit and by steadily working to implement suggested changes. This could 
be tested in a time-series design using accident, incident and near-miss 
statistics each year for various organizations using the instrument, and 
comparing with organizations that don't. 
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Ro~~ Mrm~~~~m~~~ AlUl~oft 
A Sy~ft~m f©W 
A~~~~ftru~w~ [E~ru~©~fto©~ lPr©~r~m~~ 
This manual is designed as a reference tool 
for auditors who have received appropriate 
training in safety auditing. An ethical user 
of this manual will have: 
( 1 ) Attended a training course in the use of the auditing 
instrument, approved by the author. 
(2) Acted as an assistant auditor on an audit of an adventure 
education program, supervised by a skilled auditor, and 
have received a recommendation from that auditor as to 
their ability to administer the audit and interpret the 
results. 
© Grant Davidson, 1992. 
A 
CAUTION 
to potential users of this Instrument. 
This audit can not administered successfully by untrained persons. 
While I originally set out to create an audit that would be generic in 
nature, and be capable of self-administration, I quickly became aware of 
my naivety on the second point. The profession of safety management 
contains a body of knowledge that is large in size and technical in nature. 
In order to audit an organization to contemporary standards it is 
important to be aware of the range of techniques to look for, be aware of, 
recommend for use, and apply. This takes training and timel 
My fear is that adventure educators may get hold of this document, 
and in the independent manner that typifies the industry, attempt to audit 
themselves. Reasons for this could include: 
- wanting to stay in control of the results 
- believing that they can do it themselves 
- costing less 
- being scared of outsiders observing their operation 
My advice is DON'T. Consider the benefits of having an external 
auditor who is trained in these techniques carry it out for you: 
- provides an objective look at your unique systems and problems 
- validates audit results in terms of application and interpretation of the 
instrument 
- lowers long term costs by being directed to good management methods 
in a shorter period of time. 
- trains your staff by the auditor demonstrating contemporary safety 
management techniques which can be used in the daily running of your 
operation. 
The gains made in having an objective assessment made by an 
expert will far outweigh the costs. The choice of auditor(s) however is 
critical. Not only do these people need to be expert in the outdoor field 
under review, they need to be diplomatic, and be skilled in safety 
management. If you choose your expert carefully, the whole process should 
aid in developing a more efficient and effective program. It is designed to 
be a positive and enlightening experience, and confidential to the 
organization under review. 
Grant Davidson. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This audit arose out of a need that was perceived to exist in the 
adventure education industry - how can a Director of an outdoor program 
measure the effectiveness of the safety program that exists within the 
operation? 
Within the adventure education field one is continually faced with a 
paradox much talked about by those involved; the paradox of the coexistent 
needs for both risk and safety (Mobley, 1981; James, 1980; Ongena, 1981; 
Ewert, 1984b). This is represented this in figure 1 below. 
U ndercontrolled 
(Recklessness) 
RISK 
GOAL 
Non destructive 
challenge 
( 
Instructor ) 
judgement 
Figure 1: Risk vs. Safety Meter for Adventure Programs. 
Overcontrol led 
(Boredom) 
The goal of adventure education programs is to provide the 
participants with an appropriate challenge so that they can grow 
personally in a variety of ways. In order to have challenge, a certain 
amount of risk is required. The presence of risk, by definition, 
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necessitates the possibility of loss (Mobley, 1981 ). This loss can be 
physical (injury, death), emotional or property related. Participants come 
to the program, or are referred, because of the positive outcomes of the 
challenge and it is expected that they will be protected from the negative 
aspects - loss. This is one fundamental difference between adventure 
(self-directed) and adventure education (facilitated) (Ewert, 1984b; 
Hollenhorst, 1987, Ewert, 1988c). 
Adventure education programs must therefore ensure an adequate 
degree of safety controls to balance the risk they undertake. There is 
danger to participants and the organization if they err too far on either 
side of the scale. If too much risk is undertaken, with too little safety 
control, the program can be considered reckless. The long term effect of 
this will be injury, death, property damage and the organization being 
closed down; either through the public not wanting to put themselves at 
risk, through litigation, or through criminal negligence proceedings. On 
the other hand if the organization uses too many safety controls while 
avoiding risk, the challenge element of the program will be gone, 
participants will be bored and the public will not want to use the services 
offered. Boredom may also lead to inattention and the potential for risk 
from this. Hence the paradox and the need to measure safety 
effectiveness of the program. 
Traditionally there are crude measures that administrators can use 
to measure the risk/safety balance existing in their programs.. They can 
listen to what their staff and clients are saying. It is rare that they 
indicate that activities are too risky; if they do program managers should 
pay heed. It is more common that staff and students want to push the 
limits; "We've been doing this for five years, lets extend it and add this." 
or "We've done that activity before, now take us on something really 
exciting." The danger is that rather than the activities being 
.inappropriate, the staff are becoming desensitized to them through long 
exposure, or the client is unable to judge real risk and their actual skill 
level correctly; therefore needing this pointed out to them through good 
facilitation. The potential then is to operate with too much emphasis on 
the risk side of the meter, and be reminded of this one morning as 
administrator with an early morning phone call. 
What is needed is a suitable analytical tool that will provide 
feedback, both qualitative and quantitative, on the effectiveness of the 
safety program within the organization. The results of such an analysis 
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can act as a motivating factor to direct energy and resources into areas 
identified as weaknesses by the analysis. This preemptive approach is far 
more appealing than facing the early morning phone call. 
Within other industries safety professionals have been dealing with 
the successful control of risk through safety programs for many decades. 
To measure the effectiveness of safety programs auditing systems have 
been developed that can be used on small or large industries. A review of 
the knowledge existing in the fields of safety management and adventure 
education led to the creation of this audit instrument. It measures the 
safety effectiveness of adventure education programs against 
contemporary standards. 
In reviewing the safety management literature many similarities 
between adventure education and other industries became apparent. For 
example, smaller businesses generally have a worse safety record than 
larger ones which have larger resources. Those in the adventure education 
field can identify with this; too much to do and too little time to do it, let 
alone try and deal with the intangible aspects of safety - "lets leave 
safety for the instructors to worry about; as administrators we'll get on 
with marketing and fundraising". Also safety management theory has 
shifted emphasis from a traditional approach of inspecting for unsafe 
conditions to an approach based on people; safety being seen as a function 
of attitudes and behaviors. This fits neatly into the intuitive approach 
that adventure educators have: that safety is a "people" issue. The people 
being instructors, participants and managers who should be monitoring all 
aspects of the safety effort. 
These commonalities that continued to show up were encouraging 
indicators that industrial safety management techniques were applicable 
to adventure education. The resulting audit is based on these techniques 
and is people/behavior oriented. 
The audit presented here is believed to be applicable to any program 
which uses adventure education primarily or as a component part of a 
larger program. When administered in an appropriate manner, by an 
appropriately trained auditor, it will provide any adventure education 
program with constructive feedback on the state of its safety 
effectiveness and suggest ways to improve its safety program. 
Grant Davidson, 1992. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE AUDIT 
Traditionally it was believed that safety could be engineered into an 
organization by processes including the correct design of tools and work 
stations, and inspections for unsafe conditions; correcting them to make 
them 'safe'. It is now recognized that an engineering approach is only a 
small part of the safety problem. Unsafe acts can occur in well-
engineered work places, while safe acts can occur in what could be 
considered to be unsafe work places. This aspect has long been known 
intuitively to adventure educators and is represented in figure 1 by the 
pivotal point of the risk/safety meter: program implementation, and more 
specifically instructor judgement. It doesn't matter what safety 
precautions are taken by the organization, the behavior of the instructor 
with the students can change the entire risk/safety balance. 
This audit is based on a people, and thus behavioral, approach to 
safety, as opposed to an engineering approach. This behavioral approach is 
represented in figure 2. 
The model shown in figure 2 suggests that safety effectiveness is a 
function of employee behavior which in turn is dependent on a number of 
factors and interactions. Past and current behavioral influences produce 
current motivation in employees. This motivation to perform, combined 
with ability, is filtered by the safety system and the environment to 
produce the final behavior. The audit is devised in such a way to test each 
of these component parts and their interactions. 
This explains the three part approach of the audit: 
PART 1: Behavioral influences 
PART 2: Safety system 
PART 3: Physical environment and interaction between all components. 
Each part of the audit requires using a different methodology to 
measure the various factors. 
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PART ONE 
lHE BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCE 
PAST a.JRRENT 
Family 
Church 
School 
Peer Grp 
Personality 
Attitudes 
Values 
Individual 
-1 ~ ~ DHferences 
Job Motivational 
factors 
The Job Itself 
Peer Group 
Pressure Norms 
Union 
CURRB'ff MOTIVATION 
CURRB'ff ABILmES 
..... 
....... 
PART TWO 
SAFETY SYSTEM 
Corporate Climate 
Safety Program 
Climate 
Leadership 
style 
skill 
credibility 
Past Performance 
........, Communications I 
PART THREE 
lHE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMB'ff 
+- - - - - - - - --
Physical 
Physiological 
......... ------ • ....... .-~ ....... 
Policy ~ 
CORPORAlE EMPHASIS 
VARIES WITH: 
Accountability 
Systems 
Hazard Control 
Systems 
Motivational 
Attempts 
Records 
Medical Control 
Selection 
Placement 
Training 
Economic Conditions 
Corporate goals 
Products/Tasks 
Missions 
Diversity 
Technology 
Size 
Managerial Skill 
OSHA Emphasis 
, r 
CURRENT EMPLOYEE 
BEHAVIOR 
SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS 
Figure 2: Factors Affecting Safety Effectiveness. (Petersen, 1980. p.29) 
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PART ONE: Audit of the Behavioral Influence. 
(Method of auditing = staff attitudes survey) 
As shown in figure 2, the final safety effectiveness of an individual 
staff member depends on their behavior, and this in turn is determined by 
their motivation to perform and their ability to perform. Their motivation 
and ability are dependent on a number of factors more clearly illustrated 
in figure 3. 
JOB ITSELF 
Fun? 
JOB 
MOTIVATIONAL 
FACTORS 
Achievement? 
Pressures 
PROFESSIONAL 
ASSOCIATIONS 
I 
L 
PE~ BOSS'S STYLE 
l ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE 
MOTIVATION 
BOSS PEER ASSOCIATIONS 
"-1/ 
EXTRINSIC 
I 
PERFORMANCE --....j•·l REWARD 1-~•1 SATISFACTION I 
t 
I ABILITY I 
-/~ 
SELECTION 
Can he/she? 
TRAINING 
Know how? 
-- - -~----
Considered in the safety 
system analysis (Part Two) 
I 
INTRINSIC 
Figure 3: The behavioral system in terms of motivational factors. 
Based on Motjyatjonal Factors (Petersen, 1980, p.83) 
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Each of the various factors, that are indicated in figure 3 as 
affecting motivation, are audited in Part 1 of the audit with the exception 
of ability factors. These ability factors are audited in Part 2 of the audit 
where they are considered part of the organizations safety system. 
It is time intensive to audit behavior directly, and difficult through 
observation to determine causes of the observed behavior. To do so would 
require observers to live in the organization, observing staff continually, 
and monitoring their reactions to various changes and interactions. This 
is not feasible within the constraints of a normal auditing procedure. 
Another approach is to measure behavior indirectly. The Attitude-
Behavior Model shown in figure 4 is a common approach used in research 
to measure behavior indirectly. Beliefs and attitudes that staff hold 
about various aspects of their job are used as indicators of intentions 
(motivation) and thus possible behavior. 
Beliefs 
about 
activity 
Attitude 
_ ..... ..,~ about 
activity 
Intentions Behavior 
--11 .... ~ toward --11....,~ with 
activity activity 
Figure 4: Attitude - Behavior Model Adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
The audit of behavioral influences then, comprises a survey of staff 
attitudes to various aspects of their job. This survey of attitudes is 
divided into component parts as indicated in figure 3. The theoretical 
basis for the inclusion of various questions and the constructs for indexes 
that are measured is explained below. 
CURRENT FACTORS (Audit. Part 1: Questions 1 - 24). 
These are based on the dual factor theory of Herzberg (Herzberg, 
1966). In a comprehensive review of all articles on job satisfaction and 
motivation from 1900 - 1955 Herzberg found that what people said 
positively about their job experiences were not the opposite of what they 
said negatively about their job experiences. In other words factors that 
cause job dissatisfaction are a separate class than those that cause job 
motivation. On one continuum are the factors that if present lead to no 
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dissatisfaction, and if not present lead to job dissatisfaction. These are 
the extrinsic factors such as policies, wages, working conditions, 
supervision - and termed by Herzberg as Hygiene Factors. Hygiene, in the 
medical sense, is a preventive means of stopping illness and disease, but 
its presence does not ensure wellness, just lack of unwellness. Herzberg 
termed these factors hygiene factors because in a similar way they are a 
preventive measure for dissatisfaction. On the other continuum are the 
intrinsic factors such as achievement, recognition, value of the work, 
responsibility, etc - and termed by Herzberg as Motivation Factors. If 
these are present the worker will be motivated to perform, and if absent 
will not be. These two independent continua are shown in Figure 5 below. 
HYGIENE FACTORS 
Dissatisfaction 
MOTIVATION FACTORS 
Unmotivated 
Figure 5: Herzberg's Dual Factor Theory. 
Based on Petersen ( 1988) 
No Dissatisfaction 
(Satisfaction) 
Motivated 
Thus an organization must concentrate on both hygiene factors and 
motivation factors. If the organization does not pay attention to hygiene 
factors, Herzberg's research has shown that employees will be 
dissatisfied and will express this in ways that will be detrimental to the 
organization: grievances, decreased productivity, disloyalty to 
organization (Petersen, 1988, p.140). 
If an organization does not pay any attention to the motivation 
factors, the best that can be expected is an employee who is not 
dissatisfied. These factors act to enrich the job, producing harder 
working, more committed, better performing employees. 
An organization that puts all of its resources into hygiene factors 
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will produce employees that are non-complaining, but apathetic in their 
work, not striving for safety and performance. An organization that 
supplies mostly motivational factors and no hygiene factors will produce 
well motivated workers who build up an increasingly bigger grudge 
against their employers as time goes on - eventually leaving or losing 
motivation. 
Questions 1 - 12 investigate staff attitudes to hygiene factors, 
while questions 13 - 24 investigate staff attitudes to motivational 
factors. 
INTERACTION OF STAFF WITH ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE 
(Audit. Part 1: Questions 25-35) 
These questions are based on the principles of Participative 
Management. 
Participative Management. Studies have shown that a participative 
approach to management results in a higher performance from all 
employees, who show improved attitudes, morale, turnover, etc (Petersen, 
1988, p. 1 05,115, 118). Workers want to be involved in decision-making 
where they feel they have a right to be involved. Through participation 
employees become active in the work place, less dependent on 
supervisors, view themselves as equals, and have self awareness and self 
direction. According to Argyris's Conflict (or lncongruency) Theory this is 
healthy as it is the natural state of adult life (Argyris, 1957). If someone 
is forced to behave in the immature state, which would happen in a 
hierarchical organization, Argyris believes conflict will arise. This 
conflict may cause staff to: 
- quit 
- become apathetic about their jobs 
- lack motivation 
- lose interest in the company and its goals 
- formal informal groups 
- cling to group norms instead of the company's 
- evolve a 'mind-set' that the company is wrong in most things that 
it does. 
The two conflicting states, as described by Argyris, are shown in 
figure 6 along with the management styles that produce them. 
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IMMATURE STATE 
(Childlike) 
Passive 
Dependent on others 
Interests shallow and short term 
Always in subordinate positions 
Lacking in self awareness 
t 
HE/BARCH/CAL MANAGEMENT 
imposes this state on its 
workers. 
Figure 6: Argyris's Conflict States. 
MATURE STATE 
(Adultlike) 
Active 
Independent 
Interests deep and long term 
View themselves as equals 
Have self awareness 
t 
PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT 
promotes this state in its 
workers. 
Based on the information in Petersen (1980) 
The conflict staff feel may in turn lead to inattention, disregard of 
safety rules and a poor general attitude to the company and safety1. The 
normal hierarchical management reaction to this is more control, 
specialization and pressurel Argyris proposes "levelling" by group 
decision-making and group supervision. The emphasis is on involvement in 
the decision-making process so that perceptions of problems are sought, 
ideas on alternative solutions are cultivated, thoughts on implementing 
decisions which have already been made are solicited. Through this 
process group norms become company norms and vice versa. 
This is further supported by the studies of Likert whose research 
showed that the tighter the control over the employee, the lower the 
productivity (Likert, 1967). The more punitive the supervisor is when the 
employee makes a mistake, the lower the productivity. He also supported 
1 NOTE: Other possible reactions to stress are shown in Figure 29. 
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the ideas of participative management through the principles of (1) the 
use of supportive relationships by the manager, (2) The use of group 
decision making and group methods of supervision, and (3) the manager's 
performance goals. 
The first of Likert's principles is echoed in the theory based on 
research from behavioral science and known as Care Control (Petersen, 
1980, p.123). It is built on the concept that if employees really believe 
that management personnel and their immediate supervisors are sincerely 
interested in them and their safety, they will perform in a safe fashion. 
In industry this has shown to greatly reduce accidents and their costs. 
It should be noted that participative management does not mean that 
every employee has a vote in every decision. It does mean that every 
employee has the ability to have input into things that have relevance to 
that person. This is reinforced by the findings of Gausch who studied 
fifteen locations with 10,000 employees and made the following 
conclusions: 
• It is not supported that an expression of strong participation (self 
control, group decision making, and reduced authority) will assure any 
improvement or be related positively to safety experience. 
• It is not supported that an expression of strong authority (warnings, 
threats, reprimands and reduced participation) will assure any 
improvement or be related positively to safety experiences. 
• It is supported that an expression of strongly balanced involvement 
tends to have respectable validity coefficient with improved safety 
experience (Gausch, 1973). 
Thus questions 25 - 37 look at the attitudes the staff hold to the 
climate set by the management of the organization in terms of a 
participative approach. More specifically: 
Supportive relationships (care control) 25 - 31 
Group decision making 32 - 35 
Manager's performance goals 36 - 37 
STAFF INTERACTION WITH THE SAFETY SYSTEM 
(Audit. Part 1 : Questions 38 - 46) 
Whereas in the previous section attitudes of staff to general 
organizational climate were measured, in this section special emphasis is 
placed on attitudes towards the safety system. This is because if the 
safety system portrays an inappropriate image, reactions from staff are 
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more likely to be directed to inappropriate safety behavior. The way the 
worker sees the safety program strongly influences not only behavior on 
the job but ability to learn from and to respond to safety materials. The 
purpose of this group of questions then is to determine if the employee's 
perception of the safety program climate is the same as the employer's, 
and if the climate is appropriate. 
These questions go further than simply addressing participative 
management. They are designed to gauge staff attitudes to the level the 
company is carrying out safety by objectives (S.B.O.) in a participatory 
style (see figure 1 0). 
Safety by Objectives is based on the principles of Management by 
Objectives originated by Douglas McGregor (Petersen, 1988, p.274). S.B.O. 
is considered essential in today's safety programs because it brings these 
qualities: 
- Goal directed behavior 
- Organization-wide method of allocating responsibilities for the 
corporate goals 
- Fosters participation in goal setting and decision making 
- Provides current, quick, regular feedback and reinforcement 
- Sponsors planning at all levels 
- Measures results while allowing freedom of decision and of action at 
lower levels 
- Fosters imagination and creativity in even the largest organizations. 
Thus S.B.O. should be a part of any goal-oriented, high performance, 
participative organization. 
Questions 38 - 40 measure goal setting and communicating 
Questions 41 - 42 measure participative methods 
Questions 43 - 44 measure feedback and reinforcement 
Questions 45 measures training outcome. 
Question 46 is to give a general impression of the staff's attitude 
towards the organization's safety program and is related to general 
company types identified in a study by Social Research Inc. in 1962 (Levy, 
S. & Greene, S. 1962). 
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QUALITATIVE MEASURES (Audit. Part 1: Questions 47 - 55) 
This section of questions was included to gain some qualitative 
feedback from staff on the state of the safety program as it affects them. 
It is based on the premise that the people who are continually in the field 
are the most aware of issues that need addressing, particularly 
concerning immediate risks. 
Questions 47 and 48 should produce the greatest motivational 'Turn-
on" and 'Turn-off' respectively according to Herzberg's factors, for the 
individual staff member. Question 49 and 50 are asking for staff's input 
on changes to make and how they would like to see things changed. 
Questions 51 and 52 address the interaction of the staff with the 
environment in which they work. Staff are often most aware of dangers 
that exist in the work place. Questions 53 to 55 are concerned with 
monitoring systems that should be in place. 
PAST FACTORS. 
The last part of the questionnaire is an attempt to measure the 
stress factors that individual staff members have built up in their 
immediate past due to change experienced in everyday life. The 
accumulation of stress has been shown to be linked to illness and 
proneness to accidents. The tool shown is the Social Readjustment Rating 
Scale (S.R.R.S.)(Holmes and Rahe, 1967). 
This tool has been shown to produce a statistical relationship 
between score and illness and injury experienced (Petersen, 1988, p.298): 
1 00 units scored within 12 months = 37o/o likelihood of serious illness or accident 
200 units scored within 12 months = 51 o/o likelihood of serious illness or accident 
300 units scored within 12 months = 79o/o likelihood of serious illness or accident 
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PART TWO: Audit of the Safety System. 
(Method of auditing = checklist audit with weighting) 
The safety system operating within any program is audited in 
relation to contemporary standards within other industries. Three major 
principles are used as measures of contemporary practice: 
- quality management 
- systems safety 
- multiple causation 
The last two principles are explained later in this chapter, as they relate 
to specific groups of questions. Quality management principles are more 
global in their application and will be discussed briefly here. 
LOSS CONTROL 
~ 
SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT 
Quality Safety 
Systems 
Systems Safety 
Financial 
risks not 
related to 
safety of 
individual 
workers 
Figure 7: Contemporary Safety Approaches 1992. 
Approach 
Other Management 
Concerns 
Figure 7 is a model representing the relationship between various 
components of a contemporary approach to safety management . The 
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universal set is the Quality Systems approach of the organization to all of 
its management issues. Here the principal philosophy guiding the 
performance of the organization is the guality of its products or services. 
This follows a worldwide trend towards more stringent customer 
expectations with regard to quality and accompanying this has been a 
growing realization that continual improvement in quality is necessary to 
achieve and sustain good economic performance (S.A.N.Z., 1987). 
Quality management is the implementation of the quality policy that 
guides the organization. The attainment of desired quality requires the 
commitment and participation of all members of the organization, 
whereas the responsibility for quality management belongs to top 
management. The management therefore sets policy, and from this its 
goals and objectives are determined. Quality systems are set up to ensure 
that these objectives are met. A quality system takes the form of 
organizational structure, responsibilities, procedures, processes and 
resources for the implementation of quality management. An essential 
part of the system is quality control and assurance processes to provide 
feedback and monitoring on performance being achieved in reaching the 
quality objectives. This participative approach to management and 
responsibility ensures the most effective and efficient use of the human 
resources within an organization. 
The one aspect of the organization we are particularly interested in 
is the Risk Management or Loss Control department. These two terms can 
be considered interchangeable for our purpose, and entail the 
responsibilities for preventing and minimizing losses (financial, property, 
physical, etc.) Viewed from a quality systems approach, people in these 
departments are tasked with the job of ensuring a quality safety program 
is in effect at all times, and monitoring the implemented standard through 
quality control processes. 
In adventure education the responsibility of managing risks is most 
often referred to as the safety department or committee, but it must be 
realized that the wider concept of risk management also includes risks 
such as insurance and protection from litigation, etc. Thus when 
protecting a client or staff member safety management is used and when 
protecting the organization risk management applies (Priest & Dixon, 
1990). 
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A quality system is set up to ensure the quality of the safety 
program. The component parts of the organizational structure that a 
quality safety system would include are represented in Figure 8 (simple) 
and Figure 9 (expanded) 
1- Management 
Decisions -------- High 
I ,- r +--, I Participation and 
\ Feedback ~I Performance 
Work Flow 
1/ ,, - \ "' Low ~ \ I I
I ' I I L ' Information ~ I_ 
----
Figure 8: Safety System Congruous with Goal-Oriented. High Performance 
System (simplified version). 
Sjx Elements of a Safety System by W.G. Johnson (Petersen, 1980, p.56) 
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HAZARD 
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Procedures 
8 I I MONITORING SYSTEMS l1 Methods I J. 
I I Level of 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS --1111-~1 Excellence 
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D 
e 
v 
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I 
External Sources I___. ___________ ..... Waste 
Figure 9: Dynamic Safety System - Congruent with Goal-Oriented. High 
Performance System. 
Safety System flowchart by W.G.Johnson (Petersen, 1980, p.57) 
I 
...J 
System 
Falls 
This gives the rationale for the main categories under which Part 2 
of the audit is grouped: 
1) Management Decision Processes 
2) Work Flow Processes 
3) Hazard Analysis Processes 
4) Information and Monitoring Processes (including performance). 
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A) MANAGEMENT DECISION PROCESSES: 
These processes are represented by the following audit categories: 
• 1. Goals 
• 2. Accountability 
• 3. General communication 
• 4. Safety protocols 
• 5. Selection of staff 
• 6. Staff conditions 
• 7. Emergency preparedness 
• 8. Resources 
• 9. Liability 
1. Goals: Goals must be developed and communicated in the areas of 
both educational outcomes and safety outcomes. In this way staff realize 
the close interaction between the two factors, the balance required 
between the two, and the value that management places on safety and 
educational outcomes. The final product being a quality educational 
experience for the students in a safe environment. 
From these goals realistic safety objectives need to be set. In 
setting these it should be remembered that no matter what the standard 
of the safety program, there is no way for all uncertainty and therefore 
all risk to be removed. People will attend programs with undisclosed or 
unknown health problems, other people's driving can cause accidents, or 
freak environmental hazards may occur, to mention just a few. Thus 
setting objectives which aim for no fatalities or injuries is unrealistic 
and setting the organization up for failure in reaching the objective(s). 
More realistic is the approach of setting accident levels equivalent to 
those encountered in everyday life. This is ethically defendable as society 
can't expect a better safety record in adventure education than in the 
normal practices of living. One study puts this level at 0.4 fatalities and 
30 reportable injuries per million participant hours (Ewert, 1984). 
2. Accountability: Without well understood accountabilities 
performance appraisal can't be undertaken. One of the essential tasks of 
management is to reach agreement with staff over performance 
objectives and criteria. These objectives are a key part of the Safety by 
Objectives cycle talked about in Part 1, and illustrated in Figure 10. 
S.B.O. is one means to help implement a quality management approach. 
Objectives set should be related to the production of quality product, 
rather than increasing production quantity. 
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COACH TO IMPROVE 
PERFORMANCE 
DEVISE AND SET 
OBJECTIVES 
With mutual agreement of 
staff involved. 
SAFETY 
BY 
OBJECTIVES 
PBQ\IIDE EEE[)BACK 
Reinforce and reward 
achievement 
Figure 10: Safety By Objectives. Based on Petersen, 1980, p.124. 
It is important that all levels in the organization have a role to play in 
safety and that all levels are held accountable for their performance. The 
various roles that are to be played, and the amount of involvement in each 
role at the various levels is represented in Figure 11. 
TOP MIDDLE SUPERVISORY STAFF PARTICIPANT~ 
MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT 
(Trustees) -~ (Directors) ~r+ (Chief -~ (Instructors ~~ Instructor and and other 
senior staff) 
Instructors) 
ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATION 
ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATION ~
ENFOFK:EM:NT 
and CONTROL 
and CONTROL TRAINING 
ENFORCEM:NT TRAINING 
APPLICATION 
and CONTROL 
~ TRAINING APPLICATION 
and CONTROL APPLICATION 
Figure 11: Roles of various management levels in the adventure 
education safety program. Based on Planek, 1967. 
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It is widely considered that the safety effort should be led by a 
committee which has input from all levels in the organization. This 
committee should be monitoring changes occurring within the safety 
program and keeping the top management team informed of key changes. 
At the middle management level a safety officer should be appointed 
so that the safety effort has a focus in the daily running of the 
organization. Delegation of tasks and performance checks will be the 
responsibility of this officer. 
3. General Communication: This section checks the level of 
communication and participative management occurring within the safety 
effort of the organization. 
4. Safety Protocols: Staff need to be aware of the rules and 
guidelines under which they are expected to be operating; whether these 
are organizationally determined or legislated. Rules or policies serve an 
important role. They are a risk management technique specifying a single 
option for a given set of conditions. They are useful when other possible 
options are considered to leave too great a latitude for unfavorable 
outcomes. For example if a certain environment is considered too 
dangerous to enter in a given set of circumstances, a rule may be put in 
place forbidding entry under those circumstances. This situation can be 
visualized as too great an overlap in the two sources of hazards shown in 
Figures 12, leading to an unacceptably large accident potential. 
Human 
Based 
Hazards 
Environ menta 
Based 
Hazards 
Figure 12: The accident equation. From Hale, 1984, p. 4 
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Figure 13 shows the effect of a rule on the accident equation. A rule 
acts to prevent humans from entering the environment that has been found 
to produce the accident, therefore preventing any potential of an accident 
occurring from that source. 
Human 
Based 
Hazards 
Environmental 
Based 
Hazards 
Figure 13: Effect of a rule on the accident eguation. From Hale, 1984, p.1 o 
The other important use of rules is in disclosing a procedure, use of 
equipment, ratio of staff to students, etc., that would be considered 
negligent if not complied with. 
Rules should act as stress eliminators. They should relieve all 
levels of staff of daily policy decisions in set circumstances. They should 
protect both the instructor and the participants from being placed in 
situations that are of potential danger. 
In some adventure education organizations rules may be acting as 
stress creators. This may be because the rules are so broad in scope that 
they apply to situations that can be controlled by other management 
techniques safely, or simply lack of understanding of the need for the rule 
by the instructors. Consider the case where an organization finds 
students crossing a certain river are getting cut feet (Hunt, 1984 ). A 
manager may impose a rule stating, 'boots shall be worn on all river 
crossings'. The instructors, who are employed for their ability to make 
sound judgement, are placed in a difficult situation when confronted with 
a shallow, sandy bottomed stream that has clear water. The students 
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don't want to get their boots wet, and realize it is perfectly safe to cross 
without shoes. The only justification the instructor can give is that it is 
against the rules. Rather than do this, the instructor might choose to 
disregard the rule. In this way the 'legislative manager' has put the 
instructor in a stressful situation; choosing to disregard an organizational 
rule and all that means, versus carrying out an action which judgement 
states is plainly ridiculous. The situation could be avoided by more careful 
wording of the rule, 'sturdy footwear to be worn in fast flowing rivers, 
rivers with uneven beds, or where the nature of the river bed is obscured 
by discolored water.' 
A test for rules then is that they should only apply to situations for 
which other management techniques are not appropriate. This leaves 
instructional staff empowered in the field. 
For the same reason of empowerment, or ownership and 
understanding, instructional staff should be involved in rule making, and 
have channels to question existing rules. 
Rules should be arrived at through various information channels. The 
most common, and least appropriate, is retroactively through reaction to 
an accident that occurs. Preemptive techniques such as near miss 
analysis and hazard identification processes are to be favored. 
Guidelines should be the accumulated knowledge gained by staff to 
their local conditions or equipment. Using these a new instructor could 
quickly learn what to do or watch out for in this new environment. 
Guidelines are another good method of setting staff up to succeed rather 
than letting each new staff member learn by experiencing failures that 
others have already had to deal with. 
The consequences of disregarding a policy/rule or guideline need to 
be clearly stated so there is no confusion between staff and management. 
The safety protocols need to be communicated in a clear, easy to 
read document. It is a crucial link between the safety goals of the 
organization and the instructional staff. 
5. Selection of staff: As already stated the final safety level 
within any adventure education organization depends on the ability of 
staff to make quality decisions in the field. Recruiting and selecting 
appropriate staff are the first steps in the process. 
In order to know what skills the staff need to possess, various jobs 
they are required to carry out as part of their duties need to be 
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systematically broken down into the requisite skills needed to 
satisfactorily perform them. The skills applicants bring can then be 
compared objectively against this list. The importance of this process is 
highlighted when attempting to gain gender or ethnic balances in staff. 
The most skilled applicant may not get the job, but they are still required 
to meet the skills listed, along with the other aspects they can bring to 
the organization. 
Research into links between accident rates and employee-related 
variables have revealed statistically significant negative correlations for: 
- married versus single staff 
- older versus younger staff (accident rate peaks at age 21 then 
steadily declines. Rates were found to be 2.5 times higher in ages 
between 20 - 24 than older ages) 
- staff who have a longer work history related to the job 
Positive correlations between accident rated and employee-related 
variables have been found for : 
- slow motor skills (in some jobs) 
- sensory impaired (in some jobs) 
- irresponsible, maladjusted and moody individuals 
- males (more than twice the rate of women) 
- those who use alcohol and drugs. 
No correlation has been found for: 
- intelligence 
- mechanical ability 
(Mintz & Blum, 1949; Schulzinger, 1956; Shafai-Sahrai, 1973). 
Thus, the factors we can legitimately screen for, without 
discriminating against sex and marital status are age2, physical condition 
and experience. We may also be able to screen out a very small percentage 
of the population who are 'accident prone'(< 0.5o/o) by finding out about 
accident history. This factor is much less significant than age however. 
On the positive side we also need to ensure the staff member is able to 
communicate clearly and establish respect with the students: be an 
effective educator. 
How to screen is also an important issue. An application form and 
written summary of experience and qualifications is a start. Interviews 
2 In some countries it may be considered discrimination to select using age as a factor. If this 
is the case question 5.5 of Audit Part 2 should be eliminated and more weight placed on the scores of 
question 5.6. 
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are commonly used but research suggests they are generally invalid. This 
is because interviewers' biases and stereotypes invalidate them 
(Petersen, 1988, p.200). Interviewers develop a stereotype of a good 
candidate and seek to match interviewees with stereotypes. They seek 
data to support or deny hypotheses and when satisfied turn their attention 
elsewhere. Contacting referees. especially if they are personally known 
by you, can inform of an applicant's past history. However there is no 
proof that this is in any way indicative of future performance under a 
different set of circumstances. Skill tests can be used to demonstrate 
certain skills under generally artificial conditions. An internship is 
probably the best means to screen applicants - especially over a good 
period of time - and fairest for the applicant in terms of being able to 
demonstrate their abilities. It will also give ·insight into how the 
individual fits into the unique corporate climate. The drawback is time 
(and therefore money) for both the applicant and organization, especially 
if there are many applicants. 
6. Staff Conditions: This category tests how the organization is 
catering for Herzberg's hygiene or dissatisfaction factors. Burnout is a 
common phenomenon in adventure education. The energy that instructors 
must put into successfully motivating, counselling and supervising their 
students is enormous. Often organizations reward this work with poor 
pay, long hours and bad living conditions. This results in overloaded staff 
and results in decreased levels of concentration and therefore decreased 
safety. 
An unfortunate fact about the adventure education industry is that 
organizations sometimes play on the motivation that young people have to 
get work in the industry. These younger folk in particular are considered 
by some to be fair game to work hard and reward little. When these 
instructors 'burn out' they can easily be replaced with new zealots. The 
industry should be beyond that stage now and adopting a responsible 
attitude to work conditions. 
Pay is left off the list to check as it is too subjective a topic and 
sufficient indication of acceptability is given in the staff attitudes 
survey. 
7. Emergency Preparedness: An important part of any risk 
management plan is preparing for when and if the worst happens so that it 
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is possible to minimize the consequences by dealing with the situation 
efficiently. When a crisis occurs those who have to deal with it, whether 
instructors in the field, or secretaries answering a phone call about an 
accident, will be stressed. The stress level can be visualized as in Figure 
14 for the various stages of the incident. At the onset of the incident the 
individual responding experiences a high level of stress, and this is 
maintained as various solutions are tried. 
HIGH 
I 
w 
> w ..... 
en 
en 
w 
a: 
.... 
en 
LOW 
(Confused and 
disorganized) 
CRISIS 
TRIAL AND 
EFFOR 
SOLUTIONS 
SLON RETURN TO 
NORMAL STRESS 
LEVELS 
Normal Level 
-------TIME ----------• 
Figure 14: Profile of a crisis. From Raffan, 1988, p.4. 
These high stress levels, caused by the reaction to the crisis, can lead to 
poor performance in handling the stressful situation. This is diagrammed 
in figure 15. This figure shows that a small amount of stress can lead to 
an increase in ability to handle the situation (due to focussing on the 
problem), but too much stress leads to the individual's performance 
deteriorating rapidly until that person may not be able to respond at all 
(flooding). 
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I 
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I 
FEAR INDEX 
Figure 15: Performance as a function of level of fear. From Ewert. 1985. p.11. 
With the poor performance due to high stress, and the extra time 
taken in trying different possible solutions, the damage caused in an 
incident both physical and emotional can be increased significantly. The 
best way to deal with this is to have prepared plans that people can 
follow in the event of an emergency. This will lead to a lower stress 
level in the emergency as people know what they are doing is right, and a 
faster response time. Together these two factors will act to minimize 
damage. The effect of this controlled response, utilizing an already 
practiced plan, in a stressful situation is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Profile of a managed crisis. From Raffan, 1988, p.4. 
The emergency plan must cover the range of possible incidents that 
could be dealt with, provide a well thought out plan for each one, have 
someone available to carry out the plan, and have resources available. 
Each of these plans should detail who to contact in the organization, 
including all top management (trustees), as these people may be contacted 
by the media for comment and should be prepared. 
8. Resources: This category needs little explanation. In order to 
·ensure quality equipment is available it needs to have a programmed 
turnover period. This aspect is further addressed when each equipment 
type is inspected later in the audit. 
For an organization to cover itself against financial loss due to 
theft, fire or civil disasters it must carry an up-to-date inventory and 
insure items at replacement value. 
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9. Liability: 3 Legal liability is a complex issue and interpretation of 
the law, and the possibility of civil versus criminal proceedings able to be 
brought against an individual or an organization differ from country to 
country, and change with time. The auditor should become acquainted with 
the situation in the locale in which they are carrying out the audit. 
All liability claims of concern to adventure education programs are 
liability in tort or wrongful death arising from negligent acts. Negligence 
can be either malfeance (where a standard of care owed was delivered but 
not of suitable standard) or misfeance (where the standard of care owed 
was not delivered at all). There are four elements necessary for 
negligence: 
(1) a duty was owed by the person in charge to protect the participants 
from undue risk of injury. 
(2) there was a failure to provide the standard of care required. 
(3) there were damages to the participant. 
(4) the breach of duty caused the damages. 
A successful negligence case will have to prove all four points. 
There is no doubt that a duty is owed the participant in adventure 
education activities. The standard of care required is measured against a 
"reasonable and prudent professional". This infers a skill level and 
practices that are contemporary and expert. It also infers adequate 
supervision at all times, quality equipment, activities that take into 
account the physical and mental capabilities of the student and that these 
activities are taught by means of a suitable progression. Finally, the risk 
undertaken must be appropriate to the educative objectives set. These 
aspects are checked elsewhere in the audit. 
A common method used to protect against liability suits is to have 
participants sign releases or waivers of responsibility. These are based 
on the legal principle of "volenti non fit injuria" which may be translated 
to "no harm is done to one who consents". These forms are an attempt by 
the organization to transfer the responsibility of risk to the participant. 
It must be understood however that signing these forms does not take 
away the rights of the individual. A person can not agree to take 
responsibility for risks that they do not begin to understand and 
appreciate. Nor can participants accept responsibility for hidden risks. 
Thus for releases to be most effective the risks have to be explained 
3 The information in this section is based on the work of Betty Van dar Smissen 1980 & 1987. 
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carefully to the participant so that they understand them, the participant 
should be given the opportunity to ask questions, and then activities have 
to be entered into voluntarily. For novices to adventure education 
activities, and minors, and intellectually impaired individuals in 
particular, their ability to assume responsibility for the risk is extremely 
doubtful because they have no understanding of the nature of the risks 
involved. However the release form acts as a good means of disclosing the 
potential risk to these people or their guardians so that they are more 
educated. For an adult improving skills in a particular activity, willingly 
taking part in that activity of which they have previous experience, the 
assumption of responsibility is much clearer. 
This does not release the organization from its responsibilities 
towards negligence however. A standard of care is still owed, quality 
equipment is still expected, instructors need to be trained and qualified, 
emergency procedures need to be planned and activities supervised. 
B) WORK FLOW PROCESSES. 
These processes are represented by the following audit categories: 
• 10. Staff orientation 
• 11. Staff training 
• 12. Programs 
• 13. Screening participants 
• 14. Medical program 
• 15. Personal equipment 
10. Staff Orientation: The orderly, structured and progressive 
introduction of new staff into the organization is critical. It generally 
takes considerable time for someone to familiarize themselves with local 
conditions and equipment, let alone the intricacies of a new safety 
program. The staff member needs to personally meet the middle managers 
in order to open communication channels and be introduced to the 
participative style. Enforcement of management's quest for quality in the 
safety program needs to start with management. The safety program then 
needs to be introduced from educative goals down, and checks made for 
understanding of what is expected. Providing a mentor in the form of ~n 
experienced member of staff is an important consideration especially for 
larger organizations. This provides a formal resource rather than stress 
being placed on the new staff member in finding someone with the time to 
answer questions. 
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Equally, when a staff member changes roles, or begins working on a 
different program there should be an orientation period. This will 
generally be shorter in duration but should allow review of risk 
management plans and a staged assumption of responsibility for the group. 
Thus, for team teaching, a more experienced staff member would be in 
charge or, if solo instructing, close supervision of plans and activities 
would be carried out by a senior member of staff. 
11. Staff Training: Not only are suitable training levels important in 
terms of attaining a quality product and meeting requirements for 
standard of care owed participants, staff training itself can also be a 
strong motivating factor for the employee in the work place if organized 
well. This part of the audit assumes a goal-oriented approach, where the 
employee and some member of management agree to the training 
requirements of that individual staff member and how they will be 
achieved. The goals need to be related to the job and achieving a better 
quality of product. This is made possible by having a complete list of 
skills for the various jobs in the organization. The employee can 
therefore focus on improving in the current job or working towards 
gaining skills in order to carry out a different job, or run different 
programs in the same organization. Gaining and updating professional 
qualifications is an important aspect of remaining contemporary in the 
professional field. 
A technique much favored in industry for training is observing 
positive role models. Thus a great form of training in the adventure 
education field is to allow staff to observe others, preferably experienced 
senior staff, operate with groups and so learn new approaches and 
techniques for situations. 
Training should be an on-going process for all staff, no matter what 
their level or longevity with the organization. Studies have shown that 
·one of the most important aspects in an organizati~n's safety effort is 
management's participation in the program by role modeling behavior. 
Thus management's participation in group training programs and in goal 
setting shows commitment to the rest of the staff. 
Studies have shown that the causes of severe accidents are 
different than those of frequent accidents and are predictable in certain 
situations (Petersen, 1988, p.12). These situations include: 
- Unusual, nonroutine work: normal controls that the organization has 
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adopted have little effect in nonroutine situations. 
- Nonproductive activities: maintenance, research and development; where 
there is little supervision or safety effort. 
- Sources of high energy: in the adventure education field this can be 
height, moving snow, moving water, high speed, etc. 
For this reason these areas are signalled for special attention in 
training, and driving is separated further from the high energy category 
because of the ability to forget about it and the potential to lose a whole 
group in one accident. The company should have a comprehensive defensive 
driving program in place. 
12. Programs: This category is fairly self-explanatory. The first 
question implies a check on management who accept contracts. Do they 
try to bend their own safety rules from the top, and thus stress the 
operational staff, by taking large groups for example? 
Route plans and intentions are important for emergency planning. 
Communication systems are a very subjective matter. Many organizations 
make the carrying of radios mandatory when a certain distance from a 
roadhead. For organizations with skilled staff, whose mission involves 
teaching self-sufficiency in wilderness backcountry techniques, 
dependence on radios for emergencies may be inappropriate. This will be 
for the auditor to judge in relation to other hazard identification and 
reduction processes in use. 
13. Screening Participants: In order to provide a standard of care 
suitable to the participants, it is necessary to have certain base 
information about them. This category checks that adequate information 
is obtained and available to those who need it. 
14. Medical Program: Here the quality of the emergency 
preparedness of the organization is checked in terms of medical 
knowledge and basic equipment. 
15. Personal Eguipment: The quality of equipment available to both 
staff and students will directly affect the quality of the program run. 
Both groups need to be aware of the equipment they are to provide, have 
alternatives for getting it and have it checked for adequacy. 
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C. HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESSES: 
These processes are represented by the following audit categories: 
• 16. Analysis of current activities 
• 17. Analysis of planned changes 
• 18. Analysis of new programs 
Safety management theory has progressed substantially in the past 
50 years. Traditionally organizations used what could be termed 
functional safety. A procedure was tried and used until something went 
wrong with it. Its function was looked at for the mode of failure, changes 
were made and the procedure put back into the work place. This fly-fix-fly 
approach to safety is illustrated in figure 17. 
Figure 17: Functional safety: the traditional fly-fix-fly approach. 
From Roland, 1983, p.10. 
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With the introduction of certain products and procedures such as 
nuclear bombs, nuclear power stations, space exploration and so on, the 
possibility of failures became unthinkable because of the possible losses 
involved. Thus the traditional functional safety approach could not be 
used with these projects. A new approach to safety management was 
created - systems safety. In systems safety the emphasis is placed on 
analyzing the entire life cycle of the project or system for potential 
hazards before the project is undertaken. All possible risks or failure 
points are identified at each stage from conception to termination and 
dismantling. If the risks can not be reduced to an acceptable level, or the 
cost of doing so is too great, the concept is changed and the project not 
started. The life cycle of a system is represented in figure 18. 
Concept 
Termination 
Production 
Figure 18: The Life Cycle of a System. 
In adventure education we are dealing with human lives and 
potential injuries affecting quality of life. A fly-fix-fly approach to 
safety is not an ethical or professional approach to human safety. 
Therefore an organization should be adopting systems safety tools to 
analyze all programs for risk before the programs are tried on actual 
participants. 
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Systems safety offers a range of possible tools including deductive 
methods such as Fault Tree Analysis, and inductive methods such as Fault 
Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis4. Any of these 
methods will work in the adventure education setting although they take 
significant training to use properly. A method of analysis which could 
suit the thinking of adventure educators is that contained in part 3 of the 
audit and termed Risk Analysis and Management System (R.A.M.S.). 
Whatever system an organization uses it should take into account 
the five components of a risk assessment model outlined in figure 19. 
Basic 
events 
Figure 19: Risk Assessment Model. 
Where the: 
( Roland, 1983, p. 283) 
Basic events - are the causal factors that will result in an initiating 
event when they occur in sufficient number and unfortunate order. These 
would be human, machine, or environmental factors. 
Initiating events - are all the possible minor or major accidents 
(risks). 
Consequences - are the possible results of the initiating event, up to the 
point of describing losses. 
Losses - are the results of consequences. They describe mortality, 
injury, morbidity and property damage to the environment. 
Costs - are the values placed on losses. 
16. 17. 18. Current Activities. Planned Changes. New Programs. 
A hazard analysis process should be applied to new programs, 
changes in programs and an analysis should already have been done for 
each existing program. These analyses should be viewed by the safety 
committee for final approval. Top management needs to be aware of the 
4 For more detailed information on these methods refer to texts on safety management 
techniques such as Petersen 1980, 1988 and Roland, 1983. 
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activities carried out at operational level as they are the ones who will be 
ultimately responsible in the eventuality of any liability charges. 
D) INFORMATION AND MONITORING PROCESSES. 
These processes are represented by the following audit categories: 
• 19. Information gathering 
• 20. Staff performance reviews 
• 21. Accident/incident monitoring 
• 22. Planned safety audits 
19. Information Gathering: This category checks the necessary 
information collecting methods to ensure contemporary practices are 
known and pertinent information is available on a daily basis for hazard 
identification purposes. 
20. Staff Performance Reviews: These are another diagnostic tool 
and motivational device. First staff need to be observed in their various 
roles. Then they need to receive quality feedback on how they are 
performing in those roles. By conducting formal reviews staff can see 
that management does care and is making an effort towards them 
personally. All of the various functions of the staff member and their 
various needs can be monitored in this process. Goals and objectives can 
be determined that relate to how the individual fits into the entire 
organization not merely training needs which have been discussed earlier. 
This process acts as a way for management to gain insight into the 
various stresses that are affecting the worker. A way of viewing the 
preparation of objectives from observed occurrences of inappropriate 
behavior is shown in figure 20. This figure can also be used to help 
generate staff training objectives. 
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Figure 20: Preparing training objectives: the employee model. 
From Petersen, 1988, p.59. 
21. Accident/Incident Monitoring: In 1931 H.W.Heinrich, a pioneer in 
the field of safety management, laid down basic principles for accident 
causation and through this model a scientific process for decreasing their 
occurrence. Heinrich studied many thousands of industrial accidents and 
came up with the generalized results shown in figure 21 (Heinrich, 1959). 
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MINOR rNJURIES 
300 
NO -INJURY ACCIDENTS 
·=::: ... 
~-=:· ______________ ·::::· 
1OOO's? 
UNSAFE PRACTICES AND UNSAFE CONDmONS 
Figure 21: The foundation of a major injury. From Heinrich, 1959, p. 27. 
This showed that in a unit of 330 accidents of the same kind and 
involving the same person, 300 result in no injuries, 29 in minor injuries, 
and 1 in a major lost-time injury. This shows the opportunity that exists 
to prevent the major incident by watching for tell-tale signs being 
forecast by smaller incidents and near misses occurring in the work place. 
Thus Heinrich's research shows the value in investigating and looking for 
trends in accidents, incidents and near misses. 
As previously discussed under the heading of Staff Training, many 
types of accidents, especially severe injuries, are often not preceded by 
observable minor accidents or unsafe acts and conditions, but predictably 
occur in certain situations: unusual or nonroutine work, research and 
development work, and where high energy is involved. Thus analyzing 
reported accidents, incidents and unsafe acts and conditions must be 
augmented by training staff to deal with hazards in the situations where 
severe injuries predictably occur. 
Heinrich also points out that underlying the pyramid is a larger but 
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unknown number of contributing unsafe practices and unsafe conditions. 
This is based on his Domino Theory of accident causation shown in figure 
22. This model of accident causation is a linear one in which a 
preventable accident is thought of as a series of five factors in a 
sequence that results in an injury. Each step in the sequence is always 
the result of the factor that immediately precedes it. An accident then can 
be thought of as the fall of the Dominos, one against the other, leading to 
the injury. 
.::::::::: ... 
Figure 22: The five factors in the accident seguence: Domino Theory. 
From Heinrich, ·1959, p.14. 
Heinrich's solution to the accident was to concentrate on the third 
factor; unsafe acts and conditions. By trying to identify these unsafe acts 
and conditions, by supervision or inspection, it was believed that most 
accidents could be prevented. It is now realized that this approach to 
accidents is too narrow a view of the accident chain. Today we know that 
behind every accident there lie many contributing causes that combine 
together in a random fashion to cause the accident. This is the theory of 
multiple causation (Petersen, 1988, p.1 0). Multiple causation says that it 
is important to look beyond the obvious unsafe act or condition for root 
causes, and these root causes often relate to the management system. 
Thus the observed unsafe act or condition should be viewed as a symptom 
of a problem with the management system. 
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This principle has already been utilized in the discussion of how to 
arrive at training objectives for staff using figure 20. If a linear 
approach to accident causation was used, and a staff member was 
observed performing incorrectly, the solution would be to blame the staff 
member and perhaps terminate their employment. Figure 20 shows that 
there may be multiple reasons why the staff member is not performing at 
a suitable standard and all the possible solutions are management driven. 
Multiple causation theory says that it is important to look for trends 
in accidents. incidents and near misses, analyzing each one thoroughly for 
root causes. It is tempting to be content with discovering the easily 
observed unsafe act or condition but this should be considered a symptom 
of a more serious problem with the management system. A systematic 
approach that can be used to look for root causes of accidents, due to the 
management systems in an organization. is shown in figure 23. This 
shows that for any injury or loss due to an accident there may have been 
management errors due to systems failure, overloading of staff, selection 
of the wrong staff, incorrect training of those staff. poor environments 
chosen for those staff to work, or perhaps providing staff with poorly 
designed equipment. 
Figure 24 takes a more detailed look at possible root causes for 
personnel performance errors. This diagram is an alternative way of 
approaching the same information contained in figure 20. It is important 
to restate this in alternative forms because often in adventure education, 
when an accident occurs, it is common to claim the cause of the accident 
was instructor judgement. Often staff are only too willing to buy into 
this analysis. Figure 24 illustrates again what the theory of multiple 
causation states: accident prevention is a management function. 
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Figure 23: The causation model. From Petersen, 1988, p.14. 
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Figure 24: MORT Human Error Fault Tree. From Petersen, 1980, p.n. 
Employee 
motivation less 
than adequate. 
In a similar way, important information can be gained by looking at 
the lessons learned in other organizations, and they can learn from yours. 
For this reason it is good practice to network accident/incident 
information through some collecting agencys so that trends on a larger 
scale can be observed and corrected. 
5 Alan Hale's International Safety Network was developed to help meet this need. 
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22. Planned Safety Audits: Planned evaluations of the safety 
effectiveness of an organization are important sources of feedback. There 
is a large amount the organization can do to audit itself. In terms of 
participative management, and making the safety program personally 
meaningful, it would be hard to find a better way than have members of 
the staff carry out an internal audit in a structured manner. The staff are 
aware of many of the hazards that exist in the work place and empowering 
them to find them, and find solutions, will enforce the necessity for a 
safety program at all. For this reason, and the byproduct of observational 
staff training, it is good practice to have staff continually involved in 
safety sampling practices such as those outlined in Part 3 of this audit. 
The weakness with employee conducted audits is the need for an 
objective look at operational standards, and the uncovering of hazards of 
long-term potential; staff tend to be unaware of these. Other reasons to 
use external auditors include: uncovering or changing politically sensitive 
issues, when time is critical, when impartiality is necessary and when 
the prestige of an outsider would be helpful (Petersen, 1980, p.139). As 
discussed earlier, trained auditors will also have a depth of understanding 
of safety management theory which is unlikely to be equalled by any of the· 
staff. 
It is becoming standard practice in adventure education 
organizations to have an external audit carried out every second year. 
This gives an adequate amount of time to set the audit up and make an 
impact on suggested changes before the next one. Alternating this with a 
thorough internal audit on the in-between years is a good practice. 
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITY INSPECTIONS: 
The current state of both equipment and facilities will give a 
further indication of the effectiveness of the safety system operating 
within the organization. 
23. Eguipment Inspections: As explained earlier a quality program 
will be using quality equipment that meets contemporary standards. To 
maintain such equipment entails a rigorous inspection and maintenance 
program. Tidy and safe storage of equipment helps preserve the gear, the 
users, and the stress on the staff who go to use it. 
Of special mention is the ergonomical design of equipment and 
combinations of equipment held in stock . Is the choice of equipment the 
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best available, in terms of its engineering, for the people who are going to 
be using it? Is it designed to fit the characteristics of the people using 
it? These questions relate to the environment in which it is to be used, 
the load it will get, the physical and mental demands it will place on the 
user and incompatibility with like units. Simple examples would be life 
jackets that are uncomfortable to wear, paddles that are heavy and if used 
on long trips result in repetitive strain injury (R.S.I.) for the users, having 
left feathered paddles and right feathered paddles the same color and so 
easily mixed, having locking carabiners with different locking 
mechanisms thus making it difficult to use effectively, etc. 
24. Inspections of Facilities: The safety of staff and students is 
just as important inside as out. Many accidents occur within the buildings 
of residential complexes because the risks here are considered trivial in 
the minds of instructors who deal daily with more tangible risks in the 
field. Local authorities or government agencies may inspect buildings for 
certain mandatory requirements. This will not make another inspection 
any less effective, especially during the day-to-day running of the 
operation when it is likely to be seen in its most common state. 
If you as auditor are unsure of codes for stairways, fire extinguisher 
placement, etc. these are easily obtainable for your country from various 
agencies. 
PART THREE: Audit gf_!hLPhysical Environment and Interaction 
.QLOther Factors. 
(Method of auditing = safety sampling) 
Within industry, one of the newer methods to measure safety 
effectiveness in the field is known as safety sampling. Safety sampling 
is based on the quality control principle of random sampling inspections 
to determine quality of output without making 1 00 percent inspections . 
. Like all accountability systems safety sampling is also a good 
motivational tool, as each person wants to be sure they are operating as 
safely as possible when the sample is taken. To accomplish this, he or she 
must carry out some safety activities such as training. For this reason it 
is a good principle for organizations to incorporate safety sampling 
within normal work practice. 
Safety sampling works by first preparing a code of unsafe and safe 
practices and conditions that may be observed in the activity to be 
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audited. The sample is then taken by checking each of the listed practices 
or conditions as they display themselves in the course of inspection. In 
this way the number of safe practices and conditions observed can be 
compared with the number of unsafe practices and conditions. Qualitative 
notes should be made as this is carried out for feedback to the people 
observed later. 
Safety sampling can be easily adapted to the adventure education 
field. This practice not only audits the physical environment, it also 
audits the interaction of all the components of the safety system as they 
are exhibited through the behavior of the instructor in the field. These 
various interactions that are audited through safety sampling are shown 
in figure 25. 
BEHAVIORAL 
INFLUENCE 
Staff 
t 
Students 
Figure 25: Interactions audited by safety sampling. 
The key to safety sampling then is to compile a comprehensive list 
of conditions and acts that can be expected for any particular activity. 
This is straightforward if the organization has an operating hazard 
analysis program. The list can be compiled directly from the breakdown 
.of risks and implemented management techniques for each activity. If the 
organization does not have this in place already this is a good opportunity 
for the auditor to initiate a hazard analysis system and show its value. 
There are many systems available from Fault Tree Analysis through to 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis as discussed earlier. However the 
correct application of many of these methods requires significant 
training. 
A hazard analysis instrument was developed that would be more 
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easily useable by the adventure educator. This is based on a technique 
used by the New Zealand Risk Management Training and Assessment 
organization. Their tool did not meet the criteria for a risk assessment 
model outlined in figure 19. For this reason it was expanded to produce 
the Risk Analysis and Management System (R.A.M.S.) shown in Part 3 of the 
audit. The way that the R.A.M.S. instrument meets the five criteria is 
shown in figure 26. 
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Figure 26: Risk analysis model used to determine safety sampling criteria. 
As shown in figure 26, a risk analysis process can be either 
inductive or deductive. The R.A.M.S. system is deductive. First the 
undesired events (major and minor accidents) are documented for the 
activity. For each of these a list of causal factors are listed under the 
categories of people, equipment(machine) and environment. These are then 
considered subjectively in terms of consequences, losses and costs. If the 
risk is unacceptable management strategies are implemented for each of 
the causal factors. One way to help decide which management method to 
employ is based on a frequency/severity matrix shown in figure 27. 
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Figure 27: Risk management using a freguency/severity 
matrix. Adapted from Ewert, 1984, p.29. 
If the frequency of the risk is high, no matter what the severity, it 
is unacceptable. Efforts must be made to reduce the frequency to an 
acceptable level. If this is not possible the risk should be avoided. If the 
severity of the risk is high, but frequency is low,then attempts should 
also be made to reduce the risk. If the risk can not be reduced suitably 
then it should be either avoided (documenting a policy) or transferred (if 
it is necessary to retain the risk to meet educational goals). Transferring 
means disclosing the risk to the participant and having them accept it or 
not. As discussed under liability this necessitates a participant that is 
. sufficiently aware of the dangers to be able to make a decision. A typical 
use for transference is in adult skills courses that necessitates using 
situations of real risk. If the severity of the risk is low and frequency is 
high efforts should be made to reduce the risk. If this is not possible 
these risks should be avoided. We will accept those risks that we assess 
as being low in frequency and low in severity. 
A ·strategy for deciding suitable risk reduction processes is shown 
in figure 28. 
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Figure 28: Decision-making process to decide risk reduction management 
strategies. Based on Hazard Reduction Precedence (Roland, 1983, p.40) 
Once risk management techniques have been listed for each causal 
factor, the R.A.M.S. then calls for emergency management strategies to be 
listed. Emergency strategies are thought through and listed for the same 
reasons that the organization requires emergency preparedness plans: 
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efficiency in an emergency and hence minimization of damages. Relevant 
industry standards should be documented that apply to the activity, as 
these will reflect the management techniques chosen. Potential policies 
and guidelines for staff will naturally follow from the management 
techniques chosen as will suitable skill levels for staff. 
The R.A.M.S. will therefore provide a list of unsafe acts and 
conditions to look for: from the list of causal factors. It will also provide 
a list of safe acts and conditions: from the list of management techniques, 
industry standards, policies and guidelines and necessary staff skills. 
It should be noted that where the R.A.M.S. analysis has been designed 
to be easily adopted and used by practitioners in the adventure education 
industry, it has limitations due to its simplicity. More structured hazard 
analysis tools such as the F.T.A. and F.H.A. will more clearly show the 
interaction of factors leading to various accidents. They will also clearly 
indicate commonly occurring factors which lead to many accidents. The 
other tools are also better suited to analyze specific situations, e.g. 
F.M.E.A. is ideal to analyze the risks associated with mechanical 
equipment. 
Another weakness with the R.A.M.S. tool is that in inexperienced 
hands it would be easy to slip into a linear (Domino Theory) interpretation 
of accident causation, where the user would simply look for a single 
causal factor for each major undesired event. In listing causal factors on 
the R.A.M.S. multiple causation theory must be used. 
Despite the limitations of the R.A.M.S. analysis it still offers a lot 
of power to users. Another benefit is that if it is decided to apply other 
hazard analysis tools to a problem, the previously prepared R.A.M.S. 
analysis will make the task much easier. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
ADMINISTERING THE AUDIT l. 
INformation on administering the audit is grouped in this chapter 
under the headings: 
• Goals 
• Prior to audit 
• The audit itself 
• Interpreting and summarizing results 
• The final debrief 
• The final report 
GOALS: 
In conducting an audit, the auditor(s) should always keep in mind the 
following goals for the audit. 
• To provide feedback that will help the organization improve the 
quality of its safety program. 
• To make the process a positive one for all involved. 
• To be professional, acting as an appropriate role model, in all phases 
of the audit. 
• To make suggestions based on how much more the organization can 
reasonably expect to do. 
PRIOR TO AUDIT: 
First contact: 
The audit should be initiated in response to a request from the 
organization that wants its programs reviewed. It is important that the 
organization is open and cooperative to the entire audit procedure. You 
will want to be sure that their motive for carrying out the audit is a 
genuine desire to improve, not simply to have the process carried out for 
the purpose of meeting long range planning objectives without a desire to 
act on the findings. You need to find out: 
- Who authorized the audit within the organization? 
- Does it have the approval of all levels of staff/management? 
- Who will receive the results? 
- What will be done with them? 
1. This chapter uses information from the Outward Bound Safety Review Manual (Wade & 
Fischesser, 1988). 
You as audit leader need to set the parameters for the audit with the 
organization. Agree on: 
- what will the scope of the audit be in terms of field activities to be 
audited? 
- who will be the contact person at management level within the host 
program? 
- who will act as knowledgeable guide from the host program for the audit 
team? 
- what are the budget constraints for the audit? 
- what are the time constraints? 
As audit leader, it is your responsibility to ensure that the 
parameters mentioned above will permit a quality audit to be carried out. 
The process can not be compromised by a lack of budget, or by time 
constraints, as this will be reflected in the results. 
Selecting the team: 
Once the guidelines are established it is necessary to decide on the 
other members who will make up the audit team. For a small organization, 
where the activities to be reviewed are within your field of expertise, 
there may be no team. For a larger organization, with widespread 
activities, and activities of varied nature, it will be necessary to carry 
out the audit in team fashion. The added advantages of a team approach 
are being able to finish the audit in a faster time, having a wider 
combined knowledge, skills and background to bring to the task, and most 
importantly, being able to discuss problems and share responsibility. 
The team should be chosen for what they can offer individually to 
the entire audit team's effort. The potential team members should be 
discussed with the host program. Any controversial choice should be 
replaced with someone who is mutually agreeable. A participative and 
collaborative atmosphere should be established and maintained throughout 
the audit. 
The ideal team would be a group of mature, technically skilled and 
experienced individuals who possess good listening and feedback skills. 
They should be objective, articulate, pleasant, tactful and diplomatic and 
have a concern for the development of the entire profession. They should 
have a wide and varied background in different aspects of the field of 
adventure education. 
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Background information: 
You as leader should coordinate the dates of the audit with the team 
members and the host program. The length of the audit will be determined 
by the size and variety of the activities to be reviewed but will be rarely 
longer than seven days. The audit must be timed for when the activities 
to be reviewed will be in operation to permit observation and safety 
sampling. 
Prior to the audit collect as much written material as possible that 
will orient the audit team to the program prior to arrival. This could 
include: 
* Student orientation information 
* brochures describing course programs 
* trust board handbooks with mission statements and goals 
* Instructor handbooks with policies and guidelines 
* staff training plans 
* past safety and accident/incident reports 
* prior safety audits 
* table of organizational structure 
:It job descriptions 
* timetable of activities during the auditing period 
* other information that will help to orient the auditors to the host 
program. 
You should talk to the host program director and discuss any issues or 
concerns they believe the team should be aware of and focus on. There 
may be confidentiality issues that the audit team will have to respect. 
The leader coordinates travel and accommodation of the team 
members. 
Preparations at the host program: 
Often the audit team will not have worked together before, and some 
will not have close knowledge of this audit process. It is a good idea to 
spend time upon first arriving at the program site getting to know each 
other. Have the host program's guide, who will be with the team 
throughout the process, at this meeting as well. Go through the audit 
itinerary and discuss the various roles of members of the team. Answer 
questions, ease anxieties, and generally set a positive tone for the audit. 
When first arriving at the program offices make sure you meet the 
site management and introduce your team. The team should then be 
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introduced to the staff, and the audit process explained to them. Give 
these staff the opportunity to ask questions. The staff should be 
encouraged to be open, honest and candid. They should be told that they 
are encouraged and expected to share their safety concerns with the audit 
team members. 
THE AUDIT ITSELF: 
You as team leader are responsible for ensuring the parts of the 
audit, and scope of the audit as agreed to with the host program, are 
adequately covered. Assign tasks to various members of the team and 
have team meetings regularly to ensure the process is going smoothly. 
Auditors must maintain a professional demeanor at all times. Establish 
ground rules that include the following: 
* appropriate behavior 
* appropriate dress and language 
* no criticism of the program or staff to participants 
* no taking over activities, even if the auditor feels they can do it 
better than the staff they are observing 
* no recruiting of staff or students for another program 
* absolute confidentiality of findings. 
Part 1: Staff Survey. 
Get all members of the host program staff to complete the staff 
survey instrument. In addition interview as many of the staff as possible. 
The staff are the most knowledgeable about safety practices and 
concerns, and the management approaches operating within the 
organization that set the corporate climate. Interviews can be very 
informal; over a cup of tea or coffee, at a meal, or during a break in the 
programmed activities. When interviewing be aware of probing for signs 
of stress evident in the organization. Stress will often be the cause of. 
. inattention and accidents. The symptoms to be probed for are listed in 
figure 29. 
Of note is the fact that there are many more unhealthy reactions 
than healthy, and that many of those reactions that are healthy to the 
worker are unhealthy to the organization. Unionizing can be translated as 
simply forming groups where the norms are different from those 
supported by the organization. This behavior is commonly seen in 
adventure education settings in the form of small groups of discontented 
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individuals who share resentments to one or more managers, often 
without verbalizing these thoughts directly to the managers involved. 
REACTION OPTIONS 
HEALTHY REACTIONS UNHEALTHY REACTIONS 
For Individual 
AGHT FUGHT RGHT FUGHT 
Unionize Get promoted To Individual To To Individual 
To 
omanizatlon oraanization 
Participate Hostility Ignore rules Ignore rules Accept 
- committees mediocrity 
- quality circles Frustration Quit Accept 
(turnover) mediocrity Turn off 
Ignore rules Stress & creativity 
Illness Subjective Tum off 
Quit injuries creativity Goal shifts 
-fake 
Subjective Goal shifts Substance 
injuries Use workers abuse 
- fake compensation Substance 
- users workers abuse 
compensation Alienation 
-sabotage 
Use sick leave 
Use sick 
Venting leave 
- scream room 
- hit room 
- kick dog 
Figure 29: Reaction options to stress. From Petersen, 1988, p. 133. 
If there are a large nu~ber of staff to be surveyed in the 
organization, auditors should consider the value of coding the response 
sheets to allow analysis for the different levels of management being 
surveyed. In this way it is possible to tell if any particular level has 
better or worse attitudes to their jobs than others. This may give 
valuable information on how best to implement improvements into the 
organizational systems. If this coding is done, auditors should take care 
not to breach their promise of anonymity to respondents. 
Part 2: Safety System Audit: 
You will need to arrange to go through this part of the audit with a 
well-informed member (or members) of the management staff of the host 
program. The best choice would be the program director and the safety 
officer. These may be the same person. Work through the categories one 
by one explaining your marking rationale as you proceed. You should have a 
good understanding of much of the host program's documentation already 
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which will speed up the process. Make notes as you proceed. 
Note that scoring is carried out in two separate ways. The items 
marked 'PJ' are scored subjectively, up to the points indicated, based on 
your professional judgement as to how well the organization meets the 
criteria. Those marked 'AN' are simply awarded all the points, or none, 
depending on whether the criteria are met or not. Starred items require 
some form of verification that the criteria are being met. 
It is possible that there are components of the safety system audit 
that. are not applicable in the culture that you are applying it. Some 
language may also require modification to suit the program and culture. If 
possible make necessary changes to the document, and to scoring sheets 
before the audit is conducted. 
Part 3: Physical environment and interaction of factors: 
This part of the audit has the greatest potential to reveal quality 
feedback on the operating effectiveness of the host program's safety 
program. It also has the greatest potential to alienate host program staff 
to the audit process if carried out in an insensitive manner. 
The first requirement of the auditors involved in safety sampling is 
that they are familiar with using the R.A.M.S. system, or an equivalent or 
better analysis tool, to prepare a list of safe and unsafe conditions/acts 
to audit for. The auditors should be constantly aware that there may be 
more than one way to achieve the program's goals, and manage different 
elements of risk. The host program may have a totally different way of 
doing something than the auditor is familiar with. They should be 
prepared to change their R.A.M.S. analysis to incorporate the host 
program's methods if they are suitable. Reviewers can expect to 
contribute their own ideas and experience, and also to take new ideas 
home. 
The R.A.M.S. analysis takes time to complete, but will act as a 
valuable resource for the host program, their staff, and yourself in the 
. future. Remember that any analysis is specific to location and 
implementation although there will be many similarities for the same 
activity transferred to a new setting. For example a R.A.M.S. analysis of a 
top roping session on an indoor wall will differ from one on an outside 
cliff, which in turn will differ from one on a cliff in the mountains. The 
audit team should discuss the R.A.M.S. analyses as a group before using 
them. The various components of the R.A.M.S. can be best developed using 
the combined experience of the team. An example of a completed R.A.M.S. 
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for a trust fall activity is shown in figure 30. 
The auditor should adopt a non-participative observation role. Brief 
the instructor in charge of the session beforehand on what you intend to 
do, and ask if there are things you can do that will make it easier for 
them. Remember that many instructional staff will be intimidated by the 
audit process. Try to alleviate these fears, making them aware that you 
are not aiming to make value judgements about the instructor, but rather 
to provide quality feedback to management on the effectiveness of their 
systems. Be as unobtrusive as possible. There are times when having an 
observer present would not be appropriate in terms of dynamics happening 
in the group; e.g. processing and counselling. The auditor must always be 
sensitive to inappropriate intrusion. However, if the staff and students 
have been properly briefed, an audit team member is usually welcomed by 
the group. The auditor should be prepared to give a brief description of 
the purpose and benefits of safety audits when they are introduced to the 
group. Informing people why the team is present helps to create an open 
atmosphere and remove negative impressions of cold, impersonal 
investigators. 
Auditors should be discrete in making notes and not make verbal 
comments, or nonverbal (body language) ones, about their interpretation of 
how the session is being conducted while the students are present. It is 
desirable to give the instructors feedback when an auditor has been 
observing an activity, when that activity is completed. Feedback to the 
instructor should cover positive features observed and any constructive 
points you may have to improve quality in the future. Generally, any major 
judgements about instructor actions, or lack of, in terms of safety 
practices (physical, social or emotional) should be communicated first to 
the host program manager. Making judgmental statements tends to close 
off further communication with the program staff. It is recommended 
that these personnel or activity issues be left for a later, more focussed, 
review when a range of opinions and views can be solicited. 
It is imperative that the audit team discuss a proposed course of 
action for the possibility that they observe an action or condition which is 
obviously of great risk to participants. It would be extreme negligence to 
let the condition prevail, and allow a participant to get injured, but the 
situation is sensitive in overstepping the authority of the instructor in 
charge. Discuss your proposed plans with the management of the host 
program and get their approval. 
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~~~~@~~~~~ ®W®Y~~ 
NAME: lns+ruc+or Jones DATE: Z/Z3/9Z 
ACTIVITY/SITUATION:Trus+ ra/1/ni+ia+ive e~terclse a+ Camp Li++le Lake 
UNDESIRED 
Faller hits 9rounJ lrom hel9ht anJ Is lnJurcJ 
EVENT(S) Catchers arc lnJurcJ Jurl"9 the exercise 
Accident, injury, StuJcnts Jo not want to take parl In activity 
other forms of F allcr Is emotionally or socially Jama9cJ In activity. prcvcntln9 participation In luturc cvcttts. 
damage. 
People Equipment Environment 
T au9ht poor catch1119 tcc,.,lfJUC Inappropriate take-oil polrtt Uneven terrain lor catchers 
T au9ht poor laiii"!J tec""14fUe -too ltl9h Slippery terrain 
'Poor communication -Insecure W eathCr unsuitable 
CAUSAL P-r ,.-oup control - 'foo uneven 
FACTORS 
Too lew ca'fchers lna";f.roprla'fc clo'fltln9 
Too many parllclpartts S'fu cn'fs wearln9 Jewellery. 
StuJen'fs have special nccJs watches. 9lasscs. etc. 
Clears. anxieties. ctcJ 
StuJents mcJical pr-oblems 
Instructor aware ol correct Choose appropriate take-oil Choose site that Is 1/a'f 
catchin9 anJ lalllf19 tec,.,l'fues point Check tNeatltcr: past anJ present 
lns'fruc'for sklllcJ at commun- Cltcck 11' lor. secureness Be J:cparcJ to chan9c activities 
c lcatlon Have 1-se clotltln9 tucked In I tNeatltcr chan9cs 
0 Instructor skllleJ at 9roup Remove Jewellery. 9lasscs. etc 'Dress lor weather 
-
control Check s'fuJcnts Jress .. Set minimum numhcr In 9roup ca .. Set maximum numhcr In 9roup 
CD Have knotNieJ9e ol 9roup 
c. 'Disclose risks and precautions 
0 Usc ca'fchin9 'fcc,.,ICifue that Is 
9endcr sensitive 
-
Usc mcJical lorms lor 
~en ca parllclpan'l's to Jisclosc E history Zw .. A/lotN challen9e hy choice W- 0 ~==CJ z 
cnWW 
-
CJ~ 
a: <C<C 
za: 
<C~ Have llrst aiJ kit a'f hanJ 
:a en >- lnstruc'for CifUallllcJ In llrs'f aid skills u Instructor skllleJ at 9roup skills anJ communication to hanJ/e cmcr9ency 
c O~anlzation has preparcJ an cmcr9cncy plan lor lnJurucslacciJcnts 
CD T akc spare c/odt1n9 II approprla'fc 
en .. 
CD 
E 
w 
Figure 30: Completed R.A.M.S. analysis for trust fall activity. 
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' 
RELEVANT 
INDUSTRY 
STANDARDS 
APPLICABLE 
POLICIES AND 
GUIDELINES 
RECOMMENDED 
SKILLS 
REQUIRED 
BY STAFF 
FINAL 
DECISION ON 
IMPLEMENTING 
ACTIVITY 
Project Adventure- recommend a progression of trust activities leading up to the 
trust fall 
AE.E. - recommend participants remove jewellery and objects from pockets. Glasses 
should be retained by straps. Staff should explain group goals ancl dangers. 
Technique should involve catchers' hands 'zippered not held leads to dislocation 
Recommend that the fall is from a height no greater than that of the catchers 
elbows. 
Instructors to have observed the exercise carried out by a senior member of staff 
previously 
The take-off point should be no higher than shoulderheight elbow-height better 
Minimum of eight catchers in the group 
Maximum of 1 {, people in group 
Carry first aid kit 
Emergency plans on file 
Instructors first aid certified 
Trained in group dynamics and communication skills 
Observed initiative exercises before 
Choose one 
Accept VI 
Comments: 
Safe and challenging activity with precautions listed above 
I Reject 
Figure 30 cont.: Completed R.A.M.S. analysis of trust fall activity. 
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Safe Acts and Conditions Seen Unsafe Acts and Conditions 
Instructor Dependent Factors: 
Correct catching technique used 
Correct falling technique used 
GooJ dear Instructions 
Goocl group control 
GooJ s+onclorr:J of supervision 
Correct number of porllclponts 
Students special needs surveyed 
Medico/ problems clisdosecl 
Foiling platform stable 
F olltng platform correct heigh+ 
Appropriate dothtng wom 
Clothing +uckecl In 
..Jewellery removed 
Other objects (e.g. glosses) secured 
Catchers s+oncllng on even terrain 
Weather suitable 
Risks disclosed to students 
Students allowed challenge by choice 
First old kit ovolloble 
Spore clothing ovolloble (Jf appropriate) 
Poor catching technique used 
Poor falling technique used 
Poor tns+ruc;~~: Jtven 
Poor group 
Poor supervision 
Inappropriate number of porltclpon+s 
Students special needs no+ surveyed 
Medical problems no+ cltsdosed 
F olltng platform unstable 
Foiling platform Incorrect hetgh+ 
Inappropriate do+hlng wom 
Clothing loose one/ no+ tucked In 
..Jewellery no+ removed 
Other objects left Insecure 
Catchers s+oncllng on uneven terrain 
Weather unsuitable 
Risks no+ cllsdosecl to students 
Students no+ given option of participating 
First old kit not ovolloble 
Spore do+htng no+ ovotlable 
Management Depenc/ent Factors: 
Instructor first old certified 
Instructor trained In group dynamics 
Instructor trained In communication skills 
Instructor has been trained In this exercise 
Guidelines set for group numbers (max & min) 
Gutclslfnes set for max heigh+ of falling platform 
Guidelines set to corry first old kit 
Instructor not certified 
Instructor not trained In gp. clynom/cs 
Instructor no+ trained In communication skills 
Instructor no+ +rained In this exercise 
No gulclellnes set on group numbers 
No guidelines set on height of platform 
No gutclellnes set to corry first aiel kit. 
Fig~re 30 cont.: Completed R.A.M.S. analysis of trust fall activity. 
Seen 
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INTERPRETING ANP SUMMARIZING RESULTS: 
Part 1: Staff survey of behavioral influence: 
Summary figures should be prepared that give an indication of indexes for 
- hygiene factors Questions 1 
-
12 
- motivation factors Questions 13 24 
- supportive relationships Questions 25 
-
31 
- group decision making Questions 32 - 35 
- manager's performance goals Questions 36 
-
37 
- participative approach in general Questions 25 - 37 
- safety goal setting and communicating Questions 38 - 40 
- safety participative involvement Questions 41 - 42 
- safety feedback and reinforcement Questions 43 - 44 
- safety training outcome Questions 45 
- safety program in general Questions 46 
These are calculated by calculating a mean score in each index (question 
group) for each staff member. An average mark between 1 and 7 (to two 
decimal figures) should be reported for each index. As these marks are 
calculated watch for trends which indicate factors found particularly 
good by staff, and those found consistently lacking. Also look for groups 
of staff who may be very dissatisfied with a particular index (score low 
consistently) and others who may be having their needs met well (score 
high consistently. Even one staff member who is dissatisfied with a 
particular aspect of the organization is worth noting. This could be the 
worst situation in some ways because a discontented social isolate could 
have unsafe behavior as his/her only outlet for their feelings of 
frustration. 
An organizational mean for each index should then be calculated by 
averaging the means of each staff member in each index. The range for the 
index should also be noted. Other descriptive statistics should be 
calculated if necessary to adequately describe the resultant distribution 
e.g. standard deviation, mode(s), etc. 
A mean score for any index of 3.0 or less would be considered low. 
An average for any index of 5.0 or more would be considered high. Scores 
between 3.0 and 5.0 indicate interpretation should be done with caution, 
taking into account other information attained from interview. The 
organization may be going through a transition period in the factor being 
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measured, individual results scoring in either extreme may be canceling 
each other out, or the factor may only be being achieved within the 
organization to an average level. 
Plot the resultant means (with range) in graphical form to visually 
summarize results 
The following chart will act as an aid to interpretation of results. 
Factor 
Hygiene Factors 
Motivation Factors 
Supportive Relationships 
.Lm!.._Score 
Extrinsic needs are not 
being met. Staff are 
dissatisfied with the 
conditions under which they 
work and their material and 
social rewards. Over time 
this will lead to disillusioned 
staff who become 
increasingly resentful of the 
organization. Their attitude 
to all aspects of work, 
including safety will suffer. 
Intrinsic needs are not being 
met. Staff are not turned 
on by their work. They may 
not value their work, feel 
responsible, be involved in 
decisions. At best they will 
carry out their job in order 
to get material rewards. At 
worst they will be 
uninterested, unproductive 
and unsafe. 
Staff do not feel that 
management is interested in 
them and their safety. A 
result can be that they will 
not be safe. 
High Score 
Extrinsic needs are being 
met. Staff are content with 
material and social rewards 
and the work conditions 
generally. 
Intrinsic needs are being 
met. Staff are highly 
motivated to do well. They 
are keenly interested in their 
work and motivated to 
improve their product. 
Staff feel that management 
has a strong interest in them 
and their safety. They will 
attempt to be safe in return. 
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Factor 
Groyp Decjsjon Makjng 
Manager's Performance 
~ 
Participative Approach in 
General 
Safety Goal Settjng and 
Communication 
Safety Participative 
Involvement 
Low Score 
Staff do not feel part of the 
decision making system. 
They are made to feel 
subordinate, dependent and 
passive. This reduces 
motivation to perform and 
can cause rebellion against 
the administration and 
imposed safety policies. 
Staff feel managers have an 
inappropriate style for them 
and show little recognition 
for their work. This can lead 
to resistance to the safety 
programs of management 
and loss of interest in work 
in general. 
Staff feel they have little 
role in the workings of the 
organization. The best that 
can be expected is passive, 
dependent staff. At worst 
the staff rebel against the 
lack of involvement either 
directly against the 
hierarchy or by ignoring 
safety rules and guidelines. 
Staff are not aware of 
safety goals, are not made 
accountable for 
performance and are not 
driven to produce and 
expect quality. This leads to 
poor attainment of safety 
standards throughout the 
organization. 
Staff do not feel involved in 
the safety program and 
therefore are not 
committed to it. 
High Score 
Staff feel empowered in the 
decision making system. 
They see themselves as 
equals, are independent and 
active in the organization. 
This leads to interest and 
motivation. 
Staff feel that management 
style and recognition of their 
work is good. This leads to 
motivation to continue to 
perform well in the future. 
Staff feel actively involved in 
all the workings and decisions 
of the organization. They 
feel aligned with it. As such 
they are motivated to help 
build a better and stronger 
organization as part of the 
team. 
Staff are aware of safety 
goals, know they are 
accountable to them and 
understand that quality 
results are expected. This 
leads to staff striving for 
quality performance. 
Staff feel actively involved in 
the safety program and as 
such feel committed to it. 
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Factor 
Safety Feedback and 
Reinforcement. 
Safety Trajnjng Oytcomes. 
Low Score 
Staff are not given enough 
feedback or reinforcement 
by good role modelling of 
expected behavior. As such 
they do not feel their work is 
valuable and do not know the 
standards that the 
organization expects. Their 
is no demand for quality 
performance and thus 
safety standards drop. 
Staff feel ill prepared for the 
jobs they are asked to do. 
They are placed in positions 
of stress because of this 
which compounds the safety 
problem further. 
High Score 
Staff are getting a good level 
of feedback and role 
modelling of expected 
behavior. They know the 
quality standards expected 
by the organization and 
strive to meet them. 
Staff feel well prepared for 
the jobs they are asked to 
perform. They are 
comfortable in their work 
and confident in their 
abilities to handle the work 
situation. 
Graph the mean and range for each index on the form provided in the 
appendix. Summarize the qualitative feedback provided by staff in note 
form, stressing trends in particular; both favorable factors and those in 
need of improvement. Finally, summarize the background stress levels of 
staff according to the categories shown on the summary sheet. 
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Part 2: Safety system audit: 
Summarize the results of the audit using the summary sheet in 
Appendix Ill. Graph the percentages attained for each index based on these 
results. At the end of this summarize the qualitative comments you have 
made. 
Interpretations should be made of these figures with suggestions of 
improvements that could feasibly be implemented within the organization. 
For any section the scores can be interpreted as: 
Oo/o- 50% Low - major components are missing from the safety 
system to adequately address this factor. 
50o/o - 80o/o Medium - The organization is making some efforts in this 
category however changes still need to be made to the 
safety system to ensure the factor in question is 
appropriately covered. 
80% - 100°/o High - The safety system is doing a good job at meeting 
the requirements of the factor in question. Some fine 
tuning is probably all that is required. 
Low scores for any index can be interpreted: 
MANAGEMENT DECISION PROCESSES: 
1 Goals 
The organization requires clearly defined and communicated goals in order 
to demonstrate to staff its commitment to safety and a quality product. 
2 Accountability. 
An accountability system must be established for every level of the 
organization so that everyone is aware of their role and the 
interdependence of roles. In this way people realize that they are 
.responsible for the final delivery of that stated responsibility, and can be 
measured against the standard expected. 
3 General communication 
Communication lines must exist within the organization so that everyone 
is aware of what is happening at all other levels. In this way people will 
feel part of the general safety effort and feel they are part of a team 
working towards a common goal. 
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4 Safety protocols 
An organization should possess a set of written protocols based on the 
knowledge gained from the past experience of staff within the 
organization and pre-emptive analysis of possible risks. These should be 
communicated to staff in order to set staff up for success in the field. 
When the organization states these protocols it is equally important to 
state the consequences of not following them. At the same time they 
should be worded in such a way as to be situationally variable so as not to 
restrict an instructor to following them when they would be unsuitable. 
There should also be a formal way for staff to have input into the 
alteration or addition of protocols so that they are empowered and have 
ownership of them. 
5 Selection of staff 
Staff should be screened in a systematic way in order to get the best 
match of skills for the role they are to fulfill. 
6 Staff conditions 
Staff should be working under conditions that eliminate unnecessary 
stress. This should allow suitable non-contact time, provide support in 
times of personal problems/issues, and opportunity for personal growth. 
7 Emergency preparedness 
Well thought out emergency plans will reduce stress on staff in times of 
emergency and help ensure the quality of response at those times. 
8 Resources 
The staff require quality resources in order to carry out quality programs. 
It is managements responsibility to make this happen. 
9 Liability 
· The organization should take reasonable steps to protect itself from the 
possibility of litigation which could signal the end of any adventure 
education operation. 
WORK FLOW PROCESSES: 
10 Staff orientation 
New staff, or staff assuming new roles in the organization, need to be 
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given a formal orientation to that role. This should include 
responsibilities, disclosure of risks and should be checked for 
completeness. A mentor should be formally appointed so that each staff 
member has someone whose responsibility is to answer questions and help 
with orientation. It should not be left up to the individual to continually 
have to impose their questions on others. 
11 Staff training 
Staff should be regularly setting goals for further training, with the help 
of management, and receive assistance to attain these goals. The quality 
that is expected of them should be demonstrated by good role models in 
the organization. 
12 Programs 
Programs should be set up to meet the same safety protocols expected of 
staff. In addition communication lines should be established so that 
parties in the field can be located should the need arise. 
13 Screening participants 
Participants should be screened for possible risks before any program is 
undertaken. 
14 Medical program 
The organization is required as part of its duty to the client to be able to 
provide quality treatment in case of incident occurring. 
15 Personal equipment 
Staff and students should be using quality equipment in any program to 
prevent unnecessary risk from this potential source. 
HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESSES: 
· 16 Current activities 
All activities should be systematically analyzed for potential risks. 
Management strategies should then be developed for each risk and this 
information available to staff. Technology and techniques change and so 
these plans should be updated at regular intervals. If staff see potential 
hazards in the field there should be a mechanism whereby there concerns 
can be officially registered and they know that they will be actioned. 
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17 Planned changes 
All planned changes to programs should be analyzed for risks, and plans to 
manage the risk developed before the changes are implemented 
18 New programs 
All new programs should be analyzed for risks, and plans to manage the 
risk developed before the new programs are implemented) 
INFORMATION AND MONITORING PROCESSES: 
19 Information gathering 
The organization should have available all contemporary information 
pertaining to its field of operations in order to make decisions. 
20 Staff performance reviews 
As a follow-up to accountability, staff should regularly take part in 
structured performance reviews in order to receive quality feedback on 
their to measure their achievement of set goals. This should allow a new 
set of goals to be set to motivate even higher quality in the future. 
21 Accident/incident monitoring 
A procedure should be in place that allows information tp be gained from 
accidents/incidents/near misses such that they can be prevented from 
being repeated in the future. Multiple causation principles should be 
employed so that all causes are remedied. 
22 Planned safety audits 
Regular external audits should be planned and carried out so that the 
organization can get objective views of their safety effectiveness. 
EQUIPMENT INSPECTIONS: 
Steps should be taken to ensure that each type of equipment is in a safe 
·operating condition and should be stored, have a maintenance program in 
place, and checked so the quality of operation is continually guaranteed. 
INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES: 
Each building or facility should be made free from dangers to the users. 
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Part 3: Physical environment and jnteractjon of factors: 
For each activity, summarize observations on the summary sheet 
provided in Appendix IV. Do this first in a quantitative manner by simply 
stating the number of safe acts/conditions observed and the number of 
unsafe acts/conditions observed. Express the safety quality attained for 
the event as two percentages: one for the instructor dependent factors and 
a second for the management dependent factors. Where: 
number of safe events 
safety quality = -------------------------- X 1 o 0 
total number of events 
Summarize observations, both safe and unsafe, in the space provided 
and attach the completed R.A.M.S. analysis. 
Making recommendations: 
From the results of the individual parts of the audit the team should 
compile an interim report. This will summarize the safe acts/conditions, 
so that the host program can build on what it is doing well, and also the 
unsafe acts/conditions as feedback required to improve quality. 
Each of the unsafe acts/conditions should be explained in full as to 
the impact it could have on the staff, participants and organization. It 
should then be assigned a quantitative risk score according to the formula 
below. 
Risk Score = Consequences x Exposure x Probability 
Where: 
Consequences 
Degree of severity of consequences 
Catastrophe: numerous fatalities or extensive damages, 
major costs to organization, major disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 00 
Major: fatality or serious damages and costs to the 
organ1zat1on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 
Serious: extremely serious or disabling injuries or 
large costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 
Notable: injuries requiring professional medical 
attention, lost work time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Minor: minor cuts, bumps and bruises; minor damage . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
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Exposure 
The hazard event occurs 
Continuously: many times daily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Ereguently: approximately daily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Usually: from once a week to once a month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Occasionally: from once a month to once per year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
Rarely: has been known to occur or known to be possible . . . . . . . 1 
Probability 
That the accident sequence, including consequences, will occur: 
Most likely: expected result and consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Quite possible: would not be unusual, an even 50/50 chance . . . . 6 
Unusual: unlikely to occur, but not to be ruled out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Rarely: extremely unlikely but has been known to happen . . . . . . . . 1 
Examples: 
1) A high zip-wire (flying fox), used every day by groups, is found to have 
a defective pulley due to no inspection program being in place: 
risk score = (C=50) x (E=10) x (P=10) = 5000 
2) A low ropes course element does not use any form of spotting for its 
students: 
risk score = (C=1) x (E=1 0) x (P=6) = 60 
Obviously the assigning of scores is a subjective process but is very 
helpful in ranking faults according to seriousness. It should be kept in 
mind as a rough guide that a risk score: 
Greater than 250 indicates a condition requiring immediate correction. 
The activity should be discontinued until the hazard is reduced . 
. 90 - 250 is urgent. Requires attention as soon as possible. 
20 - 90 should be eliminated without delay, but the situation is not an 
emergency. 
The team then needs to recommend changes that will improve the 
quality of the program. These need to be realistic in terms of what the 
organization can be expected to achieve with its resources. The 
recommendations should be prioritized according to Justification Score, 
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where: 
Risk Score 
Justification score = 
----------------------------------
Cost factor X Degree of Correction 
Cost Factor 
Estimate of dollar cost and difficulty of corrective change 
Large: many thousands of dollars; difficult and lengthy . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
Moderate: hundreds of dollars; average time and effort . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Easy: very little cost; fast and simple changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Degree gf_Correction 
The degree the proposed change will eliminate or alleviate the hazard 
1 OOo/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
> 75o/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
50% - 75o/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
25o/o - 50o/o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
<25% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Examples: Consider again the examples given above in terms of the 
following recommendations. 
1) Recommend that the program 
a) Discontinues using the zip line until; 
b) A new pulley is purchased of appropriate standard, and 
a monthly inspection and maintenance program is put in place. 
Justification a) = 5000 I ((CF = 1) x (DC = 1)) = 5000 
As cost is nothing and it provides 1 OOo/o correction . 
. Justification b) = 5000 I ((CF = 5) x (DC = 1)) = 1000 
As cost is over $100 and the inspection program should completely 
solve future problems. 
2) Recommend that staff are trained in contemporary spotting techniques 
and that having students spot each other becomes an operating procedure 
for low ropes elements, written into the staff handbook. 
Justification = 60 I ((CF = 1) x (DC = 2)) = 3 0 
As the cost is minor assuming someone on the staff can instruct 
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others, and the effect these changes will have should eliminate the hazard 
more than 75o/o of the time. 
As seen from the small case history above, the priority we would 
suggest is: 
1) Discontinue zip line use until other corrections made ... 5000 
2) Buy industry standard pulley and institute monthly 
inspection and maintenance program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 0 0 
3) Train staff in spotting and write procedure into staff 
manual for low ropes course elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 
THE FINAL DEBRIEF. 
Once the summaries and recommendations are completed a final 
debrief should be held with the host program. This should include key 
program managers and safety trustees from the host program, along with 
the audit team. The team leader should chair the meeting and be 
responsible for its format. 
The purpose of this debrief is to share the observations and 
reflections of the audit team. New ideas are explained face-to-face so 
that no surprises appear in the final report. The team may wish to reword 
or withdraw certain recommendations after learning more about a 
particular subject in the debriefing. 
As the team leader reviews the observations and recommendations 
in each category, the points for improvement should be balanced by things 
the program is doing well. It is helpful to remind the host program 
several times during the meeting that there are too many positive points 
to comment on them all. 
Generally the audit team and the host organization should be able to 
agree on reasonable recommendations to address the problems observed. 
The audit team must be cognizant of their duty to the public to assure 
safety and should not back down on making tough recommendations, 
including closure or postponement of programs, if this is felt necessary. 
THE FINAL REPORT. 
The team leader incorporates comments and notes from all the 
auditors into a final report containing a prioritized list of 
recommendations for improvement in safety as discussed above. There 
should be a narrative account of exactly which elements of the host 
program were observed and audited. 
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A typical format for the final report is: 
* statistics of the audit; place, dates, team members, etc. 
* overview of the scope of the organization's operations. 
* improvements needed in safety management. 
* narrative of what the review team did and did not look at. 
* summary sheets from each part of the audit. 
Because there is the possibility that the report could be used as 
evidence in legal proceedings, broad criticisms and opinions that are not 
related to facts or observations should be avoided. The report must not 
contain judgmental phrases, instead it should contain reported 
observations, and reasonable inferences based on these. 
Improvements that the audit team considers need to be made should 
be grouped under three headings: Required, recommended and suggested. 
The contents of each should be obvious. 
In phrasing improvements consider what will be an acceptable 
response. If there are several satisfactory solutions to the problems 
identified, then give the program some latitude and ownership in coming 
up with the solution that works best for them. It is appropriate, if many 
solutions exist, to phrase the improvement required so that the problem is 
stated and the degree of correction required is also stated. How they 
choose to meet these criteria can be up to them. 
e.g. "Students were observed while rock climbing belaying in such a way 
that the control rope was rarely in a locked-off position. This could 
result in a long fall for the climber and/or rope burn for the belayer. The 
program should adopt and teach a method for belaying where the rope is 
locked-off for the maximum period of time. This technique should be 
documented in the staff handbook." 
If only one response is acceptable, then the specific course of action 
should be recommended. 
e.g. "When students are climbing at Shaky Rock Crag they should all wear 
helmets. This should be a policy in the staff handbook". 
These guidelines should help to provide you and your audit team with 
the necessary information to conduct a quality audit, producing valuable 
feedback for the host program. 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary ~responsibilities fQLsafety audits 2.. 
Audit Team Leader: 
1 . Sets dates with host program 
2. Selects audit team members 
3. Discusses issues for audit with host program 
4. Sends orientation materials to team members 
5. Arranges transport and accommodation with host program 
6. Designs audit schedule 
7. Coordinates actual audit 
8. Leads final debrief 
9. Writes final report 
1 0. Sends report draft to team members for approval 
11 . Sends report to host program 
Host Program: 
1 . Sets dates with review team leader 
2. Approves audit team members 
3. Provides all pertinent documents 
4. Arranges logistics of audit 
5. Assigns a guide to the audit team 
6. Is available for interviews 
7. Present at final debrief 
8. Actions results of audit 
Audit Team Members: 
1. Reviews material from host program 
2. Arranges most economic transport to audit site 
3. Sends travel itinerary to team leader 
4. Takes notes on observations during the audit 
· 5. Contributes to the audit process in mature and constructive manner 
6. Contributes at final debrief 
7. Reviews draft of final report and informs team leader of approval 
and/or input 
2. This is based on information from the Outward Bound Safety Review Manual 1986. 
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Review Team Guide from Host Program: 
1. Fully briefed on audit team visit, mission, needs and logistics 
2. Serves as an advisor and guide to the audit team 
3. Present throughout entire audit visit 
Host Program Safety Committee Chair: 
1. Is informed on plans for review 
2. Contributes issues for audit team to address 
3. Briefs safety committee on the audit 
4. Arranges committee members to present for all or part of audit 
5. Attends final debrief 
6. Acts on audit recommendations 
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APPENDIX II 
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Hygiene factors ......................... . 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Motivation factors ..................... . 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statjstjcs: 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statjstjcs· 
Supportive relationships ........ · · · · · · · · summary Index 
Indicated as well done: Mean: 
Range: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Other Statjstjcs: 
Group decision making ........... · · · · · · · · · summary Index 
Indicated as well done: Mean: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Manager's performance goals ........... . 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Range: 
Other Statistics: 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statjstjcs· 
Appendices Page M74 
Staff attitudes survey: summary sheet cont. . • 
Participative approach .ln_general ...... . 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Safety: goal setting and communicating 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Safety: participative involvement ...... . 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Safety: feedback and reinforcement ..... 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Safety: outcomes ........................ . 
·Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statistics: 
.Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statjstjcs· 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statjstjcs: 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statjstjcs: 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Statistics: 
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Staff attitudes survey: summary sheet cont. . . 
Safety: program in general. ............ . 
Indicated as well done: 
Indicated as need improvement: 
Summary gt_past behavioral influences: 
Summary Index 
Mean: 
Range: 
Other Stat!stjcs· 
Percentage of staff with scores greater than 300 . . . . . . . . . . . __ o/o 
Percentage of staff with score 200- 300 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __ o/o 
Percentage of staff with score 1 00 - 200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___ o/o 
Percentage of staff with score less than 1 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . __ o/o 
Summary gt_gyalitative remarks: 
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APPENDIX Ill 
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Score Percent 
MANAGEMENT PECISION PROCESSES: 
1 Goals ..................................... . /160 0/o 
2 Accountability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1170 Ok 
3 General communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Ok 
4 Safety protocols. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1245 Ok 
5 Selection of staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 o/o 
6 Staff conditions ........................... . I 50 Ok 
7 Emergency preparedness .................... . 1200 0/o 
8 Resources ................................. . I 95 % 
9 Liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1155 Ofq 
TOTAL: ••.•••••••••••.••••••••..•••• /1 3 4 0 --~~---0 
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Safety System Audit: summary sheet cont. • • 
Score Percent 
WORK FLOW PROCESSES: 
10 Staff Orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1130 Ofo 
11 Staff training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 % 
12 Programs ................................. I 40 0/o 
13 Screening participants ..................... 1105 % 
14 Medical program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 85 0/o 
15 Personal equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... l 75 Ofq 
TOTAL: ••••••••.••••••••.••••••••••• I 6 0 0 -----'-04,_ 
HAZARD ANALYSIS PROCESSES: 
16 Current activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165 °/o 
17 Planned changes ......................... . l 8 0 ___ 0/c~q 
18 New programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 8 0 ___ 0/c~q 
·TOTAL: •••••••••.•••••••••..•.••.••• 
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Safety System Audit: summary sheet cont. • . 
Score ~ercent 
INFORMATION AND MONITORING PROCESSES; 
19 Information gathering ...................... I 65 Ofo 
20 Staff performance reviews ................. /130 Ofo 
21 Accident/incident monitoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . /260 Ofo 
22 Planned safety audits ...................... l1Q5 ob 
TOTAL: ••••••••••••••••.••.••.•••••• /56 0 --.....!~~0 
Score ~e[cent 
EQUIPMENT INSPECTIONS: 
Equipment type /215 % 
Equipment type l215 0/o 
Equipment type l215 0/o 
Equipment type l215 o/o 
Equipment type l215 0/o 
. Equipment type l215 0/o 
Equipment type /215 % 
TOTAL: ••••••••••••••••••••..•..•••• I % 
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Safety System Audit: summary sheet cont. . . 
Score ~e[cent 
INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES: 
Building or facility /120 oa, 
Building or facility /120 0/o 
Building or facility /120 0/o 
Building or facility /120 oa, 
Building or facility /120 0/o 
Building or facility /120 0/o 
Building or facility /120 % 
Building or facility /120 0/o 
Building or facility /120 0/o 
Building or facility /120 o/o 
Building or facility /120 0/o 
Building or facility l12Q 0/Q 
TOTAL: •••.••••.•....•••.••••••••••• I % 
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Safety System Audit: summary sheet cont. • . 
QUALITATIVE COMMENTS: 
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17. Planned Changes 
18. New Programs 
19. Info Gathering 
20. Performance Reviews 
21. Accident Monitoring 
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APPENDIX IV 
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Activity/event observed: 
Number of safe conditions/acts observed: 
Number of unsafe conditions/acts observed: 
Safety quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Summary of observations: 
Instructor 
Dependent 
Risk score: C __ x E __ x P __ = __ _ 
Recommendations: 
o/o 
Management 
Dependent 
% 
Justification score: Risk score + (CF __ x DC __ ) = __ _ 
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